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# 3

## AN EXPLORATION OF THE SALIENCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN PARTY MANIFESTOS

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### Introduction

With the global decline of the quality democracy for the past decade, scholars started to investigate the origins and the causes of this phenomenon. Several hypotheses have been formulated and one of them directly involves domestic and institutionalised political actors: political parties. Parties are not only viewed as the figurehead of autocratisation trends, but their varying policy positions and organisational structure might also be considered as the trigger to the decline of the quality of democracy. For instance, the seminal project ‘Varieties of Democracy’ (V-Dem) launched in 2020 its academic spin-off called ‘Varieties of Party Identity and Organisation’ (V-Party). This sub-project aims at analysing key features regarding party positions and organisations and publishing analyses focusing on recent party trends regarding populism, illiberalism or conservatism.

Similarly, this chapter aims at exploring the presence and the salience of authoritarian values among Japanese and European parties by testing specific country-level hypotheses that might explain variations of authoritarianism. The research design consists in a quantitative analysis of the content of nearly 3,000 party manifestos in Japan and 37 European countries. On average, no less than 14% of the content of these party manifestos concern authoritarian issues but one can observe important variations across countries. Besides country-level explanations of authoritarian values and a particular focus on the differences between Japanese, Eastern European and Western European parties, several control variables related to the (micro) party-level will also be included in our analyses.

This chapter is structured as follows. A first section investigates the literature on party politics by focusing on the cleavages involving party positions on authoritarian issues as well as the main policy issues related to authoritarianism. This section also stresses the existence of three main dimensions in authoritarian values before

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formulating three country-level hypotheses explaining the presence and the salience of authoritarian values among Japanese and European parties. The second and third sections focus on the methodology behind the measurement of authoritarianism in party manifestos and describe the different variables mobilised in the explanatory models. A fourth section presents the main results of the regression analyses and discusses some alternative models. A final section summarises the main findings. Overall, this chapter confirms the impact of the national context on the presence of authoritarian values in party manifestos, in particular the quality of democracy, the quality and performance of governments as well as their autonomy.

### **Section 1: Literature and hypotheses**

Scholarly works on authoritarian values in political parties often approach this research topic by referring to the concept of cleavage. Rather than directly attempting to assess the presence and importance of authoritarian values for parties, scholars tend to prefer viewing authoritarian values as part of a cleavage or a scale. Political parties are located on a policy continuum and authoritarianism ‘only’ constitutes one pole of the cleavage. In the study of party politics, one main cleavage has historically integrated authoritarianism in party positioning, often with different labels. Authoritarian values can therefore be directly found in the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage (see for instance Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1992; Evans and Heath, 1995; Hix 1999; Benoit and Laver, 2006) or together with other policy domains in the so-called GAL-TAN cleavage, that is Green – Alternative – Libertarian vs. Traditional – Authoritarian – Nationalist (see for instance Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2006; Bakker et al., 2015). Yet, both variations of the same cleavage refer to about the same list of policy issues in order to define the existence of a libertarian-authoritarian cleavage, that is mainly social order, morality, nationalism, immigration and tradition.<sup>1</sup>

Scholars have also observed that the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage poorly discusses economic and social issues and is proven difficult to be connected with the socio-economic left-right cleavage. On the contrary, and by focusing on the structure of the society or the community, the authoritarian-libertarian cleavage discusses traditional values that are at the core of the secular-religious cleavage (Marks et al., 2006) and captures party positions on society matters, including abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia (Evans and Heath, 1995; Hix, 1999). Yet, this later cleavage has lost of its importance over the last decades given the secularisation of European societies and the use of religion is now always clearly subordinated to tactical imperatives (Engeli et al., 2012; Foret, 2019). Similarly, the issue of traditional morality (or traditional values) is no longer salient as only one third of all parties across Europe discuss these issues in the European manifestos (Foret and Dandoy, 2011).

If the link between authoritarian values and tradition or religion is weakening, the same does not apply for another set of issues: those related to law and order. Law and order issues occupy an important place in party ideologies and party manifestos since the 1990s. Partly in reaction to increasing criminality figures, conservative parties transformed a – sometimes neglected – valence issue into a

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positional issue and interesting patterns of issue competition emerged in several European countries (see for instance Zedner, 1995; Wenzelburger, 2015; Konig, 2017). Based on Manifesto project data, Wenzelburger (2015) underlined significant changes of partisan positions on law and order and suggested that the increase of attention to this issue has moved parties to a more authoritarian pole.

Other policy issues that have often been studied in relation with authoritarian values are the question of national identity and nationalism – i.e. history, culture and national consciousness –, the attitudes towards immigration and the political authority (see for instance Kitschelt, 1994; Hanley, 2002; Marks et al., 2006; Benoit and Laver, 2006). However, previous studies of authoritarianism in party positions suffered many criticisms, among others that they displayed too many exceptions and few general trends, that authoritarian-related issues in manifestos were poorly salient, or that explanatory models were not frequently significant.

More recently and based on data from the Chapel Hill expert survey of 2014, Norris and Inglehart (2019) analysed authoritarian and populist parties in Europe and around the world. The authors observed that such parties reject the values of individualism, free-spiritedness, and personal liberation, which could be related to a libertarian ideology. On the contrary, authoritarian and populist parties tend to favour authoritarian values. Norris and Inglehart linked several policy items with the presence of authoritarian values in the ideology of European parties. Regarding party positions on freedoms and rights, authoritarian parties value order, tradition, and stability. Authoritarian parties are proved to be in favour of nationalism and to oppose liberal social lifestyles (for instance on homosexuality). Regarding law and order, authoritarian parties prefer strong measures to fight crime rather than the protection of civil liberties. Finally, authoritarian parties are against multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants and they oppose rights for ethnic minorities.

Based on their empirical analysis of populist-authoritarian European parties, Norris and Inglehart confirm the existence of three main dimensions in authoritarian values displayed by political parties and outlined in Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) definition of authoritarianism. A first dimension concerns the fact that parties advocate **conformity** with conventional moral norms and traditions. In a second dimension, authoritarian parties are expected to show **loyalty** to the group and its leaders, as well being intolerant towards dissent and out-groups that are perceived as a threat to in-groups. A third dimension of authoritarian values concerns parties' objectives to strengthen collective **security** against perceived group threats. In this chapter, we renamed these dimensions as conformity, authority and security dimensions.

This chapter aims to explore the presence and the salience of authoritarian values among Japanese and European parties by quantitatively analysing the content of their party manifestos, and to identify causal patterns that might explain variations of authoritarianism. Even if we decided to focus on country-level explanations of authoritarian values, several control variables related to the party-level will also be included in our models. Following Thompson (2004), we know that authoritarianism is often found in countries displaying lower levels of democracy and governance. Similarly, we believe that political parties from less democratic countries, from countries

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that show lower levels of performance regarding governance issues and from weaker countries will be more prone to adopt authoritarian values than parties elsewhere. In sum, our three hypotheses can be formulated as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- *Democratic hypothesis*: More authoritarian values are expected to be found in parties from less democratic countries.
- *Performance hypothesis*: More authoritarian values are expected to be found in parties from less performing countries.
- *Strength hypothesis*: More authoritarian values are expected to be found in parties from weaker countries.

### ~~Section 2:~~ Measuring authoritarianism in party manifestos

There are different ways of measuring party positions on cleavages and/or on specific policy issues. The most common ones rely on expert surveys and on the quantitative analysis of the content of party manifestos. The database used in this chapter relies on data collected in the framework of the Manifesto project. Data consist in quantitative information about the content of about 3,000 party manifestos drafted for the national legislative elections (lower house) in Japan and in European countries for the period 1944 to 2018.<sup>3</sup> As we focus on national legislative elections, some coded sub-national territories such as Northern Ireland are not included in the analysis. Altogether, our database contains party positions from 37 Western and Eastern European countries as well as Japan<sup>4</sup>.

The documents collected by the Manifesto project present a large variation of nature, length and content. For our analyses, we selected the manifestos that presented all three following characteristics: (1) manifestos from parties that obtained at least one seat in the national parliament (lower house); (2) manifestos longer than 50 (quasi-)sentences; and (3) manifestos with less than 50% uncodable sentences. In total, our database covers no less than 2,970 party manifestos.

The most important step in our research design is the operationalisation of our dependent variable, i.e. the measurement of authoritarianism in party manifestos. We used the Manifesto project's coding categories in order to evaluate the importance of authority, conformity and security in each coded party manifesto. This measurement of the importance of an issue relies on the concept of salience, that is the relative number (quasi-)sentences allocated to a certain topic in the party document.

While surveys have been used to measure individuals' position on the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage (Evans and Heath, 1995; Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996)<sup>5</sup>, data from the Manifesto project has often been used in order to measure authoritarianism in political parties. For instance, Hix (1999) and Bakker and Hobolt (2013) identified six policy issues that could be related to authoritarian position of parties: traditional morality, national way of life, political authority, law and order, social harmony and opposition to multiculturalism. Hix (1999) added two additional policy issues to his measurement of authoritarianism, i.e. constitutionalism and militarism. Each policy issue can be related to a precise coding category in the Manifesto project.

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The Manifesto project has also been used by scholars in order to evaluate conservatism in political parties, but sometimes in rather different ways. For instance, Benoit and Laver (2007) measured conservatism with the help of eight policy categories: militarism, freedom and human rights, constitutionalism, political authority, national way of life, traditional morality, law and order and social harmony. On the contrary, Prosser (2014) measured the same phenomenon with the same data but used fairly different policy issues to position political parties on the liberal-conservative cleavage: internationalism, centralisation, political authority, national way of life and opposition to multiculturalism.

The comparative advantage of our measurement is that it relies on a multi-dimensional approach of the authoritarian phenomenon. Based on the three dimensions of authoritarianism from Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) and Norris and Inglehart (2019), we distinguish between policy issues related to authority, conformity and security. The Appendix (Table A3.1) presents the list of coding categories from the Manifesto project that have been associated to each dimension. Another advantage comes from the inclusion of manifesto data from Central and Eastern European countries and well as more recent manifestos from other countries, as the coding for these manifestos relied on a more fine-grained codebook and allowing us to obtain a more precise picture of party position on these three dimensions.

As a result, this chapter relies on a multi-dimensional dependent variable based on the salience of authority, conformity and security issues in party manifestos, as well as the sum of all three dimensions, indicating the relative importance of authoritarianism for a given political party. On average, no less than 14% of the content of all 2,890 party manifestos concern authoritarian issues. There are important variations across countries. As there are significant differences in political culture between Western European and Eastern European countries (not to mention potential differences in the coding of the content of the manifestos), we compare parties in countries from these two geographical areas.

The mobilisation of Japanese parties can in this regard be viewed as an interesting cultural benchmark in the understanding of the observed differences across European parties: the average importance of authoritarian issues is lower in Japanese manifestos (8.8%) compared with Western European (12.8%) and Eastern European (16.3%) averages. When looking down at the three different dimensions of authoritarianism (see Table 3.1), manifestos from all three geographical areas pay relatively more importance to the issues of authority, followed by security issues and finally

**TABLE 3.1** Salience of authoritarianism in party manifestos (1944–2018)

	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Western Europe</i>	<i>Eastern Europe</i>
Authority	3.96 %	6.07 %	6.99 %
Conformity	1.01 %	3.14 %	4.35 %
Security	3.88 %	3.59 %	4.91 %
Authoritarianism	8.84 %	12.78 %	16.25 %

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conformity issues. Interestingly, our measures of the three dimensions are poorly correlated, confirming that we deal here with three independent dimensions of the same phenomenon.<sup>6</sup>

When looking at differences over time, we observe that the share of authoritarian issues in party manifestos tends to vary from 16.7% in the 1940s to 9.9% in the 1960s. Even if there are variation over time, one can hardly identify long term trends or even an increase or a decrease of authoritarian issues in recent years. In addition, one should be cautious in the analysis of such trends as the number of countries (and therefore parties) included in the database varies strongly over time. For instance, countries from Central and Eastern Europe were only added in the nineties onwards, skewing any overall look at the figures. When looking down at the three dimensions of authoritarianism (see Figure 3.1), we also barely observe time trends regarding dimensions of authority and conformity. On the contrary, the importance of the dimension of security seems to increase almost linearly since the 1960s.

### Section 3: Independent and control variables

Regarding independent variables, the first set of variables concerns the state of democracy in the country. We first include a dummy variable indicating whether the country belongs to the third wave of democracy, i.e. a country that witnessed a democratic transition between the mid-1970s until the early 1990s. We also add a variable measuring the quality of democracy. For this variable, we rely on the V-Dem data and on its electoral democracy index (*v2x\_polyarchy*).

The second set of variables concerns indicators evaluating the quality and performance of the government in the analysed countries: an indicator of the government accountability that evaluates the constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions (based on the V-Dem variable *v2x\_accountability*); an indicator of regime corruption that measures to what extent political actors do use political office for private or political gain (based on the V-Dem variable *v2xnp\_regcorr*); an indicator of clientelism that measures to what extent politics are based on clientelist relationships (based on the V-Dem




FIGURE 3.1 Share of party manifestos allocated to dimensions of authority, conformity and security (per decade)

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variable *v2xnp\_client*); and an indicator of the use of physical violence by the state, such as political killings and torture by the government (based on the V-Dem variable *v2x\_cphy*).

A last set of variable aims at measuring the strength of the state. Such variables evaluate the state authority over the national territory, i.e. what percentage of the national territory is under the effective control of the state (based on the V-Dem variable *v2svsterr*) and the state autonomy, i.e. whether the state is autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy (based on the V-Dem variable *v2svdomaut*) such as Bosnia-Herzegovina in the nineties or Austria in the early 1950s.

We also used a series of control variable at the country level. Based on a dummy variable, we used an indicator that measures the presence of a competing authoritarian party. More precisely, we evaluate whether at least one party in the party system allocates more than 20% of the content of its manifesto to authoritarianism. We also control for regime type by using a dummy variable that indicates presidential systems and we created some other dummy variables for Japan, countries from Western Europe, countries from Eastern Europe and countries that belong to the European Union (EU).

We also add a set of control variables located at the micro level and that concern party characteristics. As discussed above, ideology is a key feature of the values displayed by a party in its manifesto. A first control variable concerns party family. Parties have been clustered by Manifesto project coders into one of the ten following party families: ecological or green parties, socialist or other left parties, social democratic parties, liberal parties, Christian democratic parties, conservative parties<sup>7</sup>, nationalist parties, agrarian parties, ethnic or regional parties and special issue parties (that we recoded into ‘others’).

Second, we introduced a control variable evaluating the party position on the socio-economic cleavage. Evans and Heath (1995) proved that libertarian-authoritarian and left-right cleavages are moderately correlated at the individual level. It is not possible to use the party’s left-right position as coded by the Manifesto project as there is an overlap between this cleavage and the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage. Similarly, some coding categories used in the calculation of the ‘*rile*’ variable are to be found in our operationalisation of our dependent variable. Therefore, we opt for an alternative measurement and decided to focus exclusively on the party position regarding the economy. We therefore subtract the salience of issues related to a market economy (codes per401 and per304) from the salience of issues related to a planned economy (codes per403, per404 and per412). A positive score in this index means that the party prefers a market economy while a negative score indicates that it prefers a planned economy.

Finally, we also control for party size (party vote shares in the legislative elections), whether the party consists in an electoral alliance or if the manifesto is common to different political parties (dummy variables), for the length of the manifesto (in number of coded quasi-sentences) and for the share of the manifesto that has been actually coded into one of the policy categories (i.e. the percentage

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of codable quasi-sentences). We finally control for time (years). We used an OLS regression analysis for our models, as our independent variables are all located at the country level and as party-level variables (that are clustered into countries and would therefore require a multi-level analysis) are considered as control variables.<sup>8</sup>

### ~~Section 4:~~ Explaining the salience of authoritarian values

This chapter aims at exploring the salience of authoritarian values among Japanese and European parties and intends to tentatively explain such salience with the help of a large series of country- and party-level variables. Table 3.2 presents the results of the main OLS regression models. The first model only concerns country-level independent and control variables as well as time (election years). This last variable is positive and significant, meaning that parties tend to increase their attention to authoritarian values in recent party manifestos.

Overall, we observe that the main features of the national state do have an important impact on parties' emphasis of authoritarianism. As expected, a larger share of authoritarian issues is observed in parties belonging to less democratic countries (*Democratic hypothesis*). The link between the quality of democracy as measured by the V-Dem project and the salience of authoritarian issues is significant and negative. This effect is independent from the dynamics of democratic transition as the dummy variable for third wave democracies is also significant, meaning that fewer authoritarian values are to be found in those countries.

Interestingly, the quality and performance of the government in the analysed countries has almost no impact on party positions on authoritarian issues in these countries (*Performance hypothesis*). Variables measuring government accountability, regime corruption or the use of physical violence by the state are not associated with a higher authoritarianism. The exception is to be found in the variable measuring regime clientelism, indicating that more authoritarianism is observed in less clientelist states. Despite this weakly significant exception, we can reject our second hypothesis.

Our third hypothesis concerned the strength of the state and we expected that parties would put forward more authoritarian values in weaker states (*Strength hypothesis*). Our model indeed confirms that the state autonomy is connected with such values, but in the opposite direction: more authoritarianism is observed in countries that are autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy. Added to the fact that the variable measuring state authority over the national territory appears not significant, our third hypothesis has therefore to be rejected.

Finally, all of our country-level control variables do have an impact on authoritarian values. First, we observe that parties tend to de-emphasise authoritarianism in their manifestos when another political party is already owning this type of issues in the same party system. In that sense, party competition is negatively influencing party positions as parties decide to adopt a dismissive strategy by not addressing the issue in their manifestos (Meguid, 2008). Second, more authoritarian values are observed in parties in presidential regimes. Third, authoritarianism is less present in



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**TABLE 3.2** Explaining authoritarianism in party manifestos

<i>Variables</i>		<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Country-level	Third wave democracy	-4.608*** (0.728)	-1.900** (0.737)
	Quality of democracy	-8.568*** (2.717)	-10.99*** (2.632)
	Government accountability	1.201 (1.506)	2.423* (1.463)
	Regime corruption	-0.795 (2.347)	2.446 (2.278)
	Regime clientelism	-4.567* (2.506)	-5.708** (2.445)
	State violence	-2.793 (3.683)	-4.960 (3.494)
	Control of territory	-0.0548 (0.0448)	-0.0124 (0.0427)
	State autonomy	1.490*** (0.506)	0.930* (0.486)
	Competing authoritarian party	-8.320*** (0.394)	-7.044*** (0.380)
	Presidential regime	6.445*** (1.035)	6.410*** (0.982)
	Japan	-16.75*** (1.415)	-12.85*** (1.383)
	EU member	-1.159** (0.465)	-0.390 (0.446)
	Western Europe	-8.428*** (0.919)	-4.463*** (0.924)
	Party-level	Socialist parties	-
Social democratic parties		-	2.687*** (0.982)
Liberal parties		-	2.620*** (0.983)
Christian democratic parties		-	7.897*** (1.006)

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<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Conservative parties	-	5.795*** (1.048)
Nationalist parties	-	12.89*** (1.121)
Agrarian parties	-	5.514*** (1.186)
Ethnic parties	-	-0.848 (1.072)
Other parties	-	5.836*** (1.278)
Left-right position	-	0.0815*** (0.0276)
Size (vote share)	-	-0.0200 (0.0156)
Alliance	-	0.641 (0.692)
Manifesto length	-	-0.00170*** (0.000223)
% manifesto coded	-	0.166*** (0.0243)
Election year	0.0796*** (0.0133)	0.0757*** (0.0143)
Constant	-121.2*** (25.71)	-138.5*** (27.08)
Model summary		
Observations	2,970	2,880
R-squared	0.178	0.299
Adj. R-squared	0.174	0.292

Notes: Green party family as reference category. Standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

countries belonging to the EU and in Western European countries (compared to Eastern European countries). Authoritarian values are particularly less present in Japanese party manifestos. While we refer to this country as a benchmark to compare differences across groups of European countries, the salience of authoritarianism decreases – all things being equal – by about 16.8% in the Japanese party manifestos compared their Eastern European party counterparts.

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We ran a second model that included a large number of party-level control variables. This inclusion slightly reduced our number of cases but led to an increase of the overall explanatory power of the model. This second model confirmed our first hypothesis (*Democratic hypothesis*) regarding the impact of democracy: more authoritarianism is observed among parties in countries displaying a lower quality of democracy. Compared to the first model, this impact is even reinforced while the third wave democracy country dummy loses some of its strength (but remains significant). Once again, our second hypothesis regarding quality and performance of the government is rejected, with the exception of regime corruption leading to less authoritarian values. The model also confirms that we need to reject the third hypothesis regarding the state's strength. Finally, all previously identified control variables remain significant and have an impact on authoritarianism, with the exception of the EU country dummy.

Regarding party-level control variables, the second model indicated that the green and ecologist parties do pay less attention to authoritarian values than any other party family (with the exception of the ethnic and regionalist parties). Among those parties, nationalist parties are the ones putting forward authoritarianism in their manifestos, followed by Christian democratic parties. Interestingly, there is a small (but significant) impact of the left-right positioning of parties regarding socio-economic issues: parties on the right side of this cleavage pay more attention to authoritarian values than left-wing parties. Control variables of party size and electoral alliance are significant while more authoritarianism is observed in smaller party manifestos and in manifestos that – proportionally – contain more policy issues. Finally, the second model confirms that there is a tendency to observe more authoritarianism over time.

We have seen above that there is a significant difference between countries and parties from Western and Eastern Europe. We duplicated our analyses by distinguishing between these countries but, owing to the small number of cases (N=95), we could not test similar models for Japanese political parties. We observe completely different stories, depending on whether we explore authoritarianism in Western or in Eastern Europe.

We observe in Models 3 and 4 (see Table 3.3) that our first hypothesis regarding democracy is only confirmed for Western European countries. The dummy variable indicating third wave democracy countries remains negative and significant (the variable is absent among our Eastern European countries) while the quality of democracy has a strong and negative impact on authoritarian values. The lower the quality of democracy, the larger the salience of authoritarianism in party manifestos.

Concerning the second hypothesis on the quality and performance of governments, Eastern European countries display interesting patterns: more authoritarianism is observed in less accountable but at the same time in less clientelist states. The other two indicators of government performance remain significant. Overall, it might indicate that – in the case of Eastern European countries – our second hypothesis is partially confirmed.

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**TABLE 3.3** Explaining authoritarianism in party manifestos (West vs East)

		<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	
<i>Variables</i>		<i>Western Europe</i>	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	
Country-level	Third wave democracy	-1.491* (0.809)	-	
	Quality of democracy	-21.56*** (3.460)	4.458 (4.252)	
	Government accountability	1.619 (2.074)	-5.986*** (2.294)	
	Regime corruption	0.754 (5.721)	-2.279 (2.973)	
	Regime clientelism	-6.859* (4.164)	-14.02*** (3.280)	
	State violence	-4.419 (4.247)	1.634 (6.015)	
	Control of territory	-0.122* (0.0643)	-0.258*** (0.0808)	
	State autonomy	3.775*** (0.782)	-1.620** (0.683)	
	Competing authoritarian party	-5.417*** (0.460)	-11.19*** (0.645)	
	Presidential regime	9.182*** (1.101)	-10.78*** (2.823)	
	Party-level	Socialist parties	1.088 (1.074)	3.950 (2.941)
		Social democratic parties	3.694*** (1.071)	1.983 (2.840)
Liberal parties		2.633** (1.057)	3.709 (2.844)	
Christian democratic parties		9.500*** (1.077)	4.827 (2.936)	
Conservative parties		6.679*** (1.172)	5.212* (2.931)	
Nationalist parties		16.49*** (1.317)	8.292*** (2.907)	
	Agrarian parties	6.349***	3.526	

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	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
	(1.302)	(3.089)
Ethnic parties	-2.751**	1.216
	(1.223)	(2.890)
Other parties	7.976***	-0.0406
	(1.397)	(3.282)
Left-right position	0.0949***	0.0447
	(0.0313)	(0.0657)
Size (vote share)	-0.0624***	0.0463*
	(0.0202)	(0.0258)
Alliance	-0.190	1.205
	(1.004)	(0.931)
Manifesto length	-0.00111***	-0.00217***
	(0.000268)	(0.000384)
% manifesto coded	0.182***	-0.208***
	(0.0260)	(0.0671)
Election year	0.0929***	-0.00659
	(0.0166)	(0.0419)
Constant	-163.5***	88.89
	(30.21)	(81.41)
Model summary		
Observations	1,943	842
R-squared	0.316	0.408
Adj. R-squared	0.308	0.390

Notes: Green party family as reference category. Standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Our third hypothesis concerned the strength of the state is also confirmed for Eastern European countries. In these countries, parties put forward more authoritarian values in countries that have a poor control on their territory and in countries that are under the (semi-)control of other states regarding their domestic policy. In the case of Western European countries, parties also do slightly pay more attention to authoritarian values in those countries that have a poor control on their territory but at the same time in countries that are autonomous from other states.

Regarding control variables, we similarly observe diverging trends between the two sets of countries. Authoritarianism is higher in presidential regimes in Western Europe while it is significantly lower in Eastern Europe. Authoritarian values are also present in no less than six party families among Western European countries

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while they are basically more present only in nationalist parties in Eastern European countries. This can be explained by the fact that our reference category – green parties – is more present in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe and that they generally tend to express fewer authoritarian values compare to other party families.

Finally, and even if party size has differentiating impact depending on the sets of countries, authoritarianism is only more present among socio-economically right-wing parties in Western Europe.<sup>9</sup> Yet, both geographical areas have in common the negative impact of party competition, meaning that parties in Western and Eastern Europe pay less attention to authoritarian values when another party in the same party system emphasises such issues.

We also ran a series of alternative models, testing the same set of hypotheses but at the level of each of the three dimensions of authoritarianism (see Table A3.2 in Appendix). The model explaining the dimension of authority is proved to be weaker while the explanatory power of the models concerning the dimensions of conformity and security is higher than the overall models presented above.

Indeed, we observe that completely different dynamics are at play, depending on the dimensions. The dimensions of conformity and security seem to go in the same direction in a large series of variables (even if they are poorly correlated) while the dimension of authority presents (completely) different dynamics. For instance, state violence leads to more attention to authority issues in party manifestos while it reduces the salience of conformity and security. Interestingly, Japan party manifestos display lower levels of authoritarianism on the conformity and security dimensions than their European counterparts, while the dimension of authority appears to be non-significant. Once again, this country can hardly be considered as a benchmark between Western and Eastern European countries given the specific dynamics at play here.

However, some factors are common to all three dimensions. A poor quality of democracy is associated to an increase of attention to the three dimensions (even if the dimension of authority is not significant) and party competition has a negative impact on the content of the manifestos (meaning that the parties tend to avoid discussion on any of the three dimensions when another party is already emphasising authoritarianism). Finally, one can mention that there is an increase of attention to all three dimensions of authoritarianism over time. Rather than dismissing our previous findings, these analyses confirm that authoritarianism is indeed a multi-dimensional phenomenon that cannot be grasped by a few key variables.

### Conclusion

This chapter aimed at exploring the presence and the salience of authoritarian values among Japanese and European parties by quantitatively investigating the content of their electoral platforms. Based on the analysis of nearly 3,000 party manifestos in 38 countries, we identified causal patterns that contribute to the explanation of the variations of authoritarianism. Our models focused on country-level explanations of authoritarian values and three main hypotheses regarding the presence of such values in party manifestos have been developed.

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One of the main findings of this chapter concerns the rise of authoritarianism. While we investigated party positions over more than seven decades (1944–2018), we do not observe that authoritarian values are more present in recent party positions. A significant exception is to be found in the case of the dimension of security (and to a lesser extent, the dimension of conformity): there is a strong – and almost linear – increase of the attention that parties allocate to the security dimension of authoritarianism over the years. The case of the Japanese party Komeito, also known as the Clean Government Party, illustrates this trend. In its origins, Komeito had a negative attitude towards national security (Yakushiji, 2016). The party was for instance opposed to the right of collective self-defence and adopted a critical attitude towards the Japanese-US alliance. The conservative party began to change its attitude towards security in the 1990s and in particular after forming a coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party in 1999. The electoral platforms of Komeito reflect this trend as the party started to discuss public security and the fight against crime in its 2005 manifesto while, in its 2014 manifesto, the party focused some of its pledges on national security and defence (for instance on the control over the Senkaku Islands).

We observed that the main features of the national state do have an important impact on parties' emphasis of authoritarianism. A larger share of authoritarian issues is indeed observed in parties belonging to less democratic countries (*Democratic hypothesis*) while more authoritarianism is observed in countries that are autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy (contradicting our *Strength hypothesis*). Interestingly, the quality and performance of the government has almost no impact on party positions on authoritarian issues in these countries, meaning that our *Performance hypothesis* had to be rejected. In addition, other country-level control variables proved to have an impact on authoritarian values, such as patterns of party competition and presidential regimes.

This chapter also concluded that authoritarian values are particularly less present in Japanese party manifestos: the salience of authoritarianism decreases by about 16.8% in the Japanese party manifestos compared their Eastern European party counterparts. Similarly, different explanatory patterns have been observed when geographically duplicating the analyses. The democratic hypothesis is only confirmed for Western European countries, while more authoritarianism is observed in Eastern European countries in less accountable and less clientelist states (*Performance hypothesis*) and in countries that have a poor control on their territory and that are under the (semi-)control of other states regarding their domestic policy (*Strength hypothesis*). Concerning party-specific variables, we observed that nationalist parties (in particular in Eastern European countries) and Christian democratic parties do pay more attention to authoritarian values in their manifestos than any other party family, while parties pay less attention to authoritarian values when another party in the same party system emphasises such issues. Authoritarianism is finally more present among socio-economically right-wing parties in Western Europe.

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This chapter calls for further research. One obvious avenue of additional analyses concerns the extension of the set of countries to other geographical areas such as Asia and Latin America, and of the set of political parties to fringe parties (that are not included in manifesto databases). Research on authoritarian values would also gain by exploring further the three dimensions of authoritarianism (authority, conformity and security) whose surface has only been scratched by this chapter. We observed that our measures of the three dimensions are poorly correlated, confirming that we deal here with three independent dimensions of the same phenomenon. Different dynamics are at play depending on the dimensions and could indicate that authoritarianism in parties is less homogeneous than one might think. This chapter therefore calls for a refinement of our quantitative measurement of authoritarianism party manifestos, and, in particular, of its multi-dimensional approach of the authoritarian phenomenon.

**TABLE 3.4** Coding categories from the Manifesto project

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Coding categories</i>
Authority	Constitutionalism: Positive (per203), incl. Presidential Regime: Positive (per2031), Republic: Positive (per2032), Checks and Balances: Positive (per2033) Political Authority (per305), incl. Political Coalitions: Positive (per3055) Civic Mindedness: Positive (per606)
Conformity	Traditional Morality: Positive (per603) National Way of Life: Positive (per601) Multiculturalism: Negative (per608), incl. Multiculturalism pro Roma: Negative (per6081)
Security	Military: Positive (per104) Law and Order Positive (per605), incl. National Security: Positive (per6013)

**TABLE 3.5** Explaining authoritarianism in party manifestos (per dimension)

<i>Variables</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
		<i>Authority</i>	<i>Conformity</i>	<i>Security</i>
Country-level	Third wave democracy	2.415*** (0.577)	-3.158*** (0.405)	-1.157*** (0.262)
	Quality of democracy	-0.765 (2.062)	-7.121*** (1.448)	-3.106*** (0.936)
	Government accountability	-1.407 (1.146)	1.205 (0.804)	2.625*** (0.520)
	Regime corruption	4.480** (1.784)	-1.248 (1.252)	-0.786 (0.810)



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<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 3 Authority</i>	<i>Model 4 Conformity</i>	<i>Model 5 Security</i>
Regime clientelism	2.683 (1.915)	-4.435*** (1.344)	-3.955*** (0.869)
State violence	9.424*** (2.737)	-6.483*** (1.922)	-7.901*** (1.242)
Control of territory	-0.0650* (0.0334)	0.0464** (0.0235)	0.00627 (0.0152)
State autonomy	0.910** (0.380)	-0.638** (0.267)	0.658*** (0.173)
Competing authoritarian party	-1.261*** (0.298)	-3.174*** (0.209)	-2.608*** (0.135)
Presidential regime	6.414*** (0.769)	1.288** (0.540)	-1.291*** (0.349)
Japan	-0.151 (1.083)	-7.904*** (0.760)	-4.791*** (0.492)
EU member	-0.265 (0.349)	-0.363 (0.245)	0.238 (0.159)
Western Europe	3.300*** (0.724)	-4.313*** (0.508)	-3.451*** (0.329)
Party-level			
Socialist parties	0.900 (0.786)	0.835 (0.552)	0.469 (0.357)
Social democratic parties	-0.318 (0.769)	1.337** (0.540)	1.669*** (0.349)
Liberal parties	-1.234 (0.770)	1.275** (0.540)	2.579*** (0.349)
Christian democratic parties	-1.225 (0.788)	6.326*** (0.553)	2.797*** (0.358)
Conservative parties	-1.496* (0.821)	3.130*** (0.576)	4.161*** (0.373)
Nationalist parties	-1.602* (0.878)	9.748*** (0.616)	4.744*** (0.398)
Agrarian parties	0.804 (0.929)	2.837*** (0.652)	1.873*** (0.422)
Ethnic parties		-3.242***	1.629***

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<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 3 Authority</i>	<i>Model 4 Conformity</i>	<i>Model 5 Security</i>
0.766**	(0.840)	(0.590)	(0.381)
Other parties	-1.545 (1.001)	4.902*** (0.703)	2.480*** (0.454)
Left-right position	0.0555** (0.0216)	0.0170 (0.0152)	0.00902 (0.00981)
Size (vote share)	0.0197 (0.0122)	-0.0462*** (0.00857)	0.00648 (0.00554)
Alliance	1.338** (0.542)	-0.611 (0.380)	-0.0858 (0.246)
Manifesto length		-0.00138***	-0.000473***
0.000155*		(0.000175)	(0.000123)
(7.93e-05)			
% manifesto coded		0.0771***	0.0390***
0.0502***	(0.0190)	(0.0134)	(0.00863)
Election year	0.000551 (0.0112)	0.0250*** (0.00784)	0.0501*** (0.00507)
Constant	-4.971 (21.21)	-38.82*** (14.89)	-94.71*** (9.628)
Model summary	Observations	2,880	2,880
	R-squared	0.137	0.307
		0.307	0.332

Notes: Green party family as reference category. Standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

### Notes

- 1 At the individual level, the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage can be based on three main dimensions: freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of association and freedom to pursue one's own course of life (Evans and Heath, 1995).
- 2 In addition, these three main hypotheses can be tested for each individual dimension of authoritarianism. For instance, the dimension on security is expected to be more present in parties from weaker countries while the dimension on authority is expected to be more present in parties from less performing and weaker countries.
- 3 We used the Database Version 2019a from September 2019 (Krause et al., 2019). Data is available here: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu>.

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- 4 These countries are: Japan, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Great Britain, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
- 5 Survey items mobilized to measure authoritarianism include respect for traditional values, censorship for moral standards, tolerance for those who lead unconventional lives, homosexual relations, protest against the government and banning of non-democratic parties.
- 6 Correlation scores for authority-conformity = 0.0657; authority-security = -.1005; and conformity-security=.1665.
- 7 Even if some authors considered Christian democratic and conservative parties as belonging to the same party family (see for instance Markowski, 1997; Haupt, 2010; Engeli et al. 2012), we follow here the party family typology used in the Manifesto Project. Empirically, there are significant differences in the attention to authoritarian values in the two party families: the dimensions of authority and security are more present in the manifestos of conservative parties, while the dimension of conformity is more present in the manifestos of Christian democratic parties.
- 8 We ran alternative models including country dummies, but it did not change the observed results and it only modestly increased the explanatory power of the model.
- 9 We ran an alternative model using the social democratic parties as reference category. Our analyses (not shown) confirm that Christian democratic, conservative and nationalist parties embrace more authoritarian values than social democratic parties.

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