

Multilevel governance: a challenge for mediterranean regions

The andalusian standpoint



JORGE TUÑÓN (COORD.) | MARCELA IGLESIAS | JAVIER ROLDÁN | RÉGIS DANDOY | ANA CARMONA

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This publication is the result of work carried out over the last nine months by a multidisciplinary, eminently Andalusian research team made up of Javier Roldán (Granada University), Ana Carmona (Seville University), Marcela Iglesias (Cadiz University), and Régis Dandoy (Brussels Free University); it is also the outcome of the debates which took place in Seville, in June 2011, during the seminar: “Multilevel Governance: A challenge for Mediterranean regions”, organised by the General Secretariat for Foreign Action of the Andalusian Government Presidency Department, and the Andalusian Studies Centre Foundation.

This report is part of the Medgovernance Project for territorial cooperation, in the MED programme for interregional cooperation (2009-2011), which springs from the Transnational Cooperation chapter of cohesion politics in today’s financial perspectives for the European Union (2007-14). This project relates Andalusia especially to five Mediterranean regions: Catalonia, Provence-Alps-Côte d’Azur (PACA), the Piedmont, Tuscany and Lazio.

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Jorge Tuñón

(Carlos III University, Madrid)

Acronyms and abbreviations

AAIDC: Andalusian Agency for International Development Cooperation

AECID: Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation

AEBR: Association of European Border Regions

AER: Assembly of European Regions

AMAT: Mediterranean Workshops for Territorial Planning

AMU: Arab Maghreb Union

AREOP: Association of Regions and Origin Products

ARLEM: Euro Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly

BOE: Official State Gazette

BOJA: Official Andalusian Government Gazette

CAP: Common Agricultural Policy

CARCE: Conference for European Community Affairs

CARUE: Conference for EU-Related Affairs

CALRE: Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies

CF: Cohesion Fund

CLRAE: Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe

CLRPE: Congress of Local and Regional Powers of Europe

COPPEM: Standing Committee for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities

CoR: Committee of the Regions

CPMR: Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe

CSCE: Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSCM: Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean

DERD: Directorate for Training, Research and Development

REG-LEG: Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers

EAFRD: European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development

EAGGF: European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund

EGTC: European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation

EGWA: European Greenways Association

EIB: European Investment Bank

EMA: Euromediterranean Association

EMHRN: Euromediterranean Human Rights Network

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

ENPLAN: Environmental Evaluation of Plans and Programmes

ENRICH: European Networking Resources and Information concerning Cultural Heritage

ERDF: European Regional Development Fund

ERSAT: Regional Entity for Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance

ESF: European Social Fund

EUREGA: European Regions for Joint Actions

FEMP: Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership

FIPAC: Cultural Heritage Training, Research and Computerisation Programme

FORMAGRI: Cooperation in professional agrarian training for sons and daughters of farmers in Northern Morocco

IAPH: Andalusian Historical Heritage Institute

IDEA: Andalusian Innovation and Development Agency

IFAPA: Agrarian and Fishing Research and Training Institute

IMC: Inter-Mediterranean Commission

IMF: International Monetary Fund

MLA: Mediterranean Landscape Award

MLG: Multilevel Governance

MED: Mediterranean Space Operative Programme

NDPHS: Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being

NIP: National Indicative Programme

OAD: Official Aid for Development

OCTA: Andalusian Territorial Cooperation Observatory

OPAM: Observatory of Atlantic and Mediterranean Fisheries

PACA: Provence-Alps-Côte d'Azur

PAI: Pre-Adhesion Instruments

PCCIAM: Andalusian-Moroccan Agrarian Research Cooperation Project

PFEA: Agrarian Employment Promotion Programme

PIC-RM: Community Initiative Projects-Mediterranean Regions

PLATFORMA: European Platform of Local and Regional Authorities

POCTEP: Spanish-Portuguese 2007-2013 Operative Programme

POCTEFEX: Spain-External borders 2008-2013 Operative Programme

R&D&I: Research, Development and Innovation

RECEP-ENELC: European Network of Local and Regional Entities for the Implementation of the European Landscape Convention

REG-LEG: Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers

ReTSE: Transfrontier Network of Business Services

RIM: Network of Mediterranean Institutes

RMP: Renewed Mediterranean Policy


SME: Small and Medium Enterprises

SUDOE: Southwestern European Space Operative Programme

TMC: Third Mediterranean Countries

UCLG: United Cities and Local Governments

UfM: Union for the Mediterranean



Introductory framework

Jorge Tuñon

Situated in the south of the Iberian Peninsula, south of the south, on the edge of Europe, Andalusia is, at the nearest point, over three hundred kilometres from the Spanish capital, Madrid, and about eighteen hundred from Brussels, the European capital. It is made up of eight provinces: Almeria, Jaen, Granada, Cordova, Malaga, Seville, Huelva and Cadiz, with 770 townships in all. Andalusia is not just another region: It is one of the most representative within its nation. In size, it is the second largest of the Spanish regions; its 87,597 square kilometres take up 17% of the national area, and it is larger than fourteen of the twenty-seven states in the European Union: in fact Andalusia and Portugal are roughly the same size. With its not inconsiderable population of over 8,300,000, Andalusia is one of the most populated regions in Europe; in fact it has more inhabitants than eleven European Union countries.

Andalusia enjoys a privileged geostrategic situation. Opposite the African coast, only fourteen kilometres away over the Straits of Gibraltar, Andalusia is the only European region whose shores are open both to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Andalusia is a border region. Besides our western border with Portugal, Andalusia is, together with the Canary Islands, the natural border between Europe and Africa. Being the natural southern gateway, however, has turned out to be more a responsibility than a privilege. Because of this, and also because of our position as an obvious international trade route, Andalusia,

in spite of being on the edge of Europe, is one of the most important regions for the Spanish government and for the whole Mediterranean.

At this point in History, when the idea of nation-state is being reformulated, different decentralisation processes are taking place, and the European Union (EU) is taking over new competences as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, Andalusia, in spite of her limitations, needs to explore the ways she can influence the European integration process, and also the building of a new Mediterranean area based on stability, peace and progress. It is no secret that Europe and the Mediterranean are now Andalusia's most decisive dimensions.

There are indeed specific conditions, sometimes not exactly positive, which limit or pre-determine both the European and the specifically Mediterranean dimension; on the other hand, the fact that Andalusia belongs to the EU and also to Mediterranean governance is undoubtedly beneficial. In fact, Andalusia feels not only identified with both projects (which are obviously interdependent and interconnected) but also remarkably grateful to them, politically, socially, culturally and economically. The fact that we belong to the EU has made possible the integration of Andalusia in a framework which conditions her political action, but also ties the public powers to criteria of democratic participation, transparency, efficacy, efficiency and evaluation of public policy, all of which strengthen both her legitimacy and public approval. The European principles of economic

and social cohesion (including the border regions of Europe, most of the non-EU Mediterranean regions among them, through projects such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and transnational and transfrontier cooperation) have consolidated regional convergence at higher levels (but not yet high enough) of economic development.

For over two decades, Andalusia has been enjoying the benefits of belonging to the framework of European integration, and also of taking part in successive efforts for Mediterranean integration, some of which have stemmed from the former, and others on her own initiative (as to regional acceptance of the need to cooperate with our southern neighbour, Morocco), as a legislatively capable region which has her own Autonomy Statute, her own administration, her own Parliament, and her own sub-state government. All these must be seen within a very special context. Pre-constitutional Spain was one of the most centralised states in Europe. However, within less than a decade, the unexpectedly successful decentralisation process was complete. The death of Franco in 1975, the widely acclaimed political transition, with highlights such as the 1977 Moncloa Pacts, the Constitution of 1978, still in force, and the different Autonomy Statutes (including Andalusia's, approved in 1981 and renewed in 2007) for each of the seventeen autonomous regions, have made Spain one of the countries which transfer most competences to sub-state entities, comparable to federal states such as Germany, Austria or Belgium.

Through the so-called Third Level strategy, the State of Autonomies has allowed Spanish sub-state entities to participate, however limitedly, in certain aspects of International Law (as long as there is no conflict with the Spanish State) and in EU decision-making processes. The aim of allowing foreign action to the different Autonomous Regions (ARs) strengthens the exercise of their competences; instrumental usefulness is the right way to look at it, beyond those few cases in which the possibility of conflict cannot be denied. In the case of Andalusia, as of other ARs which have passed "new generation" statutes, both the constitutional and the autonomous frameworks offer different options for fully legitimate foreign action, both indirect, through participation in State foreign policy, and direct action carried out by agents belonging to the autonomous institutional system.

In this sense, regarding the executive power, we have witnessed the consolidation of different practices in foreign policy, at an Andalusian regional level. Official visits, cooperation in development and the signing of agreements or partnerships with other European or non-European regions or states; participation in different forums for inter-regional association and cooperation, and increasing direct and indirect interaction with European institutions such as the Council of Ministers, the European Commission or the Committee of the Regions: Andalusia participates not only on the receiving end, as the scene or arena for European policy coming down from European decisions, but is also an agent in the upward phase of the process.

Our integration in Europe has doubtless had consequences for Spanish society, but even more for Andalusia. The impact of Andalusian integration in Europe is not just a matter of “an incoming flow of capital for the development of certain areas; membership in the EU has also affected the design of the autonomous administrations, the elaboration and implementation of public policy, the ways and means in which different stakeholders participate in the political process; in short, it has affected the manner of governing which has gradually been adopted according to the European governance model” (Fernández y Mota, 2009: 14), all of which means that Andalusia has a role in the governing of Europe.

On the one hand, the inclusion of Spain in the EU has been a true lifesaver for the Andalusian economy, thanks to European cohesion funds, and also thanks to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); on the other, the reception of these funds has triggered remodelling and adaptation in many autonomous structures, which needed to respond to the new European political framework. In this sense, the European dimension of Andalusia has been included in the new 2007 Autonomy Statute, which clearly distinguishes two stages in the participation of Andalusia in the European process: an upward stage, highlighting our role in conforming state will and state representation in European forums, and a downward stage by which the Autonomous Community (AR) assumes competences in the application of European law, and for the implementation of European policy.

For the past two decades at least, Andalusia has been driving foreign action within the EU, comparably in some instances to other important nation-conscious ARs such as the Basque Country or Catalonia; however, Andalusia’s foreign action has not enjoyed the same symbolic meaning as the other cases mentioned. In this sense, the Andalusian European impulse, the same as in the case of many other ARs, has been based on a confluence of factors derived from the participation of Spain in the European integration pro-

cess, an international political situation open to the participation of sub-state entities in affairs of international relevance, the gradual widening of Constitutional Court jurisprudence, and also the shaping of Andalusian foreign action, similar to that of other European regions.

Not only the famous and paradigmatic Basque Country sentence of 26 May 1994, by which the Constitutional Court legalised *de facto* the practice of establishing regional delegations in Brussels, but also the fact that Spain is not the only country divided into regions with legislative capacities (some of the most relevant European countries have similar systems, including Germany, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom), have made it possible for Andalusia and the other ARs to have a say in foreign action. So the successive conquests in Andalusian foreign action have been a consequence of the need for international expression, for the defence of Andalusian interests in view of Andalusian socioeconomic circumstances.

Although Andalusian foreign or international action, in relation to Europe and the Mediterranean, has not enjoyed the same symbolic charge as in the case of other Spanish ARs or European regions, and has not triggered conflicts or controversy about what aspects of international relations should be reserved for the State, Andalusia’s relations with the rest of the Mediterranean and with Europe have been marked by her condition as a peripheral actor, but also as a main arena for the implementation of European policy, with influence not only in Andalusian territory but also in her nearest partners.

As to the exclusively international dimension of Andalusia’s foreign action, it is set down in Chapter IV on “Foreign Action” of Title IX which refers to “Institutional Relations of the AR”, in the new Andalusian Autonomy Statute of 2007. Articles 240-244 cover international treaties and conventions (240), cooperation agreements (241), participation in international organisms (242), cultural relations with other countries (243) and

participation in different forums and venues (244). Chapter V on "Development Cooperation", in the same title, also covers some powers which clearly exceed the above competence title and which are obviously related to the question of "Foreign Action": we are referring particularly to interregional and cross-border cooperation (246) and also "coordination of foreign action in matters of cooperation" (247).

Within this sphere of regional activity and strategy at international level. Andalusia is extremely active in Mediterranean dynamics, and uses many different resorts for mobilisation and participation. Andalusia belongs to different networks and interregional associations, and subscribes bilateral cooperation agreements; she also places delegations abroad, promotes visits at the highest institutional levels, and also with specifically commercial aims; however, she never forgets her traditional political priorities across the ocean in Latin America, and around the Mediterranean which washes her shores.

In the last few years, Andalusia has been a part of different networks, interregional associations and bilateral cooperation agreements, as we shall see in the second chapter: among others, the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Congress of Local and Regional Powers of Europe (CLRPE), the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers (REGLEG), and the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE) which includes the Parliaments of the 74 REG-LEGs.

For a long time, but especially during the last ten years, Andalusia has subscribed a series of bilateral agreements with different foreign institutions, most importantly with the Algarve, the Alentejo, Tuscany, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur and Poitou-Charentes. Andalusia has also had the opportunity to subscribe different agreements with foreign public powers, under the form of conventions, protocols or non-normative agree-

ments, with states such as Morocco, El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, preferably in areas such as economy, health, the environment or agriculture. And as we shall see in the third chapter of this report, Andalusia has also signed different multilateral agreements for cross-border, transnational and international cooperation. Among these, for the 2000-2006 period, we may cite those derived from the application of the different INTERREG III A European programmes: "Spain-Portugal: the Andalusia-Algarve-Alentejo sub-programme" and "Spain-Morocco"; those included in INTERREG III B, such as "Western Mediterranean" (Portugal, Spain, France and the United Kingdom), the "Atlantic Area" (those above plus Ireland) or "South-western Europe" (Portugal, Spain, France and the United Kingdom); lastly, those derived from INTERREG III C, such as the "Southern Area", which also includes Andalusia. Within the current 2007-2013 period, Andalusia also participates, within the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy, in the "Mediterranean Basin 2007-2013" programme; in the sphere of European Territorial Cooperation, Andalusia cooperates with Morocco through the ERDF-funded POCTEFEX programme, and also participates in the "2007-2013 Spanish-Portuguese Cross-border Cooperation" programme, in the "MED", "SU-DOE" and "Atlantic Area" programmes, and in INTERREG IV C.

Within the framework of European regional integration in the Mediterranean area, we must now devote some attention to a specific programme of which Andalusia is a part: Medgovernance. This programme, which was promoted by Tuscany together with the Network of Mediterranean Institutes, the regions which belong to it (Andalusia and Tuscany, of course, and Lazio, the Piedmont, Catalonia and PACA) and the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, was approved in the MED 2007-2013 Interregional Cooperation Programme, with the aim of preparing political recommendations for including regional authorities in the design and implementation of Mediterranean

policies. The project, which the present report is a part of, started in 2009, and its aim is to analyse, from the perspective of the different levels of government, the contribution of the regions to Mediterranean governance in five specific areas: transport, competitiveness and innovation, the environment, culture and immigration.

Besides all these specific instances, Andalusia's foreign action has been using the traditional means of international mobilisation such as the establishment of delegations abroad, visits and other events for commercial and cultural promotion, all of which make up a good part of Andalusian foreign extension activities. The Andalusian Public Enterprise for Tourism, the Andalusian Agency for Foreign Promotion (EXTENDA), and other institutions dedicated to cultural and social matters, together with official visits by different Andalusian Government officials, mainly the President or autonomous counsellors, all work towards the commercial, economic, institutional and representative promotion of Andalusia.

We cannot, in any case, forget the main interests of Andalusian foreign action, quite apart from the EU standpoint. Andalusia has traditionally exhibited certain strategic priorities, at a world-wide level, centred on the Mediterranean and on Latin America. Besides our privileged relations with Latin America, due to historical, cultural and migratory reasons, and which would merit a research project of their own, the Mediterranean is doubtless of priority interest for Andalusia. The Mediterranean is, after all, "the meeting place of east and west, the most unequal north-south border in the world, and the gateway through which the migratory flow of all Africa tries to gain Europe", making it the geopolitical area whose development "could most affect Andalusia in the next few years" (Ojeda, 2008: 148). The fact that Andalusia is situated on the southern border or gateway of Europe, with a wide coast on the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic, both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar, and is the bridge between Europe and the Maghreb, all dictate the

preference of Andalusia for the Mediterranean axis, as a priority option for foreign action. So it is vital, from the Andalusian standpoint, for Spain and the EU, within their Neighbourhood Policy, to develop and implement inclusive, effective policies for aid for sustainable development in the area, thus contributing to prosperity and stability. However, if we bear in mind that Andalusia, as a European region and as a Spanish autonomous region, has limited capacities and possibilities for action, it may be unrealistic to try to influence such a large area as the whole Mediterranean basin (the second chapter will mention the difficulty of understanding the Mediterranean as a single area for action, or macro-region); up to now, most of Andalusian foreign action in the Mediterranean is absorbed by Morocco, which as our main partner is the object of the majority of visits, projects, etc. It must also be said that, even in the case of Morocco (our very special relations with Morocco will be thoroughly analysed in chapters three and four), it is very difficult to distinguish between specific Andalusian aims and those of general Spanish foreign policy; the actions of the Andalusian Government are very often complementary to those of the Spanish State.

We will therefore try to analyse and explain why and how Andalusia has been taking part in the governing of the Mediterranean basin, not only as an arena for the implementation of agreements and policies at different levels, but also as a privileged stakeholder. In this sense, our aim is to examine Andalusian interaction within the Mediterranean sphere, from and under the attentive gaze of the Medgovernance project, starting from a threefold complementary dimension. The second chapter will therefore analyse the decisive role played by regions in general, and Andalusia in particular, within the specific sphere of multilevel governance in the Mediterranean. The third chapter will dissect the Mediterranean area, as the traditional scene of regional relations and interaction, both north and south of the *Mare Nostrum*. Preceding the fifth section, which offers a conclusive framework,

including challenges and suggestions for future and necessary action, the fourth chapter will analyse priority actions both in Andalusia and the Mediterranean in general, from the double standpoint of interregional cooperation in the Mediterranean (with special attention to Medgovernance) and the EU's 2020 Strategy project for the Mediterranean regions.

Our first thematic block (Chapter 2: *The decisive role of the different regions and of Andalusia in particular, within Mediterranean multilevel governance*) will look into current issues such as the exercise of a Third Level of government by the regions, within the EU framework, a level of government which is conditioned by political and institutional differences, and by the asymmetrical powers among European and Mediterranean regions. We shall analyse the new regional interaction frameworks; at different levels, we shall look into institutions as relevant as the Committee of the Regions, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, the Group of Regions with Legislative Powers, the Association of European Border Regions, or the Assembly of European Regions, among others. Besides looking into the role of Mediterranean regions in the multi-level governance scheme, we shall analyse the profusion of different new Mediterranean cooperation projects, which will either complement or substitute the original Working Communities and Euroregions. We are referring to the possible implementation of the recent European Groupings for Territorial Cooperation, and also to the viability of that much-talked-about, hypothetical Mediterranean macro-region, in the image of those other experiences evaluated and contrasted at EU level, such as the Baltic or Danube Region Strategies.

The next thematic block in the present volume (Chapter 3: *The Mediterranean area: A traditional*

scene of regional relations and interaction) will consist of: the historical evolution of regional relations in the Mediterranean, from a threefold scale comprising the Mediterranean as a whole, the regions which belong to the Medgovernance project, and Andalusia itself; European regional integration within the Western Mediterranean, with special reference to political and technical decentralised cooperation actions, among the aforementioned Medgovernance regions; and also cross-border cooperation between the Northern and the Southern Mediterranean, with special attention to our necessary, privileged relations with Morocco, and with a closer look at the specific dimensions of the programmes, and some of the most representative and successful projects already implemented. In conclusion, reference will be made, in the shape of recommendations, to the main obstacles, the way to get over them, and how to try to overcome the greatest challenges now facing regional integration in the Mediterranean.

Apart from Chapter 5, which will be an eminently practical conclusion to the book, and will analyse the weaknesses, menaces, strengths and opportunities for Mediterranean integration, in the area as a whole, in the Medgovernance regions and in Andalusia in particular, the last thematic block of the volume (Chapter 4: *Mediterranean and Andalusian cooperation and priority actions within the framework of the 2020 Strategy*) analyses, from the dual standpoint of cooperation in the Mediterranean within the 2020 Strategy, some of the more specific priorities for action: the relation between the Medgovernance project and the 2020 Strategy; priority cooperation areas for the European Mediterranean regions, and for Andalusia in particular; or the specific interests of Andalusian foreign action in the Mediterranean. The special relation and the particular interests of Andalusia in Morocco will again be especially relevant in these last two paragraphs mentioned, linking the whole again to Chapter 3.



The image features a solid orange background. A large, white, sans-serif number '2' is positioned on the right side. To the left of the number, there is a rectangular area with a cross-hatch or diamond pattern in a slightly darker shade of orange. This patterned area is divided into two horizontal sections: the top section is wider and shorter, while the bottom section is narrower and taller, creating a stepped effect that frames the number '2'.

2

**The decisive
role of the
different regions,
particularly
Andalusia, in
mediterranean
multilevel
governance**

Régis Dandoy, Ana Carmona and Jorge Tuñón

2.1.

Today's multilevel governance framework: regions as a third governance level in the European Union



2.1.1. Regions as a third governance level in the European Union

The idea of a Europe of regions is not new: it came up decades ago, even prior to the birth of the EU. It originally had a strong ideological charge, as an alternative to politics based exclusively on the nation-state as the political, territorial, ideological and self-defining unit for the European continent. However, the surprisingly quick regionalisation process of European politics at the end of the eighties, and increasing regional participation both in European programmes and in UE constitutional reforms, have reawakened the desire in sub-state entities to assume a leading role.

Consequently, during the past few years we have been starting to accept the idea of a Europe of regions, a more and more integrated Europe who-

se political and administrative structure is not based on regions, but nevertheless cannot fail to take them into account. The many, deep regional and federal reforms which have taken place in Europe on one hand, the EU initiatives towards larger scopes in democracy and pluralism on the other, plus the idea of a gradual decrease in efficacy in the nation-state model, have given way to the ideal atmosphere for the flourishing of *third level politics*. According to third level theory, sub-state authorities are increasingly important in the European system, as they have the power to develop a whole new range of capacities, and enjoy a certain status in the institutional structure of the Union. The expression third level refers to the action and involvement of sub-state units wi-

thin the EU, together with European institutions (*first level*) and those belonging to nation-states (*second level*).

Although many regional government-level claims have not yet been attended to, the existence and the importance of third-level government, below the EU and the nation-states, cannot be denied. The third level is closer to the citizens, and is often more useful and efficient for the development of community politics. That is why interaction between third level and multilevel governance (MLG) is obvious. MLG is an interpretative scheme, an abstract model of the changing relations between the different levels of power within the EU, meaning basically that Europe is governed at different, interconnected levels, of which the sub-state level is the third.

It is useful to apply the concept of governance to the EU, in order to explain the complexity of the European political system, based on its own legal system, institutional balance, and cooperation, interdependence and interaction among the different powers at different levels. European governance, in short, substitutes a linear, hierarchical, vertical model for a circular one based on plural, multilevel participation and on negotiation and interaction among the stakeholders and the networks involved (Rojo Salgado, 2006). The EU will have to reorganise itself, with greater attention to the principles of proportion and subordination, in the light of criteria such as aperture, participation, responsibility, efficacy and coherence. So regions and local entities must have access to the first debating stages of European policies.

MLG means upwards power transference, towards the EU, and downwards, to the sub-state entities, so the central states still make the essential decisions, but share powers with the other two levels, bestowing a greater recognition on the regions. The novelty in MLG is precisely the regional government level, which not only has turned out to be the strategic ally of institutions such as the European Commission, but also the adequate level for introducing new policy con-

cepts and new ways of implementation. Regionalisation brings European decision-making closer to the citizens, and also expresses more authentically the plurality of identities living together in the EU. The regionalisation of the EU, far from being an obstacle, balances the supranational integration process or continentalisation.

The continuous, growing mobility of the European regions in relation to Brussels is proof of the dawn of the regional phenomenon at a continental scale, or third level institutionalisation, which took place officially in 1993 under the Treaty of Maastricht. The European capital has therefore become the ideal place for regional lobbying, through different direct channels, or indirectly through the Member States, in order to influence European decisions. Neither the position nor the claims of the regions are now the same as they were in the past. Regional priorities have changed, due to the fact that some claims have granted (participation in the Council, creation of the Committee of the Regions). Current claims refer to European-level guarantees for regional autonomy, access to the European Court of Justice, or the reform of participation mechanisms (Domínguez García, 2005).

The EU is therefore a multilevel governance system, in which different stakeholders belonging to different institutional levels participate formally and informally. So the EU is no longer just a matter of States: sub-state entities have acquired a certain power quota. The regions have not substituted the states, but take part together with them in the decision-making process, although not with the same weight or as extensively. Regions with legislative powers (their own sub-state Parliament and Government) have been claiming their place as the third step in EU government, below the European government and the governments of the member nations.

Claims for a "Europe with the regions" rather than the old "Europe of the regions" have become more realistic in the Lisbon Treaty context; but the existence and the importance of the third Euro-

pean governance level, below the European and national state governments, cannot be denied. This regional step is doubtless closer to the citizens, and therefore more efficient both in the proposal and the implementation of Union policies: There must obviously be interaction between the

third level and multilevel governance. The idea implies, basically, that Europe is governed at different, interconnected levels, of which the third is the sub-state level. In this sense, the regions with legislative capacities have a promising future ahead as a counter-power in Europe.



2.1.2. Regionalisation models and formulae in southern Europe: political and institutional differences and assymetric powers

Spain

Spain is now a EU Member State, made up of regions and nationalities. So it is: Spain has been defined as a clearly identifiable country of countries, nation of nations. In spite of its social and cultural cohesion, necessary for the structure of Spanish unity, internal rivalries are evident. In fact, the second article of the 1978 Spanish Constitution recognises and guarantees that the nationalities and regions which make up the State have a right to their autonomy, and also that they all support each other. Even so, due to the moment in History in which our Constitution was approved, it refers euphemistically to a decentralised State, and avoids the word “federation”. The quasi-liberal philosophy the text is based on has, notwithstanding, been largely noted (Moreno, 1997 and 2008).

Over 45 million inhabitants, with their different nationalities, identities, regional cultures and official languages, share about half a million square kilometres, divided into 17 autonomous regions. Castilian is the official language of the Kingdom

of Spain, but Catalan, Basque and Galician are co-official in their respective communities, the so-called “historical nationalities”. Besides, a certain percentage of citizens, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia, do not consider themselves Spanish and, at the same time, strong feelings of regional identity are growing in some ARs such as Andalusia, the Balearic Isles, the Canary Islands and Valencia (Tuñón, 2010 and 2011). An essential factor in favour of decentralisation has traditionally been the ample economic differences between the more developed northern peripheral regions and the more backward Centre and South of the Peninsula, always excepting Madrid.

The present constitutional Spain has been a democratic reality for only just over three decades. After a long, hyper-centralised dictatorship (1939-75), a peaceful transition to democracy (1975-79) and active involvement in Europe after becoming a EU member in 1986, Spain has undergone some deep changes as a multinational state in modern times.

The need for a new territorial state organisation forced the different stakeholders into a pact for an overall solution that could overcome the residual, excessively centralised structure left over from the dictatorship. A new, decentralised model was called for, with room for peripheral claims to self-government. Just one year later, the first regional governments of Catalonia and the Basque Country came into being. However, within the framework of the so-called “free for all” strategy, these first experiences in regional government produced a domino effect on other regions which had never been strongly region-conscious. By 1983, in only five years, all the Spanish ARs had come into being, as a consequence of the power derived from the basic institutional law of each one of them, the Autonomy Statute. These statutes are, as explained in Article 147 of the Spanish Constitution, organic laws recognised by the State as part of its legal order. At the beginning of the eighties (less than a decade after the dictator’s death), all of Spain was profusely regionalised, except for the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, autonomous cities which would reach their special autonomous statutes in 1995.

Once the decisive, constituent stage of the State of Autonomies was finished, a second, consolidation stage began during the second half of the century’s first decade. It consists essentially of the approval and coming into effect of a second generation of regional statutes. This second phase, however, is not over yet. Some regional parliaments (those of Andalusia, Balearic Isles, Extremadura, Castile and Leon and Aragon) have already passed their new statutes, but the Spanish parliament has not considered it advisable to pass some of them for the time being. Through a controversial and long-awaited sentence, the Spanish Constitutional Court has even rejected as unconstitutional some articles included in the Catalanian statute (which had already been passed by both the Catalanian and the Spanish parliaments). The second stage of the State of Autonomies is not yet finished, and will still need some time before it is definitely concluded and closed (Tuñón, 2010: 41-42).

The current Spanish competence model distinguishes three types of powers: those held exclusively by the ARs, those held by the State, and those shared by both. All the ARs enjoy executive and legislative competences in the following areas: town planning, housing, the environment, the regional language (only in some cases), sport, social policy, health and hygiene, and commercial seaports and airports. On the other hand, the State holds exclusive powers on matters reserved by Article 149 of the Constitution, in order to ensure national unity and sovereignty: immigration, defence, the national currency and international relations.

But the State and the ARs can also share the exercise of powers in two ways: the State can keep the legislative power over a certain matter, whilst the ARs hold the executive power; or the State can take care of the basic regulation about some matter, and the ARs develop the law on the same. The State, furthermore, enjoys three additional clauses: the residual clause, by which it holds all powers not included in the Autonomy Statutes; the prevalence clause, as to regulation or intervention in shared affairs; and a supplementary clause which establishes the validity of State law in order to avoid normative vacuum (Rodríguez Drincourt, 2006).

The distribution of powers clearly shows the asymmetries in the autonomous organisation, derived from the modes of access to autonomy by the different ARs. Territorial asymmetry is the result of the confluence of three factors: the historical heritage of a strongly centralised State; the recognition of the right to self-government for the so-called *historical nationalities*; and the opportunity of decentralisation given to the rest of the regions which aspired to their own autonomous governments.

From the beginning of the decentralisation process, *de iure* and *de facto* differences have been an additional stimulus for the competitive nature of political relations within the State of Autonomies. As a result, we have historical nationalities (Cata-

lonia, Galicia and the Basque Country); an Article 143 nationality (Valencia); Article 143 communities; a statutory community (Navarre); and insular councils (Balearic and Canary Islands).

There are some very specific powers which only some ARs enjoy: Navarre and the Basque Country have assumed larger fiscal competences, Catalonia and the Basque Country have their own police forces, the Canary Islands have their own fiscal regime; consequently, cooperation mechanisms have been triggered, for the participation of some sub-state entities in defence of the national standpoint at a European level, up to a point unheard of even in other federal organisations.

Italy

The question of regionalism or the gradual federalisation of Italy came up during the *Risorgimento*; back then, the problem was how to reconcile and integrate the different peoples and the different cultures of the Italian Peninsula. Federalist claims (lately taken up by the Northern League) greatly influence the main Italian political parties. The regionalisation of Italy, which began in the mid-seventies, and which has meant a constant, gradual increase in power for the regions, has been an unplanned, incoherent process in which reforms come into being prior to legislation. So the irregular, inconstant Italian regionalisation process is not over yet, and is an example of quick, asymmetric, unsystematic evolution of forms of government.

There had been no real regional reform in Italy up to the administrative decentralisation process which took place after World War II, and the 1948 Constitution which is still in effect. Since then, Italian regional reform has gone through different stages. From 1947 to 1970 there was a minimalist approach to regional reform. From 1970 to the early 80s there was a maximalist approach. There was a third phase in the eighties. And the current stage, from 1990 onwards, has been very prolific in legislative reforms.

The recent Italian constitutional reform in matters of territorial policy defines Italian regionalism as a gradual, asymmetric process of return of powers from the central to the sub-state entities. The system is still open, as it has to be approved, step by step, as the new regional statutes are passed. It is up to the regions to adopt homogeneous or

heterogeneous statutes. Right now, the regional statutes are practically identical to the governmental structures of the ordinary regions, but asymmetrical as to the special regions. Asymmetry in Italian regionalism is not only a consequence of historic events, political negotiations and the existence of minority groups, but a constitutional right for some regions and now an opportunity for all of them, an opportunity which will result in a highly asymmetrical regional system, clearly inspired, in its structures and in its procedures, in the Spanish model (Palermo, 2005).

So the Italian territorial system is highly regionalised, and governance takes place at different levels. The 8,100 municipalities, 103 provinces and 20 regions which make up Italy, make for many different levels of government and a "complex sub-national level". Italy is made up of two different types of region. The five "special" regions (the Aosta Valley, Trentino-Alto Adigio, Venice-Friuli-Giulia, Sardinia and Sicily) possess individual regional constitutions on the same level as the Italian Constitution (Article 116). These regions theoretically enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than the other Italian regions. The fifteen "ordinary regions" are regulated by "ordinary statutes", according to Title V of the Italian Constitution.

The fact that Italy's regional system is markedly asymmetrical has three basic constitutional and political consequences, from the standpoint of our research project: (1) The importance of the political perception of the level of sub-state self-government; (2) After the legal reforms, a markedly procedural, conflictive kind of regionalism has gradually been developing; (3) Many of the exclusive powers held by the State are not strictly speaking competences, a fact which, depending on the development of Italian regionalism, may substantially limit the sphere of regional self-

government or, on the contrary, make regional differences fit together.

Each region has a deliberative assembly, the *Consiglio*, with 30 to 80 members, elected through proportional representation. The President of the *Consiglio* is elected either by the same regional representation forum or directly by the regional electors. In any case, the President leads the regional *Giunta*, responsible for the administrative functions transferred by the central government. Regional responsibilities are outlined in the reformed Title V of the Italian Constitution: Article 117 limits the power of regional governments. Regional competences include local police, health, town planning, tourism, agriculture, and other constitutional functions delegated through constitutional laws. Article 118 complements the former, with administrative powers at regional level. However, Article 119 of the Italian Constitution is potentially the most important for the regions, as it guarantees their "financial autonomy", even if only "within the limits established by the laws of the Republic, which coordinate said autonomy". This article also guarantees regional taxes, as quotas of state taxes "according to each region's needs". In practice, however, the central government's minimalist interpretation of articles 117, 118 and 119, together with the Constitutional Court's markedly centralistic jurisprudence, have somewhat diluted their usefulness.

In any case, the beauty of Italian federalism resides in the fact that it is not the consequence of a perfectly structured, orchestrated process according to a pre-defined plan; but the as yet unfinished result of a series of historical circumstances and situations whose outcome is a model that looks with admiration towards the German, Belgian or Austrian systems, but has more in common with the still more advanced, asymmetrical Spanish regionalism.

France

Unlike Spain or Italy, France is a unitary state, according to the opening articles French Constitution of 1958. Several attempts at decentralisation have been made since then, but they have not been wholly successful because competences are highly fragmented among the different territorial entities, and also because there is a lack of institutional hierarchy among the regions, departments and municipalities. All of this diminishes not only the visibility of public action, but also the political responsibilities of elected representatives.

Notwithstanding all the above, France cannot be said to have been immune to the decentralising and regionalisation trend which has taken place in Europe since the middle of the last century. According to Ares (2010), decentralisation “à la française” has these traits: (a) a uniform model, designed by state institutions, by which the regions all have the same statute (with some excep-

tions), hold no powers of self-organisation, and whose regional elections are organised by the national Government; (b) the process is accompanied by a dilution in the central administration, and an increase in the power of the regional prefects (a sort of government delegate), who controls the President of the Regional Council; (c) all the territorial institutions are equally reinforced, which gives way to struggles for power between regions and departments; (d) there is no hierarchy among sub-state institutions.

France is now made up of twenty-five regions: the twenty metropolitan regions, according to the law of 6 June, 1986, plus four overseas (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana and Reunion), plus Corsica, which became the Territorial Collectivity of Corsica by the law of 13 May, 1991, with its own special statute, but is still, notwithstanding, an administrative circumscription under the jurisdiction of the regional prefect.

Within this general framework, in spite of the new powers derived from the law of 13 August, 2004, the French regions are administrations for mission and prospection, but not management, and their exclusive competences are few: the railways, and the building and maintenance



2nd Assises on Decentralised Cooperation. © Committee of the Regions.

of secondary schools. They do however share powers in such important areas as economic development, zoning, vocational studies and the environment.

As to institutions, each French region has a regional council, and its president, whose attributions and organisation are a replica of those of the departments. The regional council is therefore a deliberative assembly made up of regional councillors, elected by direct universal suffrage, within a proportional electoral system, in departmental circumscriptions.

As we have seen in other instances, financial autonomy is an indicator of the degree of regional autonomy. French sub-state entities are more dependent financially on central state resources than Spanish or Italian ones, in spite of the March 2003 constitutional revision which attempted to correct this trend, by recognising some financial

autonomy for all territorial collectivities. According to Ares (2010), the regional councils' annual budget (600-800 million euros) is still well under that of EU regions with legislative powers. The budget for the French regional councils is 12% of the total budget for French territorial collectivities; whereas the Spanish ARs spend 70% of the total budget for Spain's sub-state entities.

Although the regions of France are gradually acquiring institutional powers and recognition, the regional level is still somewhat ignored as to political representation, unlike what happens in federal states or strongly regionalised ones such as Italy or Spain. In practice, French regional powers are still only attributed by law, and never, in any case, reach legislative levels. Save the exceptional case of Corsica, the relative importance of the French regional institutions is far from that of Italian regions or Spanish ARs in their respective countries.

Measuring asymmetries: regional authority/autonomy indicators


As we have already discussed, there are still differences among Northern Mediterranean regionalisation models. Having followed different, sometimes diverging or even opposite, historical and political formulae, the decentralised institutions, which have been created each according to its own model, are not always easy to compare. It is not only a question of names; Italy, Spain and France, like other Western European countries, have obviously been gradually decentralised, but the process has affected the different political and administrative levels in different ways.

Graph 2.1 shows the decentralisation trend over the years in Italy, France and Spain. The organisation of these three countries has promoted autonomy to a greater or lesser degree in sub-state entities. All of them have gradually endowed their regions or ARs with greater competences and financial autonomy. Regional stakeholders (governments, parliaments and also political parties) have become increasingly important, and can no longer be ignored. The trend has been practically parallel in the three countries, starting with a relatively centralised system after World War II, up to today's regionalised or decentralised models. However, whilst Spain and Italy are highly, homogeneously decentralised, France has lagged behind, as her regions are not as strong, or as autonomous, as those of Spain or Italy.

Graph 2.1.

Regional autonomy in France, Italy and Spain (1950-2010). Regional autonomy index at an interstate comparative scale, made up of criteria/indicators such as fiscal, constituent, legislative or competence autonomy, among others*

(The more points, the greater regional autonomy)



Source: (Hooghe, Marks y Schakel, 2010).


* According to how the variables are chosen and pondered, autonomy and decentralisation indices for countries which enjoy a high but comparable degree of regional autonomy (Spain or Italy) may vary, situating one or the other on top; the preponderance of one over the other is not significant.

However, regional autonomy is not uniformly spread within each respective country. There are different levels, even among sub-state entities in the same country (Spain has ARs and also regions, Italy has regions and provinces, and France has regions and departments), and some are more autonomous than others. In fact, the political models in which there are differences in de-

gree of autonomy among the regions are called “asymmetrical”. In the case of France, this hardly matters, as all the regions enjoy a similar degree of autonomy (except for Corsica, which enjoyed a greater autonomy between 1982 and 1990); but in Spain and Italy there are evident examples of asymmetry within the framework of their respective political systems.

Graph 2.2.

Regional autonomy in Italy (2010). Regional autonomy index, made up of criteria/indicators such as fiscal, constituent, legislative or competence autonomy, among others
(The more points, the greater regional autonomy)




As we can see in the graphs showing regional autonomy in Italy and Spain, both models exhibit important interregional differences. In both cases, Spanish and Italian provinces enjoy a lesser degree of autonomy than Spanish ARs or Italian regions (except for the provinces of Bolzano and Trento in the North of Italy). Furthermore, some

Italian regions and Spanish ARs have special statutes which endow them with a higher degree of autonomy than that of other sub-state entities within the same country: namely, Sardinia, Sicily, the Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto Adigio and Friuli-Venice-Giulia in Italy, and the Basque Country and Navarre in Spain.



Graph 2.3.

Regional autonomy in Spain (2010). Regional autonomy index, made up of criteria/indicators such as fiscal, constituent, legislative or competence autonomy, among others
(The more points, the greater regional autonomy)



2.1.3. The action of the regions within the European Union framework

The competence of regions in foreign relations

In order to describe the relations between national States, we use the terms international policy or foreign policy. As these terms have been reserved for States, we must ask ourselves what term should be used when referring to relations between regions on one hand and States or foreign regions on the other. Petschen (1992) and others are in favour of using the term foreign policy in these cases also. According to Petschen, “some regions have a true ‘foreign policy’, by which we mean a set of aims linked as means to ends, in pursuit of an efficient incidence in the sphere of international power and influence”.

However, there has been an academic search for different terms to refer exclusively to foreign relations as regard the regions. From the legal and political point of view, the terms “activities of international importance” or “foreign promotion activities” or “international relations in the technical or strict sense” have come up, among others. Diplomatic circles have used such neologisms as “micro-diplomacy”, “paradiplomacy”, or “proto-diplomacy”, indistinctly linked to adjectives such as “regional, cross-border”, “transregional”, “global”, “regional”, “cross-border”.

Regional foreign action or paradiplomacy, terms we shall use indistinctly, derives from two types of causes according to their origin: those coming from inside the State and those coming from outside. The former include causes which

are common to the State as a whole, and also those specific to each territory within the State; the latter are due to globalisation, interdependence or supra-national integration processes (Ugalde, 2005). In fact, it would be impossible to understand Flanders’s foreign action without taking into account the European construction process, Flemish national feeling, the Belgian constitutional structure or the personal feelings of former Flemish Minister-President Luc Van den Brande; or Catalonia’s, without understanding its bourgeois nationalism, or the paradiplomatic efforts of former President Jordi Pujol; or Tuscany’s current extensive foreign action, without referring to two recent Presidents, Vanino Chiti and Claudio Martini. These are only some examples.

Beyond the causes, factors or variables favoring regional paradiplomacy, regional foreign action is not the sum of individual decisions; it reflects a strategic political decision. Although it is not always possible to see any obvious differences, as there are some intermediate situations, and strategies may be in a more or less advanced stage of development, some regions have certainly attempted to have a plan based on: inspiring principles, short-, medium- and long-term goals, courses of action, activity charts, geographic priorities, internal sectoral implication, and the evaluation of results. According to Keating (2008), the detailed development of these foreign action

plans, which had not been paid much attention in past decades, is due to the fact that they are now profitable for the regions, so now they are defining their strategies better, choosing the most beneficial options.

How far-reaching a region's foreign action is depends not only on its strategy, but also its structural features and resources. Certain regions' foreign action is even more ambitious than that of some nations, but that depends on differences between states, and also on differences between regions in the same state. Most regions have their own political-administrative institution (the names vary) responsible for coordinating regional presence abroad.

There are many ways of making regions known internationally; perhaps the most costly but also the best, symbolically, is the establishment of foreign delegations. Brussels is a favorite place for them, and their job involves information, the follow-up of European legislative initiatives, establishing contact networks, and regional assessment in European affairs. However, we insist on the fact that, apart from their valuable work, the symbolic aspect is very important: Nation-conscious regions such as Flanders or Catalonia have set up foreign delegations, and academics such as the Belgian De Winter (De Winter, Gómez Reino and Lynch, 2006) habitually refer to the Catalanian office in Brussels as the Catalanian Embassy.

Besides this specific formula, regions with an advanced European strategy have developed very detailed "international activity charts" (Ugalde, 2005), including trips, visits, and promotional activities for establishing or consolidating international relations with States, regions, international organisations, and other institutions; for making the region known abroad; for signing cooperation agreements with other governments and entities; for promoting regional presence in cooperation networks, international organisations and interregional associations; for promoting regional participation in development cooperation, and links with foreign communities.

The fact that regions have become conscious of the need for sustaining foreign action, for which they have designed strategies and to which they have assigned means, implies that paradiplomacy has important effects on contemporary international relations: It has spread across Europe because the regions are interested in making internal issues into European policy. And more importantly, the nation-state is no longer the only stakeholder able to commit itself contractually at an international level, nor is it the only one with access to international organisations. Thanks to the development of regional paradiplomacy, the State no longer monopolises international representation (Paquin, 2005).

The presence of regions in the European Union

The regions issue has been on display at a European level since the mid-eighties, thanks to the fact that the regions themselves have become conscious of their own existence, and that inter-regional associations such as the Assembly of the Regions of Europe (1984) have come into being. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) did not ignore this trend. The Committee of the Regions became the forum for regional and local expression.

But only a few years later, in the late nineties, there was a general regional disenchantment which is still lasting. It was already obvious that the regional or sub-state level was not ready to substitute the national. It became clear that it was necessary to reformulate the model according to which regions participate in twenty-first century Europe. However, in spite of the efforts of some of the largest, most populated and most powerful regions in Europe (see the European Convention of 2002-3, the failed European Constitution of 2004, and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007), there have been only limited advances in the role of regions in the EU.

There are several reasons for all of this. On the one hand, the EU is more an economic than a political union. On the other, it is a supra-national organisation, made up originally and traditionally of States, not regions; the States are not willing to give powers away to the regions. "Time has disproven those who referred to a *Europe of the Regions* in the late eighties. That initial idealism seems now to have been cut down to a *Europe with the Regions*, where these are a level of government which cooperates with, but cannot

substitute, that of the member States" (Tuñón and Dandoy, 2009).

However, over the past two decades the regions of Europe have increased their opportunities for participating in EU decision-making processes. Since the late eighties, many different formal and informal channels have come into being, through which sub-state entities can make their claims in Brussels. The regions can now take part directly, or indirectly through their State, in the European Union Council; they can also participate directly in European Commission committees, set up their own regional representation bureaus in Brussels, take part in the Committee of the Regions, and be involved in different inter-regional associations.

Few advances have been made since the mid-nineties regarding the regional issue, but the role of the regions in the EU today will have to become increasingly important in the near future, at least in the case of those with legislative capacities. Not that the regions will substitute the States, but the options opened by the principle of subordination will crystallise: the innovative *Early Alert Mechanism*, within the Lisbon Treaty context, allows previously unheard-of sub-state parliament participation in the European decision-making process.

Ever since the Treaty of Maastricht, the subordination principle has been foremost in the debate over EU institutional reform, in order to guarantee that decisions take citizens closely into account. This reinforces democratic legiti-

macy in the EU, which is very important given the internal crisis the Europeanisation process is going through at the moment. Subordination is mentioned in the European Constitution and in the subsequent Lisbon Treaty, and a protocol has been added which refers to the application of subordination and proportionality.

The main novelty is the *Early Alert Mechanism*, which makes it possible for national Parliaments, and also regional Parliaments with legislative powers in decentralised States, to politically control EU legislative initiatives, previously checking that they respect the principle of subordination. This allows regional Parliaments to express their opinion as to whether the principle of subordination is respected by EU actions which could limit or block not only State but also regional competences. "This is not a minor question: within the co-decision process, certain majorities made up, among others, of sub-state Parliaments could not only force a new study of a legislative project, but even its rejection" (Tuñón and Dandoy, 2009).

The effective application of this *Early Alert Mechanism* will be a big step forward for democracy and for the interaction between EU and regional levels. In fact, the participation of regional Parliaments constitutes an indirect formula for controlling the actions of member state governments, within the European decision-making process. In this sense, the debate about subordination should evolve, and stop focusing on how powers are shared out, in order to work on improving the necessary cooperation and transparency in European policy configuration processes, while respecting

both the functions and the representativity of each government level, including the sub-state.

As a result of all this, it is currently impossible to speak of European governance without referring to its multiple levels of power. The EU, its states and its regions (which are no longer scenarios for Europeanisation, but real stakeholders in the decision-making process) must interact as a whole, in order to advance and progress.

Regional activation mechanisms in relation to the EU

The last two decades have undoubtedly seen an increase in opportunities for the participation of regions in EU decision-making processes. Since the late eighties, formal and informal ways of access, through which European sub-state entities can make their claims known in Brussels, have increased steadily in number. From those primitive cross-border cooperation experiments of the seventies, we have now reached a multiplicity of mobilisation formulae, in which practically all European regions participate to a greater or lesser degree (Fargion, Morlino and Profeti, 2006).

We may distinguish, in any case, between direct and indirect activation channels or mechanisms. Due to the reality of the integration process the difference is not always clear; however, when speaking of direct activation mechanisms we are referring to those which immediately put European regions in touch with EU institutions or

organisms. Indirect mechanisms are those which channel those relations through national governments. There are now five direct mobilisation mechanisms and one indirect. The former include: regional participation in the EU Council, sub-state participation in European Commission Committees, regional representation offices in Brussels, participation in the Committee of the Regions, and involvement in different interregional associations. On the other hand, the indirect mechanism consists of regional participation in organisms for internal agreement, in order to defend the will of each state before EU institutions, especially the EU Council.

The European regions with greater capacities have long been conscious of the fact that, in order to influence European decisions, they could not keep waiting for the EU to approach them; they would have to take the initiative. That is why many European regions use upward activation channels for their claims to be heard in Brussels. Some participate directly in the EU Council, under different formulae agreed upon by the states they belong to, and more or less formally according to the case in hand. The most nation-conscious regions have long sought direct channels of participation; however, in many cases indirect participation through the state has proven more effective.

Among the forums open to regional participation, besides the European Council, the European Commission also offers opportunities for influen-

cing European policy through the formal *comitology* process, and also through more informal but effective lobbying exerted by regional officials on European officials. Many of those regional officials are permanently stationed in Brussels as part of their regional delegation. Practically all European regions use regional delegations, in some cases “quasi embassies”, in order to manage European activation channels more closely and efficiently.

The regions of Europe also participate in forums other than EU institutions. The Committee of the Regions is seen as a forum of scarce direct impact but great visibility and political recognition; and some of the strongest interregional associations are powerful lobby groups, and can greatly influence European decisions.

Some regions prefer certain mechanisms rather than others; other regions develop more extensive strategies. All of them are conscious of the fact that the different channels are not equally effective. The use of certain mechanisms, and also the regional impact through each one, depend on different factors. On one hand, some factors are executively, legislatively and administratively independent of the regional institutional structure; or the national level, comprising basically the constitutional structure endowing the regions with more or less competences, and also with formal organisms for coordination with the government and with the central administration. On the other hand, external factors more or less relevant to the

different regions include socioeconomic matters, regional identity, political affinity between the regional and national governments, the stability and duration of regional government majorities, the interest shown by regional political elites, and their synergy with administrative elites.

Lastly, it must be noted that European regional activation mechanisms are constantly evolving and changing. That is why it is so often the case that informal channels, vaguely mentioned in the literature, are the most effective. These more informal, less controlled channels allow the regions more direct interaction at a European level, giving them a sometimes singular, often differentiated approach. This added value is lost from the moment when the use of these informal channels is generalised and they become formal. The regions undeniably exert their own foreign action, their own paradiplomacy at a European level, and have their own more or less systematic, extensive and effective upward activation European strategy. In order to influence the European decision-making process, sub-state entities use all kinds of formal and informal mechanisms and channels to make their voices heard in Brussels.

2.2.

New Mediterranean cooperation frameworks, and the participation and contribution of the regions: the Council of Ministers, the Committee of the Regions, REG-LEG, ARLEM, CRPM, ARFE ARE, among other forums



2.2.1. The state level: Italy, France and Spain

The Council of Ministers of the European Union

The European Union Council of Ministers is the European decision-making forum by definition, although it no longer monopolises the representation of state interests within the Union since the institutionalisation of the European Council, made up of heads of state and government. The Council of Ministers is also the only European institution whose definition, contained in the Treaties, includes the presence of sub-state representatives, although they can only defend the interests of their state as a whole.

Up to the Treaty of Maastricht, only national government members could belong to the EU Council of Ministers. Article 146 declared that “the

Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member State”. This novelty in the European legal framework, proposed by the Belgians and supported by the German *länder* which had been longing to participate directly in the Council of Ministers, made it possible, as of November 1993, for the regional representatives to take part in its deliberations, as long as they had ministerial rank, and always in representation of their State as a whole. It must be noted that regional representation is a possibility, not an obligation: regional representation can be made use of, but it is up to the State to do so or not.

This possibility has ended up being applied mainly by those countries with “ministerial level representatives” at regional scale: the German, Belgian and Austrian federal states. It has also been possible in the United Kingdom, Portugal (only in the exceptional cases of Madeira and the Azores) and, since 2004, in the profusely regionalised Spanish state¹. The main difference between the federal states (Germany, Belgium and Austria) and the other countries whose sub-state entities take part in the Council of Ministers is that, whereas in the former case participation is a constitutional right which cannot be ignored or limited by the central government, in the other cases it is a possibility, by invitation of the central government to their sub-state entities, an invitation which can of course be given or not, and furthermore can always be withdrawn, something which could never legally happen in the federal states.

The EU Council of Ministers is a unitary institution, but, because of the large number of policies it must work on, for functional purposes it works through sectoral councils whose composition varies. So each State chooses its sub-state representative, according to the matters in hand. Not only that: it also depends on each Member State to decide legally and politically how, and to what degree, sub-state representatives participate in Council sessions. The Treaty makes no suggestion to the States as to considering their own territorial organisation.

The fact that there are now a number of people authorised to represent their State in the Coun-

cil makes regional participation possible beyond the figure of delegation chief; there are currently three different kinds of situation:

- (a) The central government is constitutionally bound to name a regional minister as delegation chief, when the matters in hand are internally considered to be of regional competence. That minister will direct negotiations with the other European representatives, expound the position of his Member State, and use the votes corresponding to his State. This is the system used by Germany and, in a particularly complicated way, by Belgium, as we shall see in a future chapter.
- (b) There is an internal agreement by which regional ministers can, whenever the central government so decides, act as national delegation chiefs. This is the case of Austria and Italy.
- (c) The central government can be accompanied by regional ministers who participate in negotiations under the direction of the national representative. They can speak during Council sessions if the national representative authorises them, but cannot vote. This is the case of the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), Portugal (Madeira and the Azores) and Spain.

The opportunities for regional participation in the EU Council of Ministers have been academically and politically analysed. The symbolic value

1 In Spain the formula was rejected by successive governments, until in 2004 the newly elected socialist government ordered the channels for implementing the possibility. The Conference for Affairs related to the European Communities agreed, on 9 December, 2004, to include a member with the rank of autonomous government councillor in the Spanish delegations for employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs, agriculture and fisheries, the environment, and education, youth and culture, to represent the ARs in affairs of their competence. This representative, as a full member of the Spanish delegation, defends the interests of the ARs in general, and is elected rotationally

of direct regional participation in the Council of Ministers (especially in the case of nation-conscious regions) is undeniable, but it is no less true that direct participation does not always automatically mean an increase in regional influence on European decisions. None of the systems used by the Member States contemplate regional participation in defence only of particular regional interests; quite to the contrary, regional participation must focus on the interests of the nation's sub-state entities as a whole, following a more or less complicated rotational system among themselves, and loyally developing the lines marked out by the different conformation models of the European position of each state. So sitting at a table is not as decisive as influencing the national position to be defended in Brussels.

The Committee of the Regions

The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is one of the consultative organisms of the European Union. Its constitution in 1994 as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht has been the highest form of recognition of the gradual involvement of sub-state government structures in the European decision-making process: four decades after the birth of the EU, the regions of Europe finally had their own representative organism, through which they could make themselves heard directly in European decision-making centres. The CoR was originally made up of 222 effective members, with elective mandates, proposed by the Member States and officially named by the EU Council for four-year mandates. Its scope has increased as new Member States have joi-

ned; in May 2004 it grew to 317 members from 25 states, representing all sub-state government levels, including regions, provinces, counties, municipalities and districts. And as of 1 January, 2007, after Romania and Bulgaria joined, the CoR has 344 members.

Structurally, the CoR is headed by the President's Cabinet, made up of the President and several Vice-presidents. The First Vice-president is of particular importance as, according to Article 38.3 of its internal regulation, he will substitute the President if necessary. The organisation is structured around the General Secretariat and the General Assembly (in which all the members participate, and which decides on opinions, resolutions, budget and regulations, and elects officials). Two more organisms are endowed with political decisive power: the Political Bureau, which articulates the political mandate of the CoR by implementing and coordinating the work of the plenary sessions; and the Committee's six commissions (Territorial Cohesion Policy; Socioeconomic Policy; Education, Youth, Culture and Research; the Environment, Climate change and Energy; Citizenship, Governance and Institutional and Foreign Affairs; and Natural resources), responsible for preparing non-binding reports when required by the European Commission. Many offices, such as the Committee's presidency or vice-presidency, seats on the Bureau, or the presidency and vice-presidency of the different commissions, are therefore shared by the regions which make up the organisation. Furthermore, the CoR has its own administrative structure, made up of nearly a hundred officials, plus the five hundred or so it shares with the Socioeconomic Commission, all housed in the same building.

The 344 members of the CoR and their replacements are nominated by their Member States and officially named by the Council of Ministers for four-year mandates. Each country is free to choose its representatives, but it is recommended that national delegations reflect the political, geographical and regional/local diversity of the state they represent. According to the internal organisation of the different delegations, all the Belgian, German, British, Austrian and Spanish regions are represented; whilst only fourteen Italian and twelve French regions can be present during each CoR period. France and Italy each distribute their 24 places not only among their regions, but also among their cities and provinces or departments. This situation contrasts with that of Belgian regions such as Flanders and Wallonia, with six and three places respectively, Scotland with four representatives, or different German *länder* with two places, to name a few.

The main aim of the CoR is the defence of the subordination principle, which is why it has two principal functions. On one hand, it must be consulted by the EC, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, as to those community policies implying regional responsibilities (socioeconomic cohesion, European networks, health, education, youth and culture); on the other, it can present reports on its own initiative. The CoR originally seemed to be a stimulus for German, Belgian, Italian and Spanish presidents who were strongly in favour of a *Third Level* in Europe, representing regions and stateless nations. However, its history has been difficult and controversial, and its activities have come up against insurmountable obstacles. Not having an adequate structure or autonomous resources, it


has not been able to attain real influence in European politics; it has not even been able to supply the promised democratic legitimacy to the EU, or to inform or strengthen citizen involvement. Time has shown that the CoR has very weak powers, because although it must be consulted, its decisions are not binding. Besides, its composition is too heterogeneous, from REG-LEGs with 18 million inhabitants to small local authorities, a fact which often makes it impossible to find common ground as to the future of Europe. These limitations have in fact led the Belgian regions and German *länder* to reject this participation formula, which does not respond to the possibilities offered by the Council of Ministers (Philippart, 1997).

The CoR's limitations are also reflected in its visibility, which could definitely be better, as it is practically unknown to the general public. Graph 2.4 shows how much of the population, both within the EU as a whole and in the specific cases of France, Italy and Spain, knows about the existence of the different EU institutions and organisms. The data are conclusive. Among the EU institutions and organisms analysed, the CoR is the least-known among European citizens (28%). Compare to the very popular European Parliament (90%), the European Commission (81%), or the European Central Bank (78%). At state level, there are only small differences between the different states analysed, but France and the CoR both exhibit bigger differences. Thirty-four percent of the Spanish population knows about the CoR, and 33% of the Italian, while only 17% of the French knows about it. This is probably due to France's lower degree of regional autonomy, compared to Spain or Italy.

Graph 2.4.

Popularity of EU organisms and institutions in France, Italy and Spain

Fr = France / It = Italy / Sp = Spain / Ea = European average



Source: From Eurobarometer 73 (2010).

Besides their popularity, we may also compare participation levels shown by the regions of these countries. As we have seen, the regions of Spain are the only ones which are guaranteed permanent participation in the CoR; furthermore, while three or four Spanish regions have traditionally been represented in the Political Bureau, only between one and three French or Italian regions have done the same. This is due to the fact that the French and Italian delegations are made up of more provincial and local representatives than the Spanish. In fact, in 2011 the ARs of Castile and Leon and Murcia have two vice-presidencies, and those of Asturias and Extremadura are members of the Political Bureau.

General interregional associations:
REG-LEG, CALRE, AER, AEBR, ARLEM

REG-LEG

The most important interregional association right now is the informal, recently created Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power or REG-LEG. REG-LEG was born in the First Conference of Presidents of Regions with Legislative Power, in Barcelona in November 2000, because of disappointment with the CoR, and has met every year since then. It is a chiefly political association, and its greatest success has been the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the first document to be signed by the fifteen members as they were back then; this document recognises the existence of the REG-LEGs, and gave the CoR the power to name six representatives for the European Convention, five of which belonged to REG-LEG.

At the moment, eight of the twenty-seven EU Member States have regions with legislative powers, which belong to REG-LEG: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Regions with legislative powers are, by definition, those sub-state entities which have their own regional Government and Parliament, and which share, at sub-state level, similar responsibilities to those taken on by Member States, in the framework of their competence areas, and within the three different levels of government: executive, legislative and judicial. The aim of REG-LEG is to increase the

role played by the regions, especially those with most powers and capacities, within the EU. This implies increasing the political and legal status of the regions with legislative powers, in each and every competence sphere of European governance (legislative, executive and judicial), in accordance with their functions and responsibilities.

As we have said, REG-LEG is an informal group. There is no formal roll; objectively, seventy-four regions from eight different EU countries have legislative powers, but the only requirement for belonging is effective participation in the annual conference. Some regions, such as Murcia or Liguria, never participate. As to the Presidency of REG-LEG, it is organised around a “troika”, made up of the President of the region hosting the current conference, plus the previous and the subsequent ones. REG-LEG is also organised around a coordination committee made up of between one and four regions from each Member State; this committee is responsible for organising each year’s conference and for monitoring the group’s activities. Apart from mere membership, the presidency and a place on the coordination committee are symbolically important for the regions. Spain has had three presidencies (Catalonia in 2000 and 2007, and Aragon in 2010), and Italy has had two (Tuscany in 2002 and the Piedmont in 2009).

CALRE

The Presidents of legislative assemblies (federal parliaments) of the regions meet at the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies. It is very closely related to REG-LEG in its composition, but at parliamentary, rather than executive, level. The aim of the CALRE is to consolidate the representation of regions with legislative powers within the EU.

The CALRE therefore is made up of the parliaments of the 74 regions with legislative powers, from eight member states. It includes the parliaments of the Spanish ARs, the parliaments of the Italian regions, the assemblies of the Belgian regions and communities, the parliaments of the German and Austrian *länder*, the autonomous parliament of Finland's Alland Islands, the regional assemblies of the Portuguese Madeira and Azores, and those of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, from the UK. It is worth noting that there are no French regions in the CALRE, as there are none in REG-LEG.

As to structure and organisation, together with the annual presidency, CALRE has a general assembly made up of the presidents of all its member parliaments, and also an executive committee made up of eight regional presidents from the different member states which have regions in the CALRE. As we shall see is also the case in the AER, the conference presidency and each place on the committee are highly desired and sought after by the regions.

Participation and leadership in CALRE can be measured by the number of times the regions of a certain nation have had the presidency, and have subsequently hosted the annual conference. Spain has held the presidency four times (Astu-

rias in 1997, Galicia in 2000, Catalonia in 2005 and the Basque Country in 2008), and Italy has held it five times (Tuscany in 1999, Lombardy in 2003, Calabria in 2004, Veneto in 2006, and the Bolzano Province in 2010), and Abruzzo currently has the 2011 presidency.

AER

The Assembly of European Regions is a political organisation made up of a large number of members, which gives voice to regional claims at European and international levels. Its aim is to amalgamate the interests of European regions, giving them the chance to participate both in European integration and in the building of Europe. Within its own limits, the AER would guarantee that the interests and needs of the regions are taken into account at European level. At certain moments, it has had over three hundred members from twenty-six different countries, and twelve inter-regional organisations. Any European region with political, administrative or legal institutions can belong to the AER. That would be the difference between the AER and other organisms such as the CoR or the CALRE, in which delegates sent by the governments represent all kinds of territorial entities (regions and municipalities), according to quotas depending on the Member State. In spite of all this, surprisingly all the European regions do not belong to the AER. Some German *länder* and also some Spanish ARs have left it.

The Political Bureau is the AER's executive power. In representation of member interests, it implements the decisions of the General Assembly and executes the pertinent decisions between assemblies. Along with member status and the

presidency of one or other of the committees, places on the Political Bureau are much sought after by the different regions, no matter what State they belong to, as symbols of international interest and participation.

The AER has been a point of reference for interregional associations. It appeared as the “highest exponent of the institutionalisation process of interregional cooperation which started in the seventies” (Castro Ruano, 2003); its aim was to cover all sectoral needs and to become an instrument of cooperation and representation independently of the States; it was born with the intention of promoting interregional dialogue and cooperation, the effective regionalisation of Europe, the subordination principle, and the improvement of the institutional participation of the regions in the European framework. Thanks to its qualitative and quantitative differences with other associations, it soon “became the main organism of European regional representation, and also a powerful influence and pressure group not only in different supra-state organisations but also within the States”. In Basle on 4 December 1996, the General Assembly approved the Declaration on Regionalism in Europe, a political document said to be “a true Constituent Charter of European regionalisation” (Jauregui, 1997).

Unlike what has been the case in other associations, many Western European regions have decided to leave the AER over the last few years. In fact, by 2010 only 19 French regions (including associated territories), 18 Italian regions (including autonomous provinces) and, most surprisingly of all, five Spanish ARs were left in the AER. Although the AER welcomes new members every year, mostly from Central and Eastern Eu-

ropean countries, the truth is that most German and Spanish regions have left. In any case, the yearly assemblies have been held in France on seven occasions (in Alsace in 1986, 1990, 1994 and 2005; in Languedoc-Roussillon in 1997; in Rhone-Alps in 1999; and in the Franche-Comte in 2009), twice in Italy (in Campania in 2002, and in Friuli-Venice-Giulia in 2007), and three times in Spain (in Extremadura in 1992, in Catalonia in 1993, and in the Canary Islands in 2006).

CLRAE

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe was originally a consultative organisation, which would be the voice of European regions and municipalities in the Council of Europe, a forum in which local and regional representatives could discuss the problems they had in common and their experiences, and make their positions clear to their national governments. The Congress is made up of 318 members and their respective replacements, divided into two chambers: that of local and that of regional authorities. The number of places per State is limited, so not all regions can be represented. Some countries such as Italy or Spain have fewer places than regions, a fact which has excluded the Piedmont or Castile-La Mancha.

The Congress elects its President rotationally, from among the members of each chamber. The committee elected by the national delegations is the executive body of the association. The presidency and vice-presidency are currently in the hands of the Austrian *lând* of Tyrol and the Spanish AR of Extremadura, respectively. The association does not hold decentralised general

assemblies but meets annually in Strasbourg. The executive committee, made up of representatives of each national delegation, meets for autumn and spring sessions together with other, sectoral committees: Institutional, Education and culture, Sustainable development, or Territorial cohesion.

AEBR

The Association of European Border Regions has the mission of representing the common interests of the border and cross-border regions before national and international authorities, and also before institutions such as the EU; and also to initiate, support and coordinate cooperation among those regions. All these tasks are done through the implementation of programmes and projects, the organisation of events or the sharing of information both with European organisations and with the public, through common campaigns. Born in 1971, it is one of the oldest interregional associations, and currently has 93 members, plus a number of associated and honorary members (including Euroregions, interregional cooperation formulae which we shall examine further on). Many Spanish, French and Italian regions are

members, especially those in the Pyrenees and the Alps, and also on the French-German border.

The AEBR's main organisations are the Executive Committee, the General Secretariat, the General Assembly and, to a lesser degree, the thematic and consultation committees. It is situated in the German town of Gronau, on the Dutch border, and now allows French, German or Spanish regions to hold office: Aquitaine, Friuli-Veneto-Giulia and Extremadura currently hold vice-presidencies. General Assemblies and annual conferences have been hosted once in Italy, twice in France and three times in Spain: Bolzano (1991), PACA (1998), Alsace (2001), Catalonia (1989), Castile and Leon (1997) and Navarre (2006).

Interregional associationism in the
Mediterranean: ARLEM, CPMR's
Inter-mediterranean Commission

CPMR'S Inter-mediterranean Commission

The Inter-Mediterranean Commission (IMC) of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) was born in Andalusia in 1990. The Commission's essential aim was the defence of the interests of Mediterranean regions within the context of EU policy. The idea was to include both the territorial concept and the profile attributed to regional authorities within the framework of the Barcelona Process and of the Union for the

Mediterranean, developing pilot projects in key policies of regional impact. The IMC holds an annual general assembly, and also a yearly plenary assembly parallel to the CPMR assembly. As in the case of other interregional associations, the analysis of the presidency will tell us much about regional activism within the organisation. Recent General Assemblies have been held in France (in PACA, 2007) and Italy (in Campania, 2008, Lazio, 2009, Tuscany, 2010 and Sicily, 2011).

The Political Bureau elects its members for two years, and each nation is assured a certain number of places. During the last two year period, PACA held the Presidency, Murcia held the Vice-presidency, and the Bureau was made up also of the French regions of Corsica and Languedoc-Roussillon, the Italian regions of Friuli-Venice-Giulia, Apulia and Sicily, and the Spanish ARs of Andalusia, Balears, Catalonia and Valencia. The Commission's work has been done by seven work groups, six of which were led by one of the member regions: Valencia, PACA, Campania, Lazio, Apulia and Sardinia. All members of the IMC must also belong to the CPMR. It is currently made up of six Spanish ARs, four French and eleven Italian regions.

ARLEM

The Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, ARLEM in French, is a consultative assembly whose aim is to endow the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with a double, local-regional, dimension. It was created in January 2010, and is made up of 84 European members and 16 Mediterranean partners, which it represents at local and regional levels. The association's aims mean involving the local and regional levels in the development of the Union for the Mediterranean, by carrying out specific cooperation projects that make the initiative visible and present for the citizens.

ARLEM is headed by a co-presidency in which both EU regions and their Mediterranean partners take part. The EU co-president is the current CoR president, and the Political Bureau is made up of individual regions, such as PACA and Murcia in 2010-11. There are currently four French members (Brittany, Ile de France, Languedoc-Roussillon and PACA), four Italian regions (Marches, the Piedmont, Apulia and Sicily), and four Spanish ARs (Andalusia, Balears, Catalonia and Murcia). ARLEM is made up of two committees which can have up to 41 members each: ECOTER, the socio-economic committee for territorial issues, and SUDEV for sustainable development. The PACA region currently presides one of them.



2.2.2. The regional level (Medgovernance): Catalonia, PACA, Tuscany, the Piedmont, Lazio and Andalusia

The Committee of the Regions

As we have seen, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) comprises not only regions but also other sub-state entities such as provinces and cities. Each of the Spanish ARs has a permanent member (and a replacement) in the Assembly, but the same is not true of France or Italy. With a total 21 places on the CoR, the Spanish Government established the composition of its delegation, through a Senate motion voted on 20 October 1993, giving 17 of the 21 places on the Spanish delegation to the ARs, while the remaining four places would be taken by local and municipal authorities designated by the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces. It was decided that Spain's two largest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, should be represented in the institution, politically balanced by the inclusion also of smaller municipalities. In the case of France, of the 24 members who make up the delegation, only 12 are from the regions (so over half are unrepresented during any one period), six members belong to the departments and six are from municipalities. Similarly, only fourteen out of twenty Italian regions are assured membership on the CoR, as three places are set aside for provinces and seven for municipalities.

When analyzing the six Medgovernance regions as a whole, we have focused on their membership and their holding of relevant executive offices, during the last three periods including the current one. From 2002 to 2011, only four regions have been permanent members: Andalusia, Catalonia, the Piedmont and Lazio. Tuscany had been

a member since the beginning, but did not renew in the last mandate (after 2010), and PACA has not been a member for the last two periods. Some regions have been particularly active, and have held relevant positions such as the Vice-presidency, held by PACA between 2002 and 2005, and by the Piedmont between 2006 and 2009. The Piedmont currently has the Presidency.

General interregional associations: REG-LEG, CALRE, AER, AEBR


As we have seen before, none of the French regions enjoy the powers necessary to belong to REG-LEG. As to the other five regions we are analyzing, there are specific differences which are not reproduced at state level. Two different indices reveal both leadership and participation of Medgovernance regions within the REG-LEG group framework. The analysis of both indices will give us very different results for Spanish and Italian regions. Neither Lazio nor Andalusia has held the Presidency; Tuscany and the Piedmont have held it in 2002 and 2009, respectively; and Catalonia has held it twice, in 2000 and 2007. The REG-LEG presidency is held jointly by the president of the host region for the current Annual Conference, the previous one and the subsequent one. This triad of regions has always been made up of traditionally active members of the REG-LEG Coordination Committee (comprised of between one and four regions per state).

Each region’s activism can also be quantified through its presence and participation on the annual summits or conferences since 2001. A different level of participation can also be measured. As shown in graph 2.5, PACA has not been able

to attend any conference; Catalonia, at the opposite end of the scale, has not missed a chance and has attended all ten of them; the Piedmont has attended nine, and Tuscany and Andalusia have attended seven.

Graph 2.5.

Number of attendances to REG-LEG Annual Conferences (2001-2010)




Source: Information compiled by the authors.

As to Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE), two of our six regions have held the annual presidency and organised the annual conference: Tuscany in 1999 and Catalonia in 2005. Both are currently presiding one of the work groups within the association. A look at active participation of the regions in the annual CALRE conferences also leads to some interesting conclusions. Andalusia is the only region

to have attended all the most recent annual conferences, as shown in graph 2.6: Neither of the regions which have presided the conference has participated as assiduously as Andalusia, which means this AR is remarkably interested in the forum, aside from any possible positions of leadership. Participation in the CALRE is obviously not a priority for the Piedmont or Lazio; PACA is not a member.

Graph 2.6.

Number of attendances at CALRE Annual Conferences (2006-2010)



Source: Information compiled by the authors. No information was available for 2008.

As we have already mentioned, many Western European regions have recently dropped out of the AER; but in 2010 five of the six Medgovernance regions still belonged: only PACA left the AER in 2008. Some of the regions we are looking at have turned out to be very active and very interested in this forum. Catalonia hosted the annual AER General Assembly in 1993; Andalusia has been a relevant member of the Political Bureau for quite a few years now.

CALRE plenary sessions are held in Strasbourg, so it is impossible to decentralise them in the different member regions. We must therefore use other criteria to measure relative interest in participating: specifically, we shall look into regional recent participation in the Political Bureau (Presidency and Vice-presidency) and the Executive Committee. The six regions we are analyzing have all been members of the association, except the Piedmont, which was a replacement member up to 2010. The very active Catalonia participated in a work group in 2009 and currently belongs to the Executive Committee together with PACA.

None of the six regions are particularly active in the AEBR. In the first place, some of them are not too concerned about border affairs, which only really matters to regions on the periphery of the Nation-States. Secondly, even some regions which share national borders with other regions do not take advantage of the opportunities offered by the association. Catalonia, because of its full member status and its position on the executive committee, is the only active region of the six, in this forum. Andalusia is also a member, and participates preferably together with the Portuguese regions of Algarve and Alentejo; Tuscany is currently creating a cross-border region with Corsica, which will be a member from the start. General assemblies and conferences have been hosted by Catalonia in 1989 and PACA in 1998.

Interregional associations within the Mediterranean

As all Inter-Mediterranean Commission members must belong to the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), five of the six Medgovernance regions currently belong to the IMC: PACA, Lazio, Tuscany, Andalusia and Catalonia. The Piedmont does not. Involvement and participation can be measured by how many times each region has hosted the IMC General Assembly; some of the most recent have been hosted by Medgovernance regions: PACA (2008), Lazio (2009) and Tuscany (2010). These regions show a relatively high participation index in the IMC. In 2009-2010, the French region of PACA presided, whilst two of the seven work groups in the Commission were led by Medgovernance regions PACA and Lazio. Andalusia, Catalonia and Tuscany are members of the Political Bureau.

Five of the six Medgovernance regions (Lazio is the exception) are ARLEM members. The particularly active PACA is currently (2010-11) a Political Bureau member, and also presides one of its two committees. Another Medgovernance region, Catalonia, hosted the 2010 General Assembly.

Table 2.1.

Participation of Medgovernance regions in general and specifically Mediterranean sub-state associations (2011)

	PACA	Lazio	The Piedmont	Tuscany	Andalusia	Catalonia
CoR	-	Member	Member	-	Member	Member
	-	-	Presidency	-	-	-
REG-LEG	-	Member	Member	Member	Member	Member
	-	-	Committee	Committee	-	Committee
CALRE	-	Member	Member	Member	Member	Member
	-	-	-	Work group	-	Work group
AER	-	Member	Member	Member	Member	Member
	-	-	-	-	Bureau	-
CLRAE	Member	Member	-	Member	Member	Member
	Committee	-	-	-	-	Committee
IMC	Member	Member	-	Member	Member	Member
	Presidency	Work group	-	Bureau	Bureau	Bureau
ARLEM	Member	-	Member	-	Member	Member
	Bureau	-	-	-	-	-
AEBR	-	-	-	Pending	Member	Member
	-	-	-	-	-	Committee

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

2.2.3. The regional level: analysing Andalusia's case

The Council of Ministers and the Council Presidency

As a Spanish autonomous region, Andalusia has the right to participate directly in the EU Council of Ministers and its work groups, a right which is recognised by the Regional Representation and Participation Agreements signed on 9 December 2004, by the Conference for EU-Related Affairs (then CARCE, now CARUE). According to this agreement, the autonomous regions participate rotationally in four of the ten groups in the Council of Ministers: employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs, agriculture and fisheries, the environment, and education, youth and culture.

Although it is not an essential priority, as in the case of other Spanish regions such as Catalonia or the Basque Country, or certain European regions, Andalusia has enjoyed the opportunity of participating in the EU Council of Ministers since 2005. Like the other Spanish ARs, Andalusia has the right to attend a limited number of assemblies and work groups, rotationally, in representation of the common stance of the ARs as a whole. Due to the small number of groups open to this possibility, and the large number of sub-state entities that make up the Spanish State, Andalusia attends an average of three Council of Minister meetings and work groups a year; some years we attend up to six, but other years, such as 2009 and 2010, we have attended none. Andalusia has taken part in all ten sectoral groups except health.


From January to June 2010, Spain held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

During the Spanish presidency, together with parallel non-political conferences, different ARs hosted events in which experts and officials met. Some ARs were more active than others in hosting Presidency events, a reflection of how important the EU is for each of them.

Graph 2.7 shows, from the over seven hundred events organised during the Spanish Presidency, that the Community of Madrid hosted the most events (including political meetings of member-state ministers and heads of State, and also informal political meetings, administrative-level or national expert conventions, and all kinds of conventions, seminars, work groups, and cultural activities). This is not surprising, as the Community of Madrid is strategically situated in the middle of the country, is one of the most populated, on a par with Catalonia and second to Andalusia, and is the home of national legislative, executive and judicial institutions. Similar analyses in other European countries (Dandoy, Tuñón and Joly, 2011) show the overexposure of capital cities as to events during their respective rotational national presidencies.

Graph 2.7.

Number of events organised per autonomous region during the 2010 Spanish Presidency of the European Union Council




Source: Information compiled by the authors.

It would therefore be desirable to exclude Madrid, because of its status as capital city, as we have done in graph 2.8, which shows ample differences among the ARs as to regional interest and participation. Some are more active than others in hosting events. Andalusia is much more active than the rest, having hosted over a quarter, 25.7% of all events held outside Madrid, 56 in all. Catalonia is far behind, having hosted a mere 17%, and Castile and Leon hosted 10.6%. These numbers reveal that, apart from the specific and inevitable case of the Community of Madrid, Andalusia was by far the most active AR during the

2010 Spanish Presidency of the EU Council; the Presidency, the European Council of Ministers and the EU itself are clearly Andalusian priorities. It is more than a question of numbers: Andalusia is also qualitatively interested in hosting events directly related to the workings of the CoR and the AER. The CoR's Commission for Territorial Cohesion Policy met in Jaen, which also hosted a seminar on the future of Cohesion Policy in June 2010; in May 2010, also during the Spanish Presidency, the Andalusian Government hosted the Conference of the AER's European Climate Change Platform.

Graph 2.8.

Number of events hosted per autonomous region, excluding Madrid, during the 2010 Spanish Presidency of the EU Council



Source: Information compiled by the authors.

The Committee of the Regions

As we have said before, each Spanish autonomous region has a representative member plus a replacement in the CoR. This means that all ARs enjoy equal opportunities for participating on its six commissions, but only some of them have recently held posts of responsibility in the different CoR forums. There is no better example than the different Vice-presidencies in the last few years, held by Aragon and La Rioja in 2005, Extremadura in 2009, and currently Murcia and Castile and Leon in 2011. Participation of regional representatives in the CoR's Political Bureau has also been important: Asturias (2005,

2009, and 2011), Castile and Leon (2009) and Extremadura (2011).

As all ARs do, Andalusia has a representative member in the CoR (the President of the Junta), plus a replacement. The Andalusian President attends CoR meetings much more assiduously than most AR presidents, which would imply that the CoR is one of the most important regional participation formulae for Andalusia. Unlike other ARs, the highest regional political elite (including the President of the Andalusian Government) have proven to be concerned and involved enough, di-

rectly and personally, in this European organisation; they see that it may after all mean notoriety, visibility and influence that Andalusia cannot fail to take advantage of, so they have taken part in CoR plenary assemblies in order to defend notably important issues for the region, such as the “Leverage Effect of Structural Funds” or “Participation in the Mediterranean”, among others. Andalusia is currently participating actively as a member of the Commissions for Territorial Policy and Natural Resources.

General interregional associations: REG-LEG, CALRE, AER, CLRAE, AEBR


The participation of Andalusia in interregional associations has turned out to be a complementary but not basic phenomenon of regional strategy. However, although Andalusia must still cut strategically deeper and more conscientiously into interregional associations, it is true that she has never passed up a chance of participating in as many forums as possible. Andalusia is a member of the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Congress of Local and Regional Powers of Europe (CLRPE), the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMRE), the Group of European Regions with Legislative Powers (REG-LEG), and the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE), to which the 74 REG-LEG Parliaments belong. Andalusia is also a member of the Association of Regions and Origin Products (AREOP), the European Networking Resources and Information concerning Cultural Heritage (ENRICH), and the European Regions for Joint Actions (EUREGA). There have also been cross-border and interregional cooperation practices, on which Andalusia has insisted even more than on interregional associations, due to different programmes derived from regional and neighbourhood EU policies.

REG-LEG

Involvement of Spanish ARs in REG-LEG varies greatly. Some are very active and interested, and have attended each and every annual conference; others are nominally members but have never attended a conference, as graph 2.9 shows. Some have chaired the organisation at some time, namely Catalonia (2000 and 2007) and Aragon (2010), and others have belonged to the executive committee (Extremadura, Galicia and the Basque Country).

Graph 2.9.

Number of attendances at REG-LEG annual conferences (2001-2010)



Source: Information compiled by the authors.


CALRE

As we have said before, four ARs have had the opportunity to chair CALRE and host its annual conference: Asturias in 1997, Galicia in 2000, Catalonia in 2005 and the Basque Country in 2008. Some of these regions are still active in the association and head the work groups: Catalonia heads Subordination and the Basque Country leads E-democracy. In 2011, Navarre has succee-

ded Extremadura as a member of the executive committee. If we pay attention to continued and repeated participation in annual conferences, results vary, as graph 2.10 shows. Only six out of seventeen ARs have attended every annual conference: Andalusia, Aragon, Cantabria, Valencia, Murcia and Navarre); for Baleares or Castile and Leon, attendance is not a priority.

Graph 2.10.

Attendance at annual CALRE conferences (2006-2010)



Source: Information compiled by the authors. No information was available for 2008.


AER

Not all ARs belong to AER; besides, some traditional members have recently decided to leave: Galicia in 2008, or the Basque Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria and Madrid in 2006. Murcia, to the contrary, decided to join in 2009. Only five ARs are now (2011) AER members: Andalusia, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Valencia and

the aforementioned Murcia. As we have already mentioned, the annual AER conference has been hosted by three Spanish regions: Extremadura in 1992, Catalonia in 1993 and the Canary Islands in 2006. Some ARs have held posts of responsibility in the AER, and in 2011 two of them, Valencia and Andalusia, are on the Political Bureau.

Graph 2.11.

Affiliation/Membership in AER in 2005, 2009 and 2011



Source: Information compiled by the authors. No information was available for 2008.


CLRAE

As in the case of the AER and as we have said before, not all Spanish ARs belong to CLRAE. An analysis of AR membership in CLRAE in 2005 2009 and 2011 shows differences among them; see graph 2.12. Only nine of the seventeen ARs (Andalusia as usual among them)

were members in all the periods observed. Extremadura is currently very active within the association, as it holds a vice-presidency and also a place on the executive committee together with Aragon and Catalonia among other European regions.

Graph 2.12.

Affiliation/Membership in CLRAE in 2005, 2009 and 2011



AEBR

Seven Spanish regions are members of the AEBR, including Andalusia, which participates because of its cross-border relations with Morocco and Portugal (the Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euro-region). The Spanish regions involved in the AEBR are particularly active members; Extremadura currently holds a vice-presidency, and the six other regions are on the executive committee. Three General Assemblies and their corresponding annual conferences have been hosted by Spanish regions since the institutionalisation of these events: Catalonia in 1989, Castile and Leon in 1997 and Navarre in 2006.

Interregional associations in the Mediterranean

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CPMR (Inter-Mediterranean Commission)

Six of the seventeen Spanish ARs are members of the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions: Andalusia, Aragon, Balears, Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia. The Commission is special for Andalusia, as it was born here in 1990. Andalusia, Balears, Catalonia and Valencia were members of the Political Bureau in 2010, and Murcia held a vice-presidency. Valencia currently heads one of the seven work groups in the Commission.

ARLEM

Four out of seventeen Spanish ARs are members of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly: Andalusia, Balears, Catalonia and Murcia; the latter is currently in the Political Bureau. No Spanish region heads any of the association's committees, nor has any hosted the general assembly yet.

Table 2.2.

AR participation in general sub-state forums in 2011

	CoR	REG-LEG	CELRA	AER	CLRAE	ARFE
Andalusia	Member	Member	Member	Member and Bureau	Member	Member
Aragon	Member	Member and Committee	Member	-	Member Committee	Member and Committee
Asturias	Member and Bureau	Member	Member	-	-	-
Baleares	Member	Member	Member	-	-	-
Canaries	Member	Member	Member	-	-	-
Cantabria	Member	Member	Member	-	-	-
Castile and Leon	Member and Vicepresidency	Member	Member	Member	Member	Member and Committee
Castile La Mancha	Member	Member	Member	-	-	
Catalonia	Member	Member and Committee	Member and Grupo de Trabajo	Member	Member and Committee	Member and Committee
Valencia	Member	Member	Member	Member and Bureau	Member	-
Extremadura	Member and Bureau	Member and Committee	Member and Work group	-	Member, Committee and Vicepresidency	Member and Vicepresidency
Galicia	Member	Member and Committee	Member	-	Member	Member and Committee
Madrid	Member	Member	Member	-	-	-
Murcia	Member and Vicepresidency	Member	Member	Member	Member	-
Navarre	Member	Member	Member and Executive Committee	-	-	Member and Committee
Basque Country	Member	Member Committee	Member and Work group	-	Member	Member and Committee
La Rioja	Member	Member	Member	-	Member	-

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

The participation of Mediterranean regions in the multilevel governance scheme: Andalusia in the Medgovernance Project

The Declaration of the CPMR's Inter-Mediterranean Commission, on "The promotion of new forms of cooperation in the Mediterranean", signed in Marseilles on 23 January, 2008, underlines

The Declaration signed by the presidents of the six Medgovernance regions (Andalusia, Catalonia, PACA, Liguria, Lazio and Tuscany) in Marseilles on 29 May, 2009, sketches the outline of this project:

- 1) As a premise, the basic idea is to reinforce institutional relations, and to promote common policies in the context of a very severe crisis. The Declaration formulates the need “for more energetic action for the promotion of regional and local development, closer to the citizens, as an expression of solidarity and the capacity for tackling poverty”.

- 2) This frontispiece frames a selective strategy which turns on several common thematic hubs such as environmental innovation and protection, territorial accessibility, local economic development, and dialogue and cooperation among different peoples.
- 3) Having established the capacity shown by the signatory regions for cooperation through time, the Declaration appeals to the need for them to cooperate with the nation-States and with the European Union, and to assume an increasing role in all Mediterranean policies. In relation to this, allusion is made to the need for the regions to undertake the task of contributing to the definition of a new Mediterranean policy, in the debate on the future European budget for 2014-20.
- 4) Aware of the need for a prospective approach in the development of the tasks assumed by the project, the presidents allude to the necessity of strengthening the Mediterranean Research Institutes Network, as a way to enriching our policies, improving institutional relations and also comparing similar experiences worldwide.
- 5) An immediate expression of the size of the challenges assumed is the fact that the project's actions do not refer geographically to the Mediterranean as a whole but to the "Western Mediterranean area". By going forward step by step, gradually, and contrasting difficulties and advances, it will later be possible to experiment with "common development strategies in the whole Basin", helping to "overcome differences and misunderstandings".

Medgovernance is thus a project born with a clearly regional vocation, concentrated on the European shores of the Western Mediterranean, and includes regions and research institutions; its plan of action is undoubtedly aimed at testing multilevel governance formulae within the European Union. The issues on which Medgovernance action is focused refer to a series of strategic questions for the Mediterranean which the signatories are particularly interested in. As a result



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of this selective approach, the project comprises the following areas: transport, the environment, culture, immigration, competitiveness and research.

The Mediterranean Governance Report “Towards an efficient contribution of regional authorities to Euro-Mediterranean policies” (Institut de la Méditerranée, April 2010), refers expressly to the idea that “evaluating the impact of the regions and of the institutions which represent them on EU political decisions is a very difficult task. The European policy-making process is highly complex, often compared to a jigsaw puzzle, and takes place in a competitive context demanding the development of professional tools and strategies”.

Conscious of these difficulties, and moved by a firm intention of removing obstacles through regional implication in European dynamics, Andalusia has contributed relevantly in certain areas, displaying initiatives which have been materialised in specific projects, and also opening com-

munication channels with the central State (both internally and with state institutions before the Union) for issues which are of strategic interest for our Autonomous Community.

Focusing on the interest displayed by Andalusia in Medgovernance issues, and leaving a closer look at specific actions carried out in each issue for the next chapter, we now must approach the question from a general point of view, and offer the reader a summary diagnostic.

1. Transport

In this basic area, the Andalusian regional authorities have been particularly active, participating in the development of instruments and strategies for influencing national and European policy. In this sense, Andalusia takes part in the specific Commission of the Conference of Peripheral

Maritime Regions, which communicates fluently with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (DGTREN).

2. Environment

Andalusia's contribution to this area is highly valuable, according to the projects and actions developed. Her high degree of involvement is favored by the fact that the design of environmental policies lies within the specifically autonomous sphere of power. Worth noting is the development of regional plans for the prevention, prediction and fighting of forest fires.

3. Competitiveness and innovation

The general impression that regional authorities are becoming increasingly involved in the design of policies for research and innovation, most significantly in higher education, is confirmed by the case of Andalusia. Research and development policy is a priority on the Andalusian government's agenda.

From a general perspective, in the Cairo Declaration on Higher Education and Scientific Research, adopted by the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research (18 June 2007), Euromed partners agree to create a Euro-Mediterranean area for higher education, research and innovation. The Declaration refers especially to the following programmes: TEMPUS (higher education); the

Seventh Framework Programme for Technological Research and Development (the aim of which is to promote technological research, technology, innovation and development in cooperation with Mediterranean partners); Erasmus Mundus, with particular attention to Euromed grants for students in the associated nations).

However, potential cooperation in this area has been limited by heterogeneous educational systems, plus the fact that the European states are now immersed in different processes of adaptation of university studies to requirements derived from the European Space for Higher Education. Trans-national and cross-border cooperation has therefore not advanced much in this area.

4. Immigration

Within the Spanish legal order, powers regarding immigration belong exclusively to the State, so capacity for action by the ARs is scarce. This is not the case in other Medgovernance members; the Italian regions are granted ample powers by the Constitution in this area, and are therefore much more active and involved. In Spain, the central government is the key factor, responsible for designing migratory policy, and regions have little say in the matter.

This, however, has not stopped Andalusia from assuming a leading role in an essential issue related to immigration: the promotion of integration policies for immigrants residing in Andalusian territory. An expression of institutional sensitivity

towards this question is the existence of the Directorate-General for Migratory Policies (originally within the Presidency Department, and now in the Employment Department), and also the drafting of the Andalusian Government's Integral Immigration Plan, which coordinates all policies concerning foreign workers and their families.

5. Culture

Andalusia's long tradition and fruitful experience in cultural affairs are determining factors in the Junta's involvement in the Medgovernance project. The AR's exclusive legal competence in this area, plus its proven administrative capability for managing the considerable available resources, have resulted in diverse sectoral projects of Euro-Mediterranean scope.

As a counterpoint to this proven capability on the part of Andalusia, past actions underline a contrasting fact: the need to define a general cultural strategy at a European level, based on specialised thematic networks.

When evaluating practical Medgovernance action from the Andalusian standpoint, the Andalusian Government officials interviewed all pointed out that after an initial impulse during the stage immediately following its birth, interest in the project has tended to decrease gradually. The reason for this decrease is the non-continuance of the regional political personalities who were present at the outset; this has limited the possibility of proceeding to a globally defined strategy for the affairs concerned in the project.

However, the large number of projects in which Andalusia has been involved together with other

partners, shows the region's undoubtedly strong Mediterranean vocation.

Most of the officials we interviewed underlined the need to improve internal coordination of European, including Medgovernance, initiatives and projects. A direct expression of Andalusia's active commitment in this sense is the Andalusian Observatory for Territorial Cooperation (OCTA), a project of the General Secretariat for Foreign Action of the Presidency Department, approved within the 2007-2013 ERDF Operative Programme for Andalusia and financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). OCTA is a pioneer experiment, motivated by an institutional consciousness as to the need of a better vehiculation of information on sectoral projects and initiatives, with the participation of the different departments in matters of European territorial cooperation and neighbourhood. Together with the coordination function, OCTA also works on assessment, publication, information and evaluation.

Another important question, which has come up in the interviews with high-ranking administrative officials of our AR, is the need to find think tanks in Andalusia which will assume a leading role in research and reflection processes, in matters of multilevel governance in general and its application to the Mediterranean in particular. We must bear in mind that the formulation of proposals for the promotion of regional participation in European dynamics focused on the Mediterranean, and also the evaluation of comparable multilevel governance experiences in other geographical enclaves, are seen as challenges for the Medgovernance project. This reflection has been assumed in fact by the Network of Mediterranean Institutes (RIM) (a Medgovernance partner), whose individual components have carried out noteworthy prospective and analytical reports.

2.4. XX

Possibilities for new territorial cooperation schemes and their applicability in the Mediterranean area

XX

Bearing in mind the different cooperation dynamics concurring in the European area, in this sub-chapter we propose to focus on analyzing the essential features inherent to certain current cooperation schemes, and then calibrate their potential applicability to the Mediterranean, and also the degree of empathy with Andalusia's participative vocation. We must point out that we have decided to be selective in carrying out the proposed exploration task, and have focused our analysis on three specific cooperation mechanisms:

(1) In the first place we shall refer to the most deeply rooted type of regional cooperation in the European Union, one of the most efficient, preferred frameworks for channeling cooperation dynamics among cross-border

territories. We are referring, of course, to the Euroregion.

(2) We shall then study the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), created in 2006, and which offers formal normative support for different modes of territorial cooperation, but is not necessarily limited to being cross-border or interregional, but can be both at the same time.

(3) We shall finally analyze the novel idea of "macroregion", a scantily formalised, large-scale transnational type of cross-border cooperation. We shall take a close look at the two macroregions currently in existence: the Baltic and the Danube.

2.4.1. The maintenance and potentiation of Euroregions as paradigmatic expressions of cross-border cooperation

Within the context of European cooperative dynamics, the Euroregion concept merits a close look as a noteworthy expression of cross-border cooperation. This cooperative instrument has several different names (working communities or regions, for example), is deeply rooted in European life, originating in the late fifties with the birth of Euregio, made up of regions on the German-Dutch border. Recent studies have shown that Euroregions are extraordinarily vigorous today, and have doubled in number over the last decade. Structural funding in general and INTERREG in particular have played a leading role in the impulse of cross-border cooperation, enhancing the creation of management units governed by regional and local authorities around common development strategies. Territorial cohesion, of prime interest for European politics, is the main goal and axis for cooperation, and the reason for overcoming socioeconomic differences which concur in cross-border regions.

The Euroregion, in its context of reference, is an expression of the will of the authorities of contiguous territories, separated by state frontiers, to apply common strategies to the management of European programmes and initiatives merging in a certain geographical area (Perkmann, 2003). Cooperation is thus aimed at solving problems caused by malfunctions due precisely to the existence of the frontier (Oliveras and Durà, 2010).

Although Euroregions do not answer to a single pattern, and display specific, differentiating fea-

tures which in practice greatly enrich the whole concept, it is possible to point out certain basic characteristics which are common denominators in all of them. In the first place, although we must stress that the Euroregion does not imply the creation of a new institutional structure or a new administrative level, it does undeniably bring something different with it: the “working community”, which embodies the strategic cooperative agreement signed by the corresponding authorities. The powers belonging initially to those authorities are transferred by the cooperation convention to the working community, whose own organisms are attributed and distributed specific functions and competences of different kinds.

As we have said, the will to constitute a Euroregion corresponds to sub-state, regional and local authorities, which subscribe agreements with other territorial units across the state border. Does this mean it is an international activity? In order to answer this question, we must bear in mind that, from a legal standpoint, these cooperative initiatives are not included in the sphere of international relations which, as is well known, are usually set aside for the central (state) government by the Constitution; so agreements signed by local and regional entities do not rank as international treaties or conventions. Plainly, this is a cooperative activity carried out by territories both sides of a border, not an expression of the sovereign will which must be present in international relations. But the truth is that, the

sphere of sub-state entities is substantially transformed, as they transfer the exercise of their own powers to an entity (the working community) which operates beyond their own territory, in a space defined by ignoring the border.

But it must be stressed that, as we said before, the Euroregion is not endowed with political competences (it is not a new level of government), as its genetic configuration aims essentially at carrying out management-related tasks: it is a strategic actor. The working community from its birth is markedly practical, a mechanism for solving problems requiring joint, coordinated action in a territory seen as common, though politically separated by the state frontier, and in which cohesion as a goal is decisive. So the Euroregion articulates spaces for multilevel cooperation (governance), with the aim of facilitating the adoption of joint decisions in relation to European programmes and projects which each authority must apply according to its powers and resources (Morata, 2009). Thus, the working community is not endowed with political powers of decision, but operates on a different level. This rational management profile, and focus on the application of resources, are precisely what make the Euroregion so potentially functional. In practice, however, the achievement of those aims depends directly on the possibility of involving socioeconomic stakeholders in facing the challenge. The impulse from the public structures is a necessary condition for the Euroregion to start moving, but it is not enough: both governance planes (the vertical, which refers to the administrative levels involved, and the horizontal, which refers to the socioeconomic stakeholders), must work together, producing feedback, in a relationship requiring continuous cooperation and the will to improve.

A good example is the case of cross-border cooperation between Andalusia and the Portuguese regions of Algarve and Alentejo, in the INTERREG framework. The fact that the two bilateral experiences (Andalusia/Algarve and Andalusia/Alentejo) have recently been fused together into the Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion (May, 2010) is indisputable proof of the vigour of cooperative culture in Andalusia.

The cross-border cooperation convention, by which the Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion² working community was born, reflects the need to work harder at cooperative dynamics, a basic instrument for participating jointly in European programmes and actions. In this sense, the positive experience accumulated over the last 20 years by Andalusia and both Portuguese partners is an encouragement to keep working at cooperation, trying to give it a new dimension which will get better results and, at the same time, adapt it to changes undergone in the legal, economic and institutional frameworks at European, national and regional level. This conquering spirit makes the new threefold community (which is, in the words of a high ranking Andalusian Government official, an expression of second-generation cooperation) a big step forward, as it coincides territorially with that established by the European programmes for cross-border cooperation which finance most cross-border projects for this area (POCTranfr Andalucía-Algarve-Alentejo: POC-TEP, 2007). It is also steeped in the will to apply macro-strategies in its territory which are the expression of the need to put European and regional funds “at the service of planning”, in the words of the Andalusian Government official. As a cross-border cooperation project it is therefore better and more advanced than previous experiences.

2 The convention was signed on 5 May, 2010, in the Portuguese town of Faro, by the President of the Andalusian Government, the President of the Alentejo Commission for Regional Coordination and Development, and the President of the Algarve Commission for Regional Coordination and Development. It was published in the Spanish Official State Bulletin on 9 July of the same year.

The Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion Working Community (according to the 2002 Valencia Treaty between Spain and Portugal, for cross-border cooperation between territorial entities), is defined as different from the governments which agree on its constitution, but lacking in jurisdictional personality (Article 1.1 of the Convention). The Community is endowed with its own organisational structure, around the following: President and Vice-presidents, Council, Coordination committee, Sectoral committees, and Secretariat. It also has an autonomous budget.

As to the exercise of functions assigned to the Working Community, the Convention leaves no loophole for indetermination, as it expressly forbids the making of decisions which might suppose the exercise of administrative functions which internal law attributes to the members of the Community, and also the making of decisions which correspond to third parties (Article 5).

Article 3, while respecting these insurmountable limits, attributes the following to the Euroregion:

- a) The promotion of the interchange of information, and the study of matters of common interest.
- b) The promotion and coordination of initiatives, projects and actions for cooperation and the interchange of experiences.
- c) The preparation of joint programmes, projects and proposals that might benefit from European funding.
- d) The promotion of cooperation and coordination among agents, structures and public and private entities that might contribute to the development of their respective border regions.
- e) The execution of tasks within territorial cooperation programmes or any other kind of instrument accepted by the Spanish and Portuguese States.

We must pay particular attention to the sphere of cooperation, within the framework defined by law as belonging to the regions (Article 4): promotion of competitiveness and employment; national heritage and the natural environment; promotion of socioeconomic cooperation and integration. The principle of coordination, which must necessarily rule the administrations involved in the actions carried out by the Working Community, can be extended to other Working Communities along the Spanish-Portuguese border (Article 15), as long as it is limited to the aforementioned spheres.

The Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion Working Community was constituted for a period of ten years, but the signatories have the option of endowing it with "the legal form of a European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC)" (Article 16). This makes way for a possible third stage in the cooperation trajectory established among the three regions: originally, cooperation was more fragmentary and scantily formalised legally (two working communities); it is now avowedly more intense and pools initiatives which are common to the three regions and are managed by a single tripartite working community. The Extremadura-Alentejo Working Community is a similar case, constituted in 1991 and which joined Central Portugal to become the EUROACE Euroregion in 2009.

The agreement, by which the Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion was founded, leaves the door open for cooperation to crystallize at the maximum degree of legal formalisation and institutional visibility, within the current European framework: the EGTC. The founders of the Euroregion thus identified themselves with the trend shown by other similar experiences which have eventually become EGTCs.

In effect, certain Euroregions have dropped their status to become EGTCs, as an expression of reinforced cooperation, with a higher degree of

institutionalisation and legal formalisation. Because of their Mediterranean connection, and also because of the fact that one or other of the Medgovernance regions is part of them, we shall mention the following examples:

- 1) The Spanish-French Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion, made up of the ARs Catalonia, Aragon and Balearic Islands, and the French regions of Midi-Pyrenees and Languedoc-Roussillon, was constituted in 2004 and became an EGTC through the agreement subscribed four years later (3 December 2008) by the territorial governments.
- 2) The French-Italian Alps-Mediterranean Euroregion, made up of the French regions of Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (PACA) and Rhone-Alps, and the Italian regions of Liguria, Aosta Valley and the Piedmont, which after a brief time of cooperation which started in 2005, became an EGTC in 2008.
- 3) On a much larger territorial scope, involving geographical areas adjacent to European Union borders, we have the Alpe-Adria Working Community (originally created as the Working Community of the Eastern Alpine Regions, in 1978), made up of several Italian regions (Veneto, Friuli-Venice-Giulia, Lombardy), Hungarian regions (Vas and Baranda), Austrian *länder* (Carinthia, Styria and Burgenland), plus the States of Croatia and Slovenia. As an expression of the will to reinforce the experience of cooperation accumulated over the years, the Alpe-Adria Working Community is now in the process of becoming an EGTC.

Other similar cases are the following:

- 1) The Spanish, Portuguese-oriented case: the Northern Portuguese-Galician Working Community was created by agreement in 1991 and became an EGTC on 23 October, 2008.
- 2) The Austrian *länd* of Tyrol and the Italian autonomous provinces of Bolzano and Trentino-Alto Adigio make up the trans-Alpine Euroregion created in 1998, and had expressed the wish to become an EGTC in 2008, pending its definitive formalisation as the "Tyrol-Trentino-Alto Adigio Euregio".

All the above should make us wonder about the potential usefulness of the Euroregion in the Mediterranean, as a tool applicable to cooperation dynamics. Its usefulness is obvious in cross-border territories belonging to the European Union, especially as there is already long experience in the matter. From the standpoint of wider cross-border cooperation, also including lands on the southern shore, with special attention to Morocco, the creation of cooperative networks, interconnected through common goals and in favour of cohesion, seems a fruitful and very attractive formula. Once it has proven to be strategically efficient, it also offers the future possibility of creating EGTCs as a formal expression of territorial cooperation.



2.4.2. The European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): Confidence in permanent, highly formalized cooperation

This is a very recent mode of cooperation in the European sphere, having been introduced in Union law by Regulation (EC) n° 1082/2006, dated 5 July 2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council, regarding the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). The creation of this entity is inspired in the will to overcome certain organisational difficulties detected in the system of cross-border cooperation, which was then ruled by the regulation on structural funding. In the context of an extended Union, the EGTC is an expression of strong, not merely circumstantial institutional commitment (Morata, 2009), and responds to the need for designing a new legal instrument which will be useful for managing the substantial increase in economic resources dedicated to territorial cooperation, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Cohesion Fund (CF) in the 2007-2013 budget. In this context, the EGTC is a newly-minted legal instrument whose aim is to overcome the difficulties which, because of the diversity of national legislations and procedures, must be faced both by Member States and regional and local entities in the tasks inherent to territorial cooperation (Janer, 2009).

The EGTC therefore turns around three basic hubs (Article 1, Regulation 1082/2006):

- a) It means a new stage in inter-territorial cooperation, as it covers not only cross-border but also interregional and trans-national modes of cooperation.
- b) Cooperative will gives birth to a grouping of territorial entities endowed with legal personality, recognised by each of the Member States as having “the most ample capacity for action recognised by that Member State for legal entities”.
- c) Its only aim is to “reinforce socioeconomic cohesion” (article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), through the “management and execution of territorial cooperation programmes or projects co-financed by the Community, especially through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Cohesion Fund (CF)” (Article 7.3).

As to the entities recognised as subjectively capable of belonging to an EGTC, the Regulation presents an ample, varied approach, the possible stakeholders being, according to Article 3.1: a) Member States; b) regional authorities; c) local authorities; d) organisations ruled by public law. Any combination among these is possible in order to constitute a Grouping, on one condition (Article 3.2): “The EGTC will be made up of members situated in the territory of at least two Member States”. This means cooperation must necessarily present a geometrically variable trans-national dimension, whose minimum threshold is two participating subjects situated in different Member States.

There is the very interesting possibility of the EGTC's not being of exclusively European iden-

tity, that is, of including stakeholders situated outside Union territory. The regulation itself opens the door to this possibility. The content of the 16th *whereas*, preceding the articles themselves, leaves no doubt about it: “the adoption of a community measure making it possible to create an EGTC must not exclude the participation of entities from third countries in an EGTC created under the present Regulation, if allowed by the legislation of a third country or by agreements between Member States and third countries”. So if territorial entities outside the Union find no internal obstacles to belonging to an EGTC, there will be no obstacles on the European side either. The adjective “European” applied to the territorial cooperation grouping does not therefore necessarily mean that all members are European: it would be theoretically possible to create an EGTC including territories situated on the Southern Mediterranean shore; for example, an EGTC made up of Andalusia and a region or local entity situated in the north of Morocco, as long as Moroccan legislation does not forbid it.

Going further into this hypothesis, we must bear in mind that the foreign dimension of initiatives for territorial cooperation with entities in other countries is also present in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), whose aim is to “support cross-border cooperation through joint local initiatives in order to promote sustainable economic, social and environmental development in border regions and integrated territorial development along the outer borders of the Community”. The ENPI thus gives great relevance to cross-border initiatives between Member States and partners outside the EU, in order to create an area of prosperity

and good neighbourhood. ERDF regulation also includes a reference to this kind of possibility (Article 21.3): “As to cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation, the ERDF may finance expenditure incurred in implementing projects or parts of projects on the territory outside the European Community up to a limit of 10% of the amount of its contribution to the Operational Programme (10% flexibility rule), where they are for the benefit of the regions of the Community”.

Regarding the functions that may be deployed by the EGTC, the Regulation alludes, as a determining element, to the will expressed by its partners in the convention through which it is created, but always with a view to the goal which moves the existence of the EGTC: the reinforcement of socioeconomic cohesion through territorial cooperation. However, this attributive capacity runs up against an insurmountable obstacle: the respect due to the competence area which, according to each internal law, corresponds to the entities participating in the EGTC (article 7.2 Regulation 1082/2006). Plainly speaking, this means that the EGTC cannot assume functions against the internal law of the nations involved. So the principle of institutional autonomy ruling European Union action, based on the respect due to the internal organisation and structure of the Member States, is formally intact. However, from a practical standpoint, the imposition of a minimum common denominator determined by each internal law limits the framework of potential EGTC capacities.

From the standpoint of its content, and with the aim of limiting any possible loopholes, the regulation adds (article 7.3): “EGTC functions will be mainly limited to the execution of territorial cooperation projects or programmes financed by

the Community, particularly by the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and/or the Cohesion Fund. EGTCs may execute other specific actions of territorial cooperation among its partners, within the framework referred to in article 1, section 2, with or without Community financing”.

At this point we must go into a question of capital importance: access to funds linked to cohesion policy does not, in any way, depend on the

creation of an EGTC, as the subjects receiving these financial resources are free to manage them individually or in coordination with other entities; they can commend the task to an organisation created especially for the occasion, endowed with legal personality, or assign it to a different type of structure. As we shall see, the Euroregion is an excellent example of cross-border cooperative dynamics apart from the mechanism analyzed here. Nonetheless, we must underline the practical advantages of creating a figure endowed with



its own legal personality, with capacities for managing funds, autonomously and independently from the entities involved (Janer, 2010).

Once we have sketched the outline of EGTCs, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) has recently pointed out (2011) that they are not working at full capacity according to the functions they were created for; only a small number of EGTCs are managing territorial cooperation projects or programmes financed with Community funds. Quite to the contrary, most of them are executing other territorial cooperation actions, without EU financing, according to article 7.3 of Regulation 1086/2006 (CoR, 2011). The requirement of respecting the national regulation frameworks of participating entities (with the obvious problems derived from concurrent institutional asymmetries) has turned out to be a handicap which has stopped the groupings from deploying the original functions they were conceived for. The regulations must therefore be changed, in order to open normative spaces incorporating greater degrees of flexibility in the mechanism.

These operative difficulties have certainly not been an obstacle for Spain, whose regional and local entities have proven to be particularly prolific in the creation of EGTCs. Cross-border cooperation is clearly the favourite option, as only one transnational EGTC has been created: ARCHIMED (Archipelago-Mediterranean), made up of Mediterranean insular territories: the ARs Balears and Catalonia, the regions of Sicily and Sardinia, and a public organism based in Cyprus; cooperation with Portugal and France is predominant, as shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.

Anfizonia, a Mediterranean EGTC in which Spain does not however take part, was created in 2008 by municipalities in Italy, France, Greece and Cyprus. The Bouches de Bonifacio Marine Park EGTC, made up of the Nature Reserve of that name, in Corsica, and the Arcipelago di la Maddalena in Sardinia, have yet to be definitely approved.

Table 2.3.

Spanish-Portuguese EGTCs (functioning, constituted or in process of constitution)

Name	States	ARs and Regions	Local Entities	Other Public Entities
Galicia-Northern Portugal		X		
Duero-Douro			X	
ZAS-NET			X	
Euroregional Development Agency do Eixo Atlântico (EDAEA)			X	
Iberian Pyrite Belt EGTC			X	
Chaves-Verín Eurocity			X	

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 2.4.

Spanish-French EGTCs (functioning, constituted or in process of constitution)

Name	States	ARs and Regions	Local Entities	Other Public Entities
Pyrenees- Mediterranean		X		
Pyrenees-Sardinia			X	
Cross-border Catalanian Eurodistrict		X	X	X
Portalet space		X		
Cerdanya Hospital	X	X		X

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Having arrived at this point, it is time to wonder if the EGTC formula is ideal for implantation at Mediterranean scale. In order to answer systematically, we shall distinguish groupings constituted by Member States from those including entities in third countries. In the first case (exclusively European EGTCs), the cooperative potential is indisputable, especially under a geographically selective approach limiting the field of action to specific areas (the Western Mediterranean, or the Adriatic-Ionian, for example). This strategy optimises the ignition of joint actions based on previously individualised common interests, whose management requires an inclusive approach. In this sense, we must highlight the fact that cross-border cooperation now tends towards the EGTC, rather than the traditional Working Community. From a more ambitious standpoint, with a projection for future application, we must not lose sight of the added value that would derive from using the EGTC as a mechanism for channeling macroregional strategies, thus endowing the commitment of jointly managing common

policy with a specific legal framework (METIS Document, 2010).

As to EGTCs which include third-country entities, the recommendations formulated by the Committee of the Regions for revising the pertinent regulation refer expressly to the need of promoting their participation, through the regulations referred to the Pre-Adhesion Instrument (PAI) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This possibility, which would in practice endow the EGTC with extraordinary potential in the intensification and extension of cooperative culture, runs up however against the not irrelevant obstacle (which also appears in EGTCs made up solely of European partners) of needing to adjust to the law of each State. From this point of view, the success of the hypothesis depends on the effective commitment assumed by the partners, of proceeding to adapt their legal frameworks, giving leeway where needed to the capacity for action which should correspond to the EGTC in the exercise of its functions.



2.4.3. The macroregion. The Baltic and Danube experiences. Possible applicability in the Mediterranean

The Communiqué on the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (2009) defines the macroregion (which lacks legal formality in any European regulation) as “a space including associated territories in several different countries or regions, with one or more common geographical, cultural, economic or other features or challenges”.

The term thus refers to a geographically flexible area, which is articulated and acquires physicality through essentially functional criteria: it does not prejudice administrative or political competences as to its member territories, nor does it presuppose or require any certain institutional organisation of the entities it is made up of.

Map 2.1.

Baltic Sea Strategy




Source: Information compiled by the authors.

As has been aptly highlighted (Stocchiero, 2010), the macroregion idea implies that cross-border territories are conscious of common challenges and opportunities whose effective management requires joint action. Similarly, the Socioeconomic European Committee (2009), referring to the Baltic Sea but applicably to other areas, stresses the need

to “intensify and make more effective the coordination between the European Commission, Member States, regions, local entities and other parties interested in achieving more efficient application of programmes and policies”. It is therefore an expression of the will to cooperate in order to optimise the management of common problems.

Map 2.2.

Atlantic Ocean Strategy



Source: Andrés de Urdaneta Basque Geographical Institute website.

The effective expression of initiatives of this kind within the European Union centres today on two geographical areas: the Baltic (Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden), and the Danube (Germany —Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria—, Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria). Still pending its coming into effect (the European Commission was expected to present its communiqué in June 2011), we must refer to the existence of an initiative for the articulation of a macroregional strategy in the Atlantic area (Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal), which is being channeled basically by the Arc Latin Commission of the CPMR.

Lacking a legal framework, the specific profiles defining the macroregion must be studied by referring necessarily to the different documents generated by European institutions, especially the Commission, which channels the configuration, development and implementation process. From an applicative standpoint, the Baltic Macroregion has a privileged position, not only as a pioneer, because it was the first to be created, but also because, by observing its experience from the outset, it is possible to detect inherent strengths and weaknesses. The Danube Strategy, approved by the EC in 2010, is still just taking off, and is congenitally much more heterogeneous, in its component members, than its predecessor.

Once we have focused our analysis within its parameters, our first consideration as to the macro-region is its commitment to the aim of territorial cohesion pursued by the Union's Regional Policy (EC, 2009). The functional strategy, implied by its creation, in turn implies the need for both the Union and the States to identify what needs must be jointly dealt with, and then to proceed to adapting them to the available resources. Macroregional strategy is essentially internal, as it is "directed towards the European Union and its member states". However, as the Commission itself stated in the Baltic case, this question is not closed, as "the efficacy of some of the proposed actions will increase, if constructive cooperation continues with interested third countries in the area". The macroregion's functional character,

aimed at designing joint strategies for common affairs, is vital in openly formulating, for the Baltic, the need for "close cooperation between the EU and Russia in order to deal jointly with many regional challenges. The same need for constructive cooperation is also applicable to Norway and Belarus" (EC, 2009). As to the Danube, as we said before, the necessary involvement of third countries seems a necessary condition for optimising the strategy, given the diversity of countries and regions in the area. Along with the Union states, then, the Commission says expressly that "the strategy is open to other partners in the region", in allusion to Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldavia and Ukraine (Danube regions) on one hand and to the Black Sea area on the other, as the Danube flows into it.

Map 2.3.

The Danube Strategy



Source: The authors' own creation, using ARCSIG.



XIII Adriatic and Ionian Council Meeting. © Committee of the Regions

Once the geographical sphere for joint intervention has been defined, the expression of the idea requires the ignition of appropriate, duly coordinated policies “through regional, multi-sectoral, inclusive strategies” generating synergy in the use of existing European funds, without needing to pass *ad hoc* regulations specifically for macroregions, and also without needing to create new institutional structures for their management or practical application. Under these terms, the European Commission clearly conditions the articulation of macroregional structures to “the three no’s”:

- The creation of a macroregion does NOT imply the need to approve legal regulations circumscribing its activities. These are included, by definition, in the framework for the territorial cohesion objective that defines European regional policy.
- The macroregion and the strategic action it implies are NOT a way for its components to obtain more financial resources than they already have. A macroregion does NOT, therefore, supply additional funds, but is rather a channel for optimizing the funds available to the individual territories, which proceed to manage them according to the guidelines defined by joint strategy.
- The birth of a macroregion does NOT imply the creation of new institutions, as the actions planned by the strategy are managed through governance schemes with the participation of the different governance levels involved.

From these foundational premises, the Commission points out the essential hubs for the articulation of macroregional strategy:

1. An integrated line of attack for actions, as "better coordination and more strategic use of community programmes are basic ingredients".
2. The design of "specific actions in response to identified challenges".
3. Direct commitment and involvement of interested entities in the region (governments and organisations, municipalities, governmental and non-governmental organisations), both in the creation and the development of the macroregion.

Once these basic criteria are established, the so-called "Action Plan" is defined by the EC as the basic tool for determining the specific contents the strategy is to deal with. From this approach, both the Baltic and the Danube focus their plans of action on three logically oriented, progressive levels:

1. The first level defines the "basic pillars", corresponding to the previously defined "main points" of the strategy.
2. The second level covers the "priority spheres", that is, the diversified expression of the components contained in each basic pillar. At this level, "general, often very wide" subjects are broken down and priorities are enumerated. The Commission is especially careful to watch project selection, making sure that they "promote the fulfillment of goals, or offer the possibility of dealing with problems which are important for the region" (EC, 2009).
3. The third level is where the strategy attains definition at the highest degree: a series of "precise, practical" specific projects are designed for each priority sphere; in the Baltic case they are called "flagship projects".

Once we have defined the terms marking the strategy, and pointed out the principles inspiring its

design and execution, the immediate question is precisely how, in practice, the required joint strategic coordination and action are carried out. In this sense, our interest shall focus preferably on exploring the real possibilities for effective implication of sub-state logic (especially regional but also local) in macroregional dynamics. As a premise, we must quote the European Commission's energetic statement: "Macroregions can only give added value to European integration if they imply an increase in state, regional and local cooperation, reinforcing European policy". It is therefore obviously necessary to apply multilevel and multi-actor strategy, in a game of positive addition in which all affected government levels play (Stocchiero, 2010).

We have thus established the generic participative pre-condition; but our initial question is still waiting for an answer, as we have as yet said nothing about how it is all put into practice. A closer look at the concurring dynamics, during the gestation process of the strategy and also in its application once it has been approved, will allow us to come to valuable conclusions.

It is by now a commonplace to point out the wide consultations carried out by the Commission when defining the Baltic macroregion strategy, collecting an enormous amount of proposals and indications from the stakeholders implied; but it is generally agreed that it is the Member States which carry the weight, as they "establish the aims of the strategy and make the decisions about its main lines and priorities" (CoR, 2010). So the initial bottom-up direction (regional-local impulse towards higher government levels) reverses to top-down, limiting the activity of non-state entities to the consultation sphere" (CPMR, 2009).

This clearly unfavourable situation for the participative and decisive aspirations of regional institutions does not change when the time comes to design the Action Plan: far from it, the ample consultations made by the Commission with the stakeholders end up resolving in favour of state

logic. We must bear in mind that in the Baltic case, once the strategy was defined, the regions went on participating, as they had to adapt their operative programmes to the hubs of action and projects identified within that strategy; the process again presented itself as a top-down movement. At this point, we must remember the relevant role played by the Member States in assigning financial resources to transnational cooperation programmes: Each State receives a total assignation from the ERDF for regional policy as a whole (regional programmes, cross-border cooperation and transnational programmes); but the power of assigning a specific amount to each programme is in the hands of the Member State, together with the regional authorities, according to the nation's institutional configuration.

The Member States not only define priorities, but are also preferably responsible for their application. The data supplied by the Committee of the Regions are decisive: out of fifteen priority spheres, only one is of regional responsibility (the development of regional touristic policy, for Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania); health promotion has fallen to the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS) (CoR, 2009). We therefore agree with the statements contained in the document "Three Scenarios for a Mediterranean Macroregional Approach", published by the Mediterranean Institute in 2010, in the sense that "appropriation of the strategy on the part of the territorial stakeholders is limited, and in the case of those who played an active role in the public consultation stage and are now excluded from the application stage, frustration is great".

And as to flagship projects (78), continuism is also the key word: in no case have they been headed at regional level, "although these are precisely the projects in which regions could play a leading

role" (CoR, 2010). In the light of this situation, the Committee of the Regions formulates a clear claim for the future: "When making decisions about flagship projects, local and regional entities will be offered the opportunity to participate actively in said projects", which as a requirement is only in accordance with the idea handled by the Commission when alluding to the necessary cooperation between the levels involved in the actions carried out by the strategy, which means the "commitment and specific participation of all authorities at national and regional levels, and also other levels". Only the application of a perspective that reinforces the territorial dimension of the tasks in hand will achieve an integral approach (EC, 2009).

As to coordination, another axis of joint strategy, the Commission takes the role of macro-level responsibility, aided by the High Level Group, made up of representatives from all the states in the macroregion; here we must add that it would seem desirable to invite third country representatives as needed. In the following levels of development of the basic pillars, the attitude is more receptive to non-state dynamics: coordination and implementation of all priority areas (except those questions dealt with at national level by the European Union) are assigned to the Member States "jointly with third countries and/or regions". The basic idea in the Commission is to leave responsibilities to those subjects "who show commitment, acceptance and experience", no matter what their government level. This is the only way to make the job "transnational, inter-sectoral and inter-institutional" (EC, 2009).

From the standpoint of commitment to regional involvement, and bearing very much in mind the situation experienced in the Baltic Strategy, we wholly agree with the Committee of the Regions, and look forward to the Commission's

recognition of the important role played by local and regional entities “for executing the strategy”, giving them “a central position, as a consolidated element of the multilevel governance system, when defining and choosing coordination organisms and organisms responsible for the flagship projects corresponding to priority spheres” (CoR, 2010). Not to do so would be to maintain the current trend, according to which macroregional strategy works towards re-nationalisation of the actions in hand. Conscious of this handicap, the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the CPMR, in determining the profiles defining the Mediterranean Integrated Strategy (as an expression of macroregional strategy for the Mediterranean Basin), points out the need to include local and regional entities not only in the consultation process prior to formal definition by the European Commission, but also in the later implementation stage, using the current territorial cooperation framework (CPMR, 2011:2).

Now that we have seen the problems faced by sub-state entities for conquering their own functional space in the definition and management of the Baltic Strategy, we shall refer to what has been considered the main structural obstacle faced by the macroregion: financing the projects. As we have said before, macroregional strategy does not mean an increase in funds, so macroregions must adapt to the priorities defined *ex post* by cooperative logic. The main problem is that most European programmes had been designed before, with no reference to the Baltic Sea Strategy, so macroregional projects have no funds of their own, and also lack a governance level to coordinate the different existing programmes in their respective spheres of action. This lack of synchronisation between the 2007-13 Programme and the Strategy undermines its potential: The macroregional standpoints and the outline of operative programmes should be coordinated

prior to the 2014-20 budget. The Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the CPMR is currently working on the Technical Note on “Mediterranean Integrated Strategy”, highlighting the need to include the Mediterranean Basin macroregional strategy in the definition process for the 2014-20 period. In this negotiation framework, it appears necessary to link macroregional action lines to the structural funds assigned to the regions (CPMR, 2011:1).

Now that we have gone over the characteristic features of the macroregion, it is time to wonder if it is applicable to the Mediterranean area. In order to answer, we must bear in mind the following:

First

Macroregional strategy is based on common needs concurring in functional cross-border regions or areas, requiring joint action. The need to coordinate territorial and sectoral policies operating on the basis of common goals is the main idea from which macroregional projects must spring (Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, 2008). But the internal approach which is certainly a macroregional feature does not exclude its projection towards third countries. In the Baltic, third countries have a minor role (Russia, Norway and Belarus, and eight Member States), but in the Danube third countries have a much wider scope. This means that, in principle, a hypothetical Mediterranean macroregion could include all territories willing to participate. These aspects are all included in the Technical Note on “Mediterranean Integrated Strategy”: the CPMR is working on the idea of a Mediterranean macroregion integrated in European regional policy, as a strategic cohesion framework for actions carried out in this geographical area, using Eu-

ropean neighbourhood instruments. Cohesion and neighbourhood are thus seen as “transversal instruments involving other sectoral policies of interest to joint development of the area. From this integral standpoint, the following spheres of action are seen as priorities: transport, tourism and innovation, energy, and maritime and environmental policy” (CPMR, 2011:1).

So with the emergence of certain questions of supra-national projection, such as the environment, transport, logistics and public security, EU cross-border cooperation is an obvious necessity. Many territorial matters identified in this region suppose a high degree of interdependence among different territories, political spheres and action levels. They therefore require trans-national answers, and it will be necessary to “explore and define the scenarios where Mediterranean macroregions seem more coherent and synergic, and support wider political initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean” (Mediterranean Institute, 2010). In this respect, we should call attention to the fact that the need for large-scale involvement by the institutions operating in the Mediterranean is the basis for the proposal of a Mediterranean Integrated Strategy, which is currently being designed by the Mediterranean Commission of the CPMR. According to this organisation, the launching of a macroregional strategy in this area

must count on the political support of the Union for the Mediterranean (UpM), which would operate at State (diplomatic) level, and also of local entities through the ARLEM (CPMR, 2011:2).

Any Mediterranean macroregional concept must start from this premise, and then decide on its geographical scope. Heterogeneous is the Mediterranean’s dominant feature, where there are several different divisional axes between countries: members/non-members (north shore, south shore); economic development; institutional asymmetries; etc. But still, cooperative will is the most relevant catalyst, which must necessarily ignite any strategy: the macroregional approach must be supported above all by the local and regional stakeholders, who will have to cooperate with each other and also with external stakeholders. A coalition of interests must be created, among the Member States in the macroregion. In this sense, the CPMR is doing an interesting job of drawing the essential outline of a future Mediterranean Integrated Strategy, steeped in an ambitious spirit of cooperation between both shores. Realistically, however, in the light of recent political changes in the most important countries on the southern shore (Egypt, Libya, etc.), we cannot ignore the extraordinary difficulties faced by the

comprehensive approach. A time of political instability is not the best for this kind of initiative.

These being the basic circumstances surrounding the birth of a Mediterranean macroregion, perhaps it would be best to think of a step-by-step process, in stages, by area or basin. This is the opinion of the autonomous government official interviewed: "Andalusia looks southward; cooperation with Morocco is of prime importance, but the most realistic scenario today would be to redirect cooperation towards neighbourhood policy, through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)". So from a macroregional perspective, our horizon would initially be on the northern shore (western area), but this has its problems too, due basically to political differences between governments, at internal level, between Spanish Mediterranean ARs,

and also at transnational level. Furthermore, and most importantly, there seem to be no initiatives in the area that would lead us to believe in macro-regional vocation.

This rather hazy situation contrasts openly with the proposal, still only embryonic but which has already spawned the Ancona Declaration, signed in May 2010 by representatives of the governments belonging to the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia y Slovenia), after the meeting of its Council. The document states their general willingness to deepen, improve and increase cooperation, and is accompanied by another document which specifically supports the idea of a EU strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian area, in line with those already designed for the Baltic and the Danube.

Map 2.4.

Adriatic-Ionian Initiative





XIII Adriatic and Ionian Council Meeting. © Committee of the Regions.

Second

The creation of a macroregion should give added value to the management of existing policies, applying an integral approach, strongly in favour of coordination and cooperation.

Very diverse European initiatives, for specific instruments and programmes, meet in the Mediterranean (each with its own funding). This means approaches are diverse; a diversity of aims means a tight network of institutional agents in the area to carry them out. In full consciousness of that need, the IMC document on Mediterra-

nean Integrated Strategy, presenting the future Mediterranean macroregion, insists that it is necessary to explore potential tools for harmonizing the different transnational and international initiatives that meet in the Mediterranean. As is to be expected, a similar approach is proposed in the specific spheres of action deployed in the European Union, in order to integrate European strategic guidelines coherently with state and local operational programmes. The idea is to join forces, not scatter them, by configuring a coordinated strategy to avoid functional duplicity and

overlapping initiatives. It is necessary to take advantage of the synergies derived from the volume of basic current cooperative experiences, which should give way to a macroregional project developed through strategic actions and projects, with the participation of all government levels within the framework of European cooperation (CPMR, 2011:2).

In this sense, despite long cooperative experience in the Mediterranean, we cannot ignore the fact that the picture of political and action coordination in the area today is highly unsatisfactory: funding is extraordinarily scattered, and there seems to be no predominant move to coordinate it. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was created in 2007 partly in order to respond to this need for coordination. The ENPI substituted several existing geographic and thematic programmes between the EU and neighbouring countries, such as MEDA and TACIS, and so concentrates most funds destined for Euro-Mediterranean regional programmes. However, the financial systems are still fragmented, and the resources available for the territorial approach are still scarce, so the IMC, in designing a set of thematic priorities to be dealt with by a future Mediterranean macroregion, introduces a series of guidelines in relation to certain projects which are already in motion, as potentially applicable at macroregional level (CPMR, 2011: 4-6).

Third

One of the requirements for the creation of a macroregion being that funds are not increased but better used, the coordinating effort, in an area in which several financial instruments meet, is a key factor. Given the heterogeneousness of stakeholders, programmes, initiatives and instruments which in the current circumstances would surround the development of the actions defined by the strategy and which, as in the Baltic case, is an obstacle for the ideal use of funds already assigned to operative programmes, it would seem logical to apply a macroregional approach to the configuration of transnational programmes for the 2014-20 period. This approach might be useful in redefining the geographic scope of transnational cooperation programmes (Mediterranean Institute, 2010).

From this standpoint precisely, the CPMR Atlantic Arc Commission recommends creating the "macroregional operative programme", whose job would be to decide on priority projects and the responsibilities of each stakeholder (European Union, Member States, regional and local authorities), based on the previously designed Strategy (CPMR, 2010). This proposal could obviously be included in the definition process of the 2014-20 budget. The need to synchronise initiatives to applicable financial mechanisms emerges as a basic element to bear in mind in order to optimise macroregional strategy.

The synchronisation approach should also be applied to the policies to be put into effect in macroregional strategy; these policies, if they are to be successful to any degree, should flow parallel to other European initiatives regarding similar affairs. Integrated maritime policy and the European transport network are examples of this: In the Baltic macroregion, overlapping and uncoordinated situations have been detected which do nothing for macroregional efficiency.

Map 2.5.

The Mediterranean Basin





3

The Mediterranean area:

a traditional
scene of regional
relations and
interaction

Marcela Iglesias

The evolution of regional relations in the Mediterranean through History

3.1.1. Intergovernmental relations in the regionalisation process framework

A feature of the Mediterranean area is the fact that it has been the scene of the most complex, multidimensional neighbourhood relationships in History: it has seen the development of millenary civilisations; it has been the cradle of the most widespread monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism); the meeting point of three continents (Africa, Asia and Europe); a platform for human communication and exchange (cultural, commercial and political); witness to rivalry and cooperation among its peoples; in short, a *mare nostrum* that sometimes unites, sometimes divides, but where interdependence always predominates.

Strictly speaking, the Mediterranean washes the shores of 21 countries plus the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories): those belonging to the European Union (Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia), to the Balkans (Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Turkey), the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan) and the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya). However, when referring to the Mediterranean area, we tend to include countries which are geographically near, belonging to the

Maghreb or European subsystems even if they have no Mediterranean shore: namely, Mauritania and Portugal.

The Mediterranean area thus contains four regions with specific features: on the northern shore, Eastern and Western Europe, long estranged though sharing the same soil, the Christian culture and a process of economic and political integration which has speeded up since the fall of the Berlin Wall; on the southern shore, Egypt and the Maghreb countries, and on the eastern shore, the Middle East and Asia Minor, all very large territories set on two different continents, burdened by divisions and the permanent Arab-Israeli conflict (Pérez Serrano, 2006: 212).

Through the nineteenth century and up to the mid-twentieth, the north and south shores have had an imperialistic, colonial relationship which has kept the Mediterranean united but at the same time has created an abysmal gap as to economic development. Despite certain political and economic advances in the southern countries, the Mediterranean has the deepest north/south economic and human development divide in the world³.

³ According to World Bank figures, in 2007 the pondered mean GNI per capita (in 2005 PPP) in the Mediterranean Arab Countries was 5,537 dollars, 17% of the 30,921 euro region GNI. In 1995 the difference was similar: 4,294 dollars versus 24,884 (17.26%). At this pace of convergence, Morocco would need 241 years to reach 50% of the GNI per capita in euro zone PPP. Tunisia, the only country experiencing a certain convergence process, would need over 62 years (Martin, 2010:9). As to the Human Development Index (HDI), France is ranked 14th, Spain is 20th, Italy is 23rd, Tunisia is 81st, Morocco is 114th, Senegal is 144th and Mali is 160th. 2010 UNDP Report on Human Development.

This has unchained important non-military security problems which are the outcome of underdevelopment and poverty: clandestine immigration, terrorism and organised crime, unemployment, scarce and inadequate urbanisation, pollution, water scarcity, among others. All these affect the region as a whole and are known as “human security” problems, a concept which transcends that of “national security”, being multidimensional and integral, and covering political, economic, social, food, health, demographic and environmental aspects.

During the Cold War, Europe implemented successive policies projected towards the Mediterranean, such as the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972), the Euro-Arab Dialogue (1974), the New Mediterranean Policy (1986) and the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (1990), the Barcelona Process (1995) was doubtless the most ambitious modernisation project for the Mediterranean. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the first EU multilateral project, integrating economic, political and socio-cultural aspects in long-term cooperation, in which the concept of partnership replaced that of aid, giving way to cooperation both ways. In order to carry out this strategy, European diplomacy headed by Spain, France and Italy admitted that it was crucial to give significance to the Mediterranean space, putting the accent on cultural aspects shared by the different countries in the Mediterranean Basin, rather than the centuries-long differences or divides.

That is how Europe, aware of the risks and opportunities due to the end of the bipolar order and the transition to a multipolar world (which

had actually begun to emerge in the seventies), considered that it must potentiate the Mediterranean as a region for preferential action, its sphere of influence, by reviving the feeling of Mediterranean identity in order to avoid, or at least minimise, the intrusion of other powers, especially the United States with its Greater Middle East and North Africa Initiative.

In 1990, the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (RMP) was based on the idea that the stability and security of the Mediterranean area depended greatly on progress in Third Mediterranean Countries (TMC) and balanced, harmonised development in the Mediterranean Basin. In practice, the RMP consisted of financial aid for horizontal, decentralised cooperation programmes for the environment, human resources, the creation of mixed enterprises, and sub-regional cooperation in the south. Some examples are MED-Campus (higher education), MED-Invest (small and medium business development), MED-Urbs (territorial collectivities), MED-media (mass media professionals) and MED-Avicenne (research centres); all of them focus on creating networks in civil society for sharing experiences both sides of the Mediterranean⁴.

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), born in the nineties, was a Spanish-Italian proposal intended to introduce in the Mediterranean and the Middle East a security and cooperation scheme inspired in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), under the double “totality” and “progressiveness” condition, that is, a process which advances by stages, starting with affairs in which

4 Little by little, the RMP acquired neoliberal political and economic content, linking national economic progress in the TMCs to the strengthening of market powers and the promotion of democratic values and respect to human rights. After some disagreement between the EEC Commission and the Council, as to what line the RMP should take, it was finally decided to condition Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to the TMCs' acceptance of structural adjustment policies driven by the IMF and the World Bank, instead of the Commission's suggestion.

consensus level is highest, and leaving conflictive affairs (such as the Israeli-Palestinian question) for later (Barbé Izuel, 1993:82). The initiative did not then prosper, but its spirit as to gradualness has lived on and is reborn in each proposal made by European Mediterranean countries in search of a more agile, concrete and efficient cooperation level, for which an agreement framework is required with a more limited number of members. Some examples are the 5+5 Dialogue, the Ministerial Conference of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Mediterranean Forum, or the Union for the Mediterranean. The main accomplishment of all these initiatives was not so much their content, or the measures they proposed, but having made the rest of European partners (especially Germany) aware that the Mediterranean is a priority area of strategic importance for the EU, at a time when European attention towards the centre and east of the continent was unbalancing the geographical distribution of European funds.

Because of its nature, the CSCM initiative had no place in the European Economic Community or in European Political Cooperation, which expressly excluded cooperation in military security and defence. But the Maastricht Treaty (1992), by which the EU was created, established a Common Foreign and Security Policy which could (and should, given the instability in the region) include relations with Mediterranean neighbours. So the June 1994 European Council on Corfu sends a mandate for the Council to evaluate, together with the Commission, EU comprehensive policy in the Mediterranean and possible ways to reinforce it, and at the same time contemplates the possibility of calling a Euro-Mediterranean conference in 1995 (Castaño García, 2004: 23). In obedience to that mandate, in October 1994 the Commission presents a communication before the Council and the Parliament, proposing the creation of a Euro-Medi-

terranean Association (EMA). The outcome of this proposal was the First Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995, under Spanish EU presidency, with the attendance of the fifteen EU members plus twelve MTCs: Algiers, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta (these became EU members in 2004).

After arduous negotiations, the twenty-seven participating countries approved the final Declaration of the Conference and an Action Plan for the EMA to start as a partnership. The strategic aim was the creation of a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean association in order to make the Mediterranean a space for peace, stability and prosperity by intensifying dialogue on policy and security, and the instauration of economic and financial, and social, cultural and human associations⁵. These questions were organised in three baskets or chapters:

- *Political and security*: the aim is to create good neighbourhood relations, to study measures for trust and security, and to define joint disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in order to achieve peace and stability in the area.
- *Economic and finance*: it was agreed to create a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010 (which has not yet materialised), by signing bilateral association agreements with the EU (which came into effect between 1998 and 2005, with the exception of Syria, which has not yet signed), and through financial aid channelled for development cooperation, and loans from the European Investment Bank (which since 2004 has made loans amounting to 6,700 million euros, and up to 7,600 million for the 2009-13 period).

5 Final Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Barcelona, 27-28 November, 1995.

- *Socio-cultural and human*: the aim was to promote inter-cultural dialogue and an approach and interchange between civil societies, for which decentralised cooperation was necessary.

One of the original elements of the Barcelona Process was multilateralism, which theoretically includes open regionalism and places all countries as partners and active participants. This feature is lost with the adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which returns to bilateralism in relations between the EU and TMCs, who lose their status as “partners” (subjects, active participants in political decision-making and elaboration) in order to become “neighbours” (objects receiving the decisions made by the EU). We must also point out, secondly, the institutionalisation of the process, under the figure of the Conference, which met with a certain regularity and which promoted dialogue between Euro-Mediterranean, regional and local authorities and also at civil society level, through specially created forums (Martínez Dalmau, 2006: 175), such as the EuroMed Civil Forum (1995), the Euromed Network for Human Rights (1997), the Euromediterranean Forum of Economic Science Institutes (created in 1997 and which became an Association in 2005), the Euromed Trade Union Forum (1999), the Euro-Mediterranean Network for Social Economics (ESMED) (2000), the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (2004), the Euromed Non-Governmental Platform (2005), the Anna Lindh Foundation for Inter-cultural Dialogue (2005), the Euro-Mediterranean University (2008) and the most recent Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM), created in January 2010, among many others.

As a financial instrument for diminishing the negative short-term effects of the gradual implantation of bilateral Free Trade Zones, the EMA dis-

posed of resources corresponding to the MEDA I Programme⁶, in force up to 1999, of which 90% went to bilateral relations, and only 10% to regional cooperation. Bilateral cooperation was thus focused on enhancing structural adjustments, economic transition and cushioning the social consequences of these processes; regionally, resources were channeled towards industry, water, the environment, transport and the society of information (Pérez Serrano, 2006: 231-232). However, the percentage of disbursement on the commitments acquired was only 28.6 because of operative limitations and the extraordinary complexity of aid regulation. This deficiency was corrected in MEDA II (2000-2006) with 4,600 million euros, in which the proportion between disbursement and the commitments acquired grew from 55.4% in 2000 to 82.9% in 2003 and 112.2% in 2004, due to the increase in quick-disbursing budget programmes (Debrat, 2007: 284).

On the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Conference, on 27-28 November 2005 the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Summit was held, which took stock of fulfillment of the aims established in the Partnership work groups. Among the wide range of opinions, some more optimistic than others, there was a certain criticism as to the insufficient funds destined to Euro-Mediterranean programmes (in comparison to funds destined to Eastern and Central European Countries); scarce attention to migratory problems and agricultural trade, which took second place on the agenda; the excessive bureaucratisation of financial access mechanisms; the low level of ownership achieved in TMCs; the lack of specific content in the security chapter; to name only a few.

It is generally agreed that the main obstacle for the normal development of the Barcelona Process has been the failure of the Middle Eastern peace process. It is clear that the Arab-Israeli conflict

6 MEDA comes from the French *Mesures d'Accompagnement*.

is an important setback for Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, but we must not put the whole blame on it. The South-South integration promotion aim has not advanced at all, as for example in the case of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), with its festering Western Sahara Conflict and the fight for regional predominance between Algeria and Morocco. And inevitably, the terrorist attacks on New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) have had a great impact on the security and socio-cultural baskets. The clearest example of this is the political media treatment of the migratory question. The presence of an important number of Muslim immigrants residing legally in Europe, together with the illegal entry of people from Islamic countries, has generated a state of often magnified worry endangering advances in intercultural dialogue, and even giving way to situations of discrimination, racism, and xenophobia (Iglesias, 2010: 79).

Perhaps because of this, and bearing in mind that immigration is a structural element in European countries and societies, in 2005 it was decided to include a fourth basket in the Partnership: immigration, social integration, security and justice. However, if migratory policies are dealt with only from the security angle, which is what has been happening for some time, in the medium and long run they may not be efficient enough for Europe to achieve a true European space for freedom, security and justice, an aim proclaimed in the current primary law of the EU. Therefore, as the migratory phenomenon constitutes a transverse theme in the three Barcelona Process baskets—in the political and security basket (orderly management of migratory flows), the

economic and financial basket (work market, remittances, investments), and the socio-cultural (cultural dialogue)—it is of key importance to develop a comprehensive, integrating perspective, taking full advantage of instruments such as co-development which contribute to move the social basket with a positive impact on the other baskets, generating economic progress and stability; the different Barcelona Process baskets are all interrelated.

Certain politicians, think tanks and civil society organisations have come to bittersweet conclusions, as to the results obtained not meeting with initial aims; however, the Barcelona Process has had two great virtues: it has withstood those political difficulties which have made it impossible to achieve satisfactory results, and it has given way to the Union for the Mediterranean, comprised of 43 Euro-Mediterranean members including Arab countries and Israel.

In this context, there is a general climate of doubt and uncertainty as to what direction Euro-Mediterranean relations will take, with the application of the ENP, a policy that was born in 2002 within the framework of the imminent inclusion of Eastern European countries in the EU, and in answer to pressure towards redefining its geographical boundaries and its relations with its new neighbours⁷. The declared aim was to avoid the appearance of new fractures on the European borders, having the neighbours take part in the advantages of amplification (stability, security and progress) through a privileged relationship, that is, inclusion in the European Market (free circulation of goods, capital and services, but not people), and

7 Members of the European Neighbourhood Policy are: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Lebanon (southern and eastern Mediterranean) and Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia (Eastern Europe). Algeria, Syria and Libya have not been included, though they and Russia could benefit from the ENPI.

participation in some community programmes, although without the political rights given by full EU membership: the well-known “everything but the institutions” slogan.

Among ENP instruments are Action Plans and the New European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), formalised in 2007. The aim is to define, together with partners, a set of priority areas, aims and actions, which take shape in the Action Plan and the fulfillment of which brings them closer to the EU. The ENPI has replaced the earlier MEDA, Interreg, TACIS⁸ and PHARE⁹ programmes, and has a budget of 11,810 million euros for the 2007-2013 period¹⁰. Officially it has been assured that the ENP reinforce and give new impulse to the Barcelona Process; however, changes in method are obviously against multilateralism and the structure of the Partnership, as TMCs are no longer partners but neighbours.

Very possibly because of this, the Mediterranean currently has a strong sub-regional component, especially the Western basin. It so happens that, in a hurry to solve everyday problems such as managing migratory flow, environmental pollution, a rational use of water and energy, the improvement of the transport network, etc., some countries have grouped for joint action. Starting at the Helsinki Conference in 1974, when the Maltese delegation proposed the *Mediterranean*

Dimension (“there can be no security in Europe if there is no security in the Mediterranean, and vice-versa”), sub-regional meetings, conventions and projects have proliferated, under different names but usually with the same participating countries: the Euro-Arab Dialogue (a French initiative in 1974), the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (a Spanish-Italian initiative in 1990), the 5+5 Dialogue¹¹ (a French initiative in the 80s, reinitiated by Spain and Italy in 1990), the Mediterranean Forum¹² (a French-Egyptian initiative in 1994), up to the Ministerial Conference in Barcelona in 1995, which gave way to the Barcelona Process during the Spanish European presidency.

The Mediterranean Union project, initiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, was nothing new. It was first proposed in Toulon on 7 February 2007, during his election campaign, and it is closely linked to the April 2007 Avicenna Report, which highlights the need to enliven French foreign policy in the Maghreb and the Middle East, in order to counteract the erosion of France’s role in the region, and reinforce its strategic position in the Mediterranean. The original idea was that the Mediterranean Union would include a small number of countries (Mediterranean nations, European and non-European, including Turkey), and operate independently of the European Union without openly confronting the Barcelona Process, considered a failure.

8 TACIS: *Technical Assistance of the Commonwealth of Independent States*.

9 PHARE: *Poland-Hungary: Aid for Restructuring Policy*, later named: *Programme of Community Aid to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*.

10 The 2007-2010 period has seen a disbursement of a total 2,962 million euros for Mediterranean member nations, of which Morocco has been the most benefited with 654 million euros, followed by the Palestinian Authority (632 million), Egypt (558 million) y Tunisia (300 million). In March 2010, 16 new National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) were approved for 2011-13, which should give way to new Action Plans.

11 Group 4 (Italy, Spain, France and Portugal) + 5 (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) + 1 (Malta, observer, joins in October 1991).

12 This is a regional institution for intergovernmental dialogue, made up of 11 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Turkey. It has an annual rotational presidency.

However, the initial idea did not prosper, due mainly to opposition by Germany (who said that the project might threaten the EU nucleus, and that France could not drive an initiative forward using EU funds, without the presence of non-Mediterranean European countries) and the lack of enthusiasm on the part of Southern shore countries (Morocco was pursuing a “differentiated status”, Algeria privileges its association agreement with the EU, Tunisia would prefer reinforcement of the 5+5 Dialogue, and Turkey was offended, seeing it as an alternative to EU adhesion). Spain, fearful that the Mediterranean Union would replace the Barcelona Process, and that she would lose the leading role as the EMA promoter, seemed relieved that the original project had so many opponents that it would probably not get off the ground. Adopting a practical stance, in accordance with the idea of supporting the institutionalisation of the Barcelona Process, Spain agreed to negotiate a solution which would combine the different points of view. Several countries, without disagreeing openly, defended the idea of framing the new initiative better within the current Euro-Mediterranean policy started in Barcelona in 1995, in order to avoid institutional duplication and overlapping (Khader, 2008: 73, 77).

Finally, after negotiation, a final formula was agreed on in Rome in 2007. It was launched jointly by France, Italy and Spain, and consolidated after the French-German agreement in March 2008, and has little to do with the original idea. The Mediterranean Union idea, which would have been a small group of countries (initially the 5+5 Dialogue plus Egypt and Turkey, gradually growing and extending to the rest), and left the European Union out, became “The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, made up of all the Barcelona Process members, plus Mauritania, Libya and Albania, which had been observers up to then, and new members on the Mediterranean shore, such as Croatia,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Monaco. The “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” was officially born at the summit in Paris on 13 July 2008, which brought together 42 Heads of State or Government from the EU and the Mediterranean area (Morocco was represented by the brother of King Mohamed VI, and the Libyan leader Muammar el Gadafi did not attend). The summit was co-presided by the French and Egyptian Presidents, Nicolas Sarkozy and Hosni Mubarak, and ended in a Joint Declaration defining the basic aims: to reinforce multilateral relations, increase the co-appropriation of the process, establish its rule in terms of equality, and make the Barcelona Process aims into concrete, tangible projects, visible to the citizens.

The new institutional structures are: EU member-TMC co-Presidency, Heads of State and Government summits every two years, annual Foreign Minister meetings, and a Secretariat with a permanent seat. Brussels is the home of the Permanent Joint Committee of high-ranking officials, whilst the Secretariat in Barcelona coordinates the cooperation projects proposed by its members. These are the first six great selected projects:

- *Decontamination of the Mediterranean Sea:* Working on coasts, protected marine areas, and water and residue treatment.
- *Creation of highways on sea and land:* A Greek-Egyptian initiative for creating regular sea lines for the transport of goods between the main ports and highways on the southern Mediterranean coastline, together with the modernisation of railways crossing the Maghreb.
- *Development of a Mediterranean solar energy plan,* in order to respond to a growing demand for energy by the countries on the South shore, under sustainable development criteria.

- *A joint civil protection programme* for the prevention of catastrophes.
- *Creation of a Euro-Mediterranean University*, proposed by Slovenia, to enhance cooperation in higher education and research, with a Euro-Mediterranean, Erasmus-type student interchange programme.
- *Creation of an agency* for small and medium businesses, a Spanish-Italian initiative¹³.

In order to finance the projects, the EU has proposed to seek the aid of the private sector, and also assets through bilateral cooperation between the 27 community members and other members of the initiative, and funds from international financial institutions, including regional banks. Projects could also have some financial aid from the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) and the ENPI, but it could

only have up to 10% of the ENP. Due to political setbacks related to the Arab-Israeli conflict¹⁴ and the lack of concrete financial commitment, not all the projects have begun to be operative, although preparatory meetings have taken place and viability studies are being done.

We must highlight the Spanish Government's efforts for the implementation of this initiative, especially during the Spanish EU Presidency, during which the UfM Secretariat Statutes were approved (3 March 2010), and also the Seat Agreement between Spain and the UfM Secretariat 4 May 2010), by which the Secretariat is housed in the Pedralbes Palace in Barcelona, with its own autonomous statute and legal personality. The Spanish Government also worked hard on organising the Second UfM Summit, which was to take place in Barcelona, in June 2010, as the aftermath of the July 2008 Paris Summit.



13 *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean*. Paris, 13/07/2008, 18-20 (Annexe).

14 The request by the Mediterranean Arab Countries to give the Arab League observer status at all Euro-Mediterranean meetings (and not only bi-annual summits), and Israeli opposition, have deadlocked the UfM for months.

3.1.2. Relations between sub-national stakeholders —regional and local— in decentralised cooperation

As vital stakeholders in setting off territorial cooperation actions, local and regional collectivities have long been claiming a more active political and operative role within the framework of regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration, founding pillar of the EMA, establishes that within the economic and financial partnership, the Member States are committed to stimulating cooperation between local collectivities, in pro of territorial ordinance; in the social, cultural and human sphere, they agree to provide and/or reinforce the necessary tools for decentralised cooperation; and the Work Programme in the Declaration points out that partnership actions can be executed by the States, local or regional entities, or stakeholders in civil society. However, the truth is that during the first years of the EMA their action has been practically testimonial (Martín 2009b).

Local and territorial stakeholders have therefore advanced in their claims for heading their own initiatives, linked to their territories, through encounters such as the Forum of Local Collectivities, held in Marseilles in 2000 within the Euromed Civil Forum. Three years later, in November 2003, the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Mayors was held in Venice, where 102 mayors requested the creation of a regional programme for cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean towns within the MEDA project. In Barcelona 2005, the Arc Latin Association, made up of collectivities in Spain, France and Italy, organized the seminar “Current state and perspectives for decentralised cooperation between Euro-Mediterranean local governments”, which proposed the creation of a “Decentralized cooperation observatory”, very similar to the proposal made by the Committee of the Regions in April 2004, defending the need to have a coordination mechanism and a specific financial tool for decentralized cooperation.

The signatories of the Declaration of the Regions and Cities of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, passed after the Euromediterranean Cities Conference in Barcelona, just before the November 2005 Euromediterranean Summit of Heads of State and Government, expressed themselves along the same lines. This declaration requests the creation of a permanent Euromediterranean forum of regional and local authorities, recognized and supported by the Euromediterranean partnership, and also an observatory for decentralised cooperation and coordination.

A few years later, in June 2008, the Mediterranean Commission of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) organized the “Forum of local and regional Mediterranean authorities”, just before the Union for the Mediterranean Summit in Paris. In the final Declaration, addressed to the Heads of State and Government of the UfM, the 140 mayors urged the creation of a formal representation system for territorial collectivities in the Euro-mediterranean partnership, linking them to the design and implementation of the main policies, assuring sub-national governments an ever more active role in the modernisation of public policy, based on the multilevel governance model.

The local and regional authorities’ protesting effort has not been in vain; quite to the contrary, it has had operative and political effects. Operatively, they achieved the launching of different regional programmes such as the Med-Pact (Local Authorities Partnership in the Mediterranean) program, financed with 5 million euros for the 2006-2009 period, and is successor the CIUDAD Program (Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue), financed with 14 million for the 2009-2011 period (8 million for the Southern and 6 million for the Eastern Mediterranean). The aim of the latter was to promote dialogue and cooperation between local

Euro-Mediterranean stakeholders, in order to reinforce the powers of local and regional authorities for good governance and long-term, sustainable, integrated town planning. Sectoral priorities have been: a) sustainable management of the environment and energetic efficiency (water, city transport, residues, etc.); b) sustainable economic development and decrease in social disparity (competivity, marginal urban neighbourhoods, minority and immigrant integration, etc.); and c) good governance and sustainable town planning (planning tools, technical assistance, visits, studies, seminars, etc.). One of the keys to this programme has been that local stakeholders benefitting from the project could be in any Euro-Mediterranean member state in the Southern Mediterranean or Eastern Europe, without the cross-border cooperation programme limitations according to which only certain “eligible” regions can benefit.

Also, several sectoral regional programmes were set off, each with an estimated budget of 4 to 5 million euros for a period of 3 to 4 years. For the 2007-2010 period, 343 million euros were destined for these programmes. Some examples are: *Euro-Med Migration II* (2008-2011, 5 million euros); *Euro-Med Bridge dans le secteur de la protection civile* (2004-2008, 1.9 million euros); *INVEST in MED* (2008-2011, 9 million euros)

which followed *ANIMA* (2002-2007, 3.5 million euros); *EMWIS/SEMIDE Système euro-méditerranéen d'information sur le savoir-faire dans le domaine de l'eau* (2004-2008, 3.3 million euros); *MEDA Eau* (2003-2008, 40 million euros); *SMAP III Développement environnemental durable* (2005-2008, 15 million euros); *Euro Med Heritage II-III* (2002-2008, 40 million euros), to name a few (Martín, 2009a).

As to political recognition, aside from support from the EMA and the later Union for the Mediterranean, the Committee of the Regions decided to promote the creation of the ARLEM, which was born in Barcelona on 21 January 2010, and which is the institutional framework for regional participation in the development of the UfM¹⁵.

There are currently different networks and associative authorities, grouping local and regional collectivities in the Mediterranean; they have been appearing since the nineties, and have been a key factor for political and operative recognition of local and regional stakeholders in European programmes. In the Western Mediterranean Basin, we should mention the Mediterranean Commission of the UCLG¹⁶, the Inter-Mediterranean Commission (IMC) of the CPMR¹⁷, the Arc Latin¹⁸, MedCités¹⁹ and the Standing Committee for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Local

15 The ARLEM was created in 2010 and has 84 members, representing regions or local structures in the EU and its sixteen Mediterranean partners.

16 Constituted in Marseilles in May 2005.

17 Created in Andalusia in 1990, in order to express the common interests of Mediterranean regions in the main European negotiations. As a result of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, among other things, its attention has extended to the regions of the Mediterranean Basin as a whole. The IMC now has about 50 members belonging to 10 countries (Cyprus, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia).

18 The Arc Latin Association was officially born in Montpellier in June 2002, although it actually exists since 1999, and is made up of 71 (18 Spanish, 12 French and 41 Italian) regions and departments.

19 MedCités is a network of 21 towns on the Mediterranean coast, created in Barcelona in 1991 by initiative of the Mediterranean Technical Assistance Programme (METAP), established by the World Bank, the European Commission and the UNDP in 1990 for environmental improvement in the Mediterranean.

and Regional Authorities (COPPEM)²⁰, among others. Some Medgovernance regions have participated very actively in several of these networks. Andalusia, in particular, is a member of different regional cooperation groups, such as the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (CLRAE), the Assembly of European Border Regions (AEBR), the Group of Legislative Regions (REG-LEG), the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE), the Arc Latin, ARLEM, etc. (Tuñón, 2010: 95). Chapter 2, in its sub-chapter “Interregional association in the Mediterranean”, gives a

detailed analysis of the degree of participation of Medgovernance regions in the main interregional associations.

Since the mid-nineties, Andalusia has also taken part in many projects with other European regions, within EU cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation programmes, through the Cohesion Policy and the ERDF. During the 2000-2006 period, the Andalusian Government, through its different Departments, participated in over 100 projects, either heading and coordinating or side by side with other regions. The projects are shown in Table 3.1²¹.

20 COPPEM was constituted in Palermo (Italy) in November 2000 by initiative of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions and the Arab Towns Organisation.

21 Said participation has meant over 100 million euros in European funds for the Andalusian AR, in 2000-2006 (Andalusian Government, 2006: 9).

Table 3.1.

Participation of the Andalusian Government in the Interreg-III Initiative (2000-2006)

INTERREG III-A Cross-border cooperation

AIM
The impulse of cross-border cooperation between authorities of neighbouring countries, and the development of cross-border economic centres through joint strategies for lasting territorial development.

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME
SPAIN-PORTUGAL [Spain and Portugal]

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 23

Nº of projects as leader: 20

Total cost of projects (€): 64.140.033

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME
SPAIN-MOROCCO [Spain and Morocco]

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 27

Nº of projects as leader: 27

Total cost of projects (€): 77.559.230

INTERREG III-B Trans-national cooperation

AIM

To enhance transnational cooperation between national, regional and local authorities, in order to promote better territorial integration in the European Union thanks to the birth of large groups of European regions.

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME

WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN [Spain (Andalusia, Aragon, Balears, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, Murcia, Ceuta And Melilla), France (Corsica, Languedoc-Roussellon, Provence-Alps-Côte D'azur and Rhone-Alps), Portugal (Algarve and Alentejo), Italy (Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romana, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardy, Umbria, Piedmont, Sardinia, Sicily, Tuscany and Aosta Valley), UK (Gibraltar)].

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 23

Nº of projects as leader: 3

Total cost of projects (€): 42.958.227

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME

DIAGONAL CONTINENTAL SOUTHWEST [Spain (whole territory), Portugal (whole territory), France (Aquitaine, Auverne, Languedoc-Roussellon, Limousin, Midi-Pyrenees, Poitou-Charentes), UK (Gibraltar).]

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 5

Nº of projects as leader: 1

Total cost of projects (€): 4.942.247

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME

ATLANTIC SPACE [Portugal (whole territory), Ireland (whole territory), Spain (Asturias, Cantabria, Navarra, Basque Country, La Rioja, Castile And Leon And Canaries, And The Andalusian Provinces Of Huelva, Cadiz And Seville –France (Aquitaine, Poitou-Charentes, Loire Country, Brittany, Bas Normandie, Haut Normandie, Limousin, Central And Midi-Pyrenees), Uk (Cumbria, Lancashire, Gran Manchester, Cheshire, Merseyside, Worcestershire and Warwickshire, Avon, Gloucestershire Y Wiltshire, Dorset and Somerset, Cornwall and Devon, Staffordshire, Herefordshire, Shropshire and West Midlands, The 22 Unitary Circumscriptions of Wales, Northern Ireland, Highlands, Islands and Southwestern Scotland)].

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 8

Nº of projects as leader: 2

Total cost of projects (€): 23.545.897

INTERREG III-C Interregional cooperation

AIM

To improve the efficacy of policies and instruments for regional development and cohesion through networks and exchange of experiences. The whole EU territory has been eligible, divided into zones to make the programme management easier.

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME

SOUTH ZONE

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 9

Nº of projects as leader: 1

Total cost of projects (€): 26.844.689

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME

WEST ZONE

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 4

Nº of projects as leader: 0

Total cost of projects (€): 19.228.519

OPERATIVE PROGRAMME

NORTH ZONE

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 4

Nº of projects as leader: 0

Total cost of projects (€): 1.453.333

INTERACT

AIM:

To promote the interchange of experiences and the establishment of a cooperation network, the diffusion of information and support for all stakeholders involved in managing INTERREG III programmes. To supply information on INTERREG activities to national, regional and local stakeholders and to the general public.

Nº of projects in which the Junta de Andalucía participated: 1

Nº of projects as leader: 0

Total cost of projects (€): 591.700

Within the current 2007-2013 period for EU Cohesion Policy funds, Andalusia is taking part in six programmes in the three chapters of European Territorial Cooperation Objective:

a) In the cross-border cooperation chapter:

- “*Spanish-Portuguese 2007-2013” Operative Programme (POCTEP)*, for the joint management of border region infrastructures, equipments, services and socio-economic development. Eligible areas are: Galicia-North, North-Castile and Leon, Castile and Leon-Centre, Centre-Extremadura-Alentejo, and Andalusia-Algarve-Alentejo. The project has funds of 354,024,540 euros. In its first call, 81 projects out of 328 were approved; in 15 of them one of the participants was an Andalusian partner, 12 of them with Alentejo-Algarve and 3 multiregional (15,367 million euros from ERDF funds). In the second call, 114 projects out of 269 were approved. Distribution of projects by Cooperation Area in the second call was as follows: 35 projects in Galicia-North of Portugal; 13 in North of Portugal-Castile and Leon; 12 in Castile and Leon-Centre; 21 projects in Centre-Extremadura-Alentejo; 17 in Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia and lastly, 16 multiregional projects. Andalusia is a partner in 20 projects, of which 17 are with Alentejo-Algarve and 3 are multiregional²².
- “*Spain-External borders 2008-2013” Operative Programme (POCTEFEX)*, for streng-

thening and maintaining the networks created among agents in the eligible border areas of Andalusia, Ceuta, Melilla and the north of Morocco during INTERREG cooperation. POCTEFEX 2008-09 was a transitional tool, but after the deadline for an agreement between the partners for an operative programme adjusted to the ENPI cross-border and maritime basins, on 30 June 2010 it was decided to redirect the ERDF funds assigned to the programme, through POCTEFEX 2008-13, within the European Territorial Cooperation Objective. In the first POCTEFEX call, out of 98 candidates, 39 projects were approved (in 27 of which there is some Andalusian partner): 30 in the Straits area and 9 in the Atlantic, in execution up to June 2011. Of the 25.5 million euros in ERDF funds, 21.5 are for the Straits area. The second call is supposed to communicate its resolution in October 2011 at the latest, and the execution deadline for selected projects will be December 2013. The maximum ERDF amount available is 63 million for the 2010-2013 period²³.

b) In the trans-national cooperation chapter:

- “*Southwestern European Space” Operative Programme (SUDOE)*, for cooperation in competitiveness and innovation, the environment, sustainable development and planning. Partners are: Portugal (the whole territory), the UK (Gibraltar), Spain (the whole country except the Canary Islands) and France (Aquitaine, Auvergne, Languedoc-

22 <http://www.poctep.eu/>

23 <http://www.poctefex.eu/>

Roussillon, Limousine, Midi-Pyrenees, and Poitou Charente). Total funding amounts to 132,055,638 euros. In the first call, in 2008, out of 256 candidates, 46 projects were approved, in 13 of which there is an Andalusian partner. In the second call 28 out of 223 were approved; Andalusian agents take part in 10 of them and head 2 of these.

- *“Mediterranean Space Operative Programme” (MED)*, for strengthening the region’s innovative capacities, improving territorial mobility and accessibility, protecting the environment and promoting the sustainable, polycentric, integrated development of the Mediterranean space. The programme covers the following areas: Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Slovenia (the whole territories), France (Corsica, Languedoc-Roussillon, PACA and Rhone-Alps), Portugal (Algarve and Alentejo), the United Kingdom (Gibraltar), Spain (Andalusia, Aragon, Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Murcia, Valencia and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla) and Italy (Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venice-Giulia, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardy, Marche, Molise, Umbria and the Piedmont). It has a budget of 256,617,688 euros. The first call (2008) approved 50 projects out of 524 candidates. There were 91 Spanish partners (22.2% of total participants); only Italy had more (121 partners, 29.51%). As to project leaders, Spain had 9 (18%), behind Greece with 12 (24%) and Italy with 19 (38%). Andalusia participated in 22 projects and was the leader in 4 of them. In the second (2009) call, of 451 candidate projects, 52 were

approved. Spain participated with 93 partners (19.54%) and 12 leaders (23%), second only to Italy with 134 partners (28.15%) and 17 leaders (51%), and followed by Greece (91 partners and 6 leaders) and France (66 partners and 4 leaders)²⁴. There are Andalusian partners in 16 projects, and leaders in 3.

- *“Atlantic Space” Operative Programme*, for transnational promotion of networks for innovation, protection and maritime security and sustainability in the coastal environment, improvement of accessibility and internal and international networks, and the promotion of synergies in urban and regional sustainable development. Eligible areas are: Spain (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Navarre, Basque Country, Andalusia —Huelva, Cadiz and Seville—), France (Aquitaine, Poitou Charente, Loire, Brittany, Bas-Normandie and Haute-Normandie), Ireland (Border, Centre and West, and South and East), Portugal (North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo, Algarve) and the United Kingdom (Cumbria, Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and North Somerset, Dorset and Somerset, Cornwall and the Scilly Isles, Devon, West Wales and the Valleys, East Wales, Southwestern Scotland, the Highlands and the Isles, and Northern Ireland). It has a budget of 158,798,190 euros. In the first and second calls, 2008 and 2009, a total 48 projects were approved. Spain took part in 24 projects in the first call, and led 9 of them. Andalusia was present in 9 projects. In the second call, Spain took part in 23 and led 8; Andalusia was a partner in 7²⁵.

24 <http://www.programmemed.eu/projets/statistiques.html>

25 <http://atlanticarea.inescporto.pt/presentation/beneficiaries>



Second plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly. Agadir, Morocco.
© Committee of the Regions.

c) The interregional cooperation chapter:

Is made up of four programmes (URBACT II, ESPON/ORATE II, INTERACT II and INTERREG IV C), for improving the efficacy of regional development policies and instruments, through the interchange of experiences and good practice in the spheres of innovation, knowledge economy, small and medium businesses, the environment and risk prevention, water, energy, transport, natural and cultural heritage, etc. Eligible areas are the whole European territory, including peripheral and insular areas, and also Norway and

Switzerland. The total budget for 2007-2013 is 321 million euros. INTERREG IV C focuses on Lisbon Strategy (competitiveness) and Göteborg (sustainable development) priorities. Andalusia has taken part in 20 projects, 7 of 41 in the first call and 13 of 74 in the second²⁶.

As to bilateral regional cooperation, Andalusia has signed collaboration protocols and conventions for joint action with certain Mediterranean regions since the nineties:

26 <http://www.interreg4c.net>

- *Collaboration Protocol with the Regional Council of Poitou-Charente (France)*, in May 1992, by which the partners state that they share interests susceptible of reinforcement through specific collaborative action in different sectors, especially through the Atlantic Arc Commission of the CPMR, and commit themselves to establishing ways to cooperate in order to develop joint actions in agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, culture, training and economy, and any other field that might be of interest in the future. They also agree to collaborate in European programmes of common interest.
- *Collaboration Protocol with the Regional Government of Tuscany (Italy)*, March 1997, by which, based on interregional cooperation actions promoted by the Assembly of European Regions, the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the CPMR and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, both regions agree to establish the necessary ways to cooperate for joint action in the following: infrastructures; the environment; agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture; tourism; culture; training, research and technological development;

economy; and any other field which might be of interest in the future. They also agree to cooperate in Community programmes of common interest.

- *Bilateral Cooperation Convention with the Regional Council of PACA (France)*, February 2008, by which the partners agree to widen their bilateral relations in order to contribute to regional development, based on common interests and participation in EU organisations and programmes, both being members of the CPMR IMC and the Barcelona Process. They agree to establish ways to cooperate for the deployment of joint action in the following: development of competitiveness and innovation poles; the environment and sustainable development; training; immigrant social integration; and culture and heritage. They may also include any other spheres of interest in the future.
- *Cross-border cooperation convention for the "Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion Working Community"*, May 2010, formally a Working Group according to the 3 October 2002

Spanish-Portuguese Treaty for Cross-Border Cooperation between Territorial Entities and Authorities, with the following aims: to promote the interchange of information and studies on subjects of common interest; to promote and coordinate initiatives, projects and proposals for action for cooperation and interchange of experiences among the three signatory partners, and their follow-up; to prepare joint projects, programmes and proposals that might benefit from community co-financing. Spheres of action are: promotion of competitiveness and employment; environment and heritage; planning and accessibility; promotion of socio-economic cooperation and integration. The convention also alludes to coordination with other Working Communities along the Spanish-Portuguese border, and to a possible European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) by the three partners.

The Convention with Alentejo and Algarve is undoubtedly the most advanced of all, the outcome of over 20 years' regional cooperation, and is based on the experience of actions carried out both within and without the framework of the Andalusia-Algarve Working Community, created through the Cooperation Protocol with the Algarve Regional Coordination Commission in July 1995, and the Andalusia-Alentejo Working Community, created through the Cooperation Protocol with the Alentejo Regional Coordination Commission in January 2001; both these protocols have been replaced by the present Convention.

The aims of this new Euroregion are: the preparation of programmes that might be more readily co-financed by the EU; the coordination of initiatives and projects; the interchange of information and studies; and the promotion of cooperation

between public and private, Andalusian and Portuguese entities, which will obviously improve international relations. The first Euroregional Council, with the attendance of authorities from the three regions, met in Seville in March 2011; local entities were also invited. At that first meeting, the Council approved the working structure of the Euroregion, and began the elaboration of an Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Cross-Border Development Plan, a process in which all three will take part.

Given the great diversity and number of projects in which Andalusia through its Departments is a partner, the Presidency Department's General Secretariat for Foreign Action, coordinator of interregional and cross-border cooperation, decided that it was necessary to take a big step forward in coordination mechanisms, in order to promote present and future actions of Andalusian foreign cooperation; the five-year Andalusian Territorial Cooperation Observatory (OCTA), co-financed with ERDF funds (2007-13), has the following aims:

- To ensure an efficient coordination of European territorial (cross-border, transnational and international) and neighbourhood cooperation projects, and promote synergy among them.
- To enhance complementarity between European territorial cooperation projects, the Andalusian regional operative programme and other programmes of growing relevance for our region.
- To supply promoters the tools for developing territorial and neighbourhood cooperation projects, through assessment, training and information.

- To be a meeting point and reference axis in matters of European territorial cooperation and neighbourhood, for all Andalusian agents involved in project management and implementation.

Among the OCTA initiatives, the website²⁷ is already operative and offers important tools such as a project directory, partner search, or updated information on announcements, courses and events; and the bimonthly OCTA Newsletter, which already has nearly 2,000 subscribers, and like the website is an extremely useful platform for spreading information, where project managers can publish their experiences.

OCTA is without a doubt a novel initiative, for the coordination, publication and evaluation of actions and projects financed by ERDF funds and implemented in Andalusia, in matters of European territorial cooperation and neighbourhood. The idea is to reinforce the Andalusian administration's capacity for managing projects, from an approach based on the principles of coordination, complementarity, knowledge and good governance. The project is therefore part of a key strategy for capitalizing decentralised cooperation, begun in the nineties, and for enhancing its impact on the development of Andalusia.




27 <http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/OCTA/web>

3.2.

European regional integration in the Western Mediterranean framework:

political and technical actions for decentralised cooperation among Medgovernance regions



Medgovernance partners have been cooperating in different joint actions for over two decades, although it was especially after the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Barcelona, in November 2005, that local and, especially, regional authorities, meeting under the initiative of the Catalanian regional government, and supported by the CPMR, expressed their will to reinforce links for increasing the coherence and efficiency of their Mediterranean policies. By initiative of the President of PACA, the Presidents of the six Arc Latin regions (Andalusia, Catalonia, Tuscany, Liguria, Lazio and the Piedmont) agreed to create a work group in order to draw a joint strategy and an action plan for reinforcing the place and role of the regions in the building of the Mediterranean, with the support of their research institutes: the Institute of the Mediterranean (PACA), the Andalusian Three Cultures Foundation, the European Institute of the Mediterranean (Catalonia), the Paralleli Institu-

te (Piedmont), the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in the European University Institute and the MAEM/MEMA network (Tuscany), and the Centre for International Political Studies (Lazio).

All these institutes belong to the Network of Mediterranean Institutes (RIM), created in 2006 in order to establish the methodological and research bases for designing regional policy in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Action Plan, published in November 2006, was the first relevant contribution to establishing priorities and perspectives for joint regional governance in the Mediterranean. This document identifies: a) a joint vision of Mediterranean aims and challenges; b) a series of strategic priorities shared by Mediterranean regions as a whole; and c) specific projects corresponding to the selected strategic priorities, to which the regions would be committed and would coordinate their efforts.

Chart 3.1.

Action Plan for the Mediterranean: aims, priorities and projects

A) Joint vision on mediterranean aims and challenges

1. To make the Mediterranean a space for shared peace and prosperity, open to its differences.
2. Facing the challenge of competitiveness, to make the Mediterranean an area for competitive world integration and solidarity.
3. To preserve and enhance Mediterranean collective goods.

B) Priorities for action

- Priority 1:** To control the effects of globalisation on the Mediterranean, reinforcing competitiveness and territorial cohesion.
- Priority 2:** To give a new impulse to environmental protection policy and sustainable development.
- Priority 3:** To work towards creating a coordinated European policy on immigration.
- Priority 4:** To enhance intercultural dialogue.

C) Projects

- Project 1:** To network Mediterranean Basin development poles.
- Project 2:** To promote a joint policy on priority transport corridors for the Mediterranean space. **Project 3:** To create broadband connections between the main development poles around the Mediterranean.
- Project 4:** To create regional investment funds for small and medium businesses, with the cooperation of the European Investment Bank.
- Project 5:** To align regional policy with the Kyoto Protocol.
- Project 6:** To launch interregional cooperation in the Mediterranean around Project Galileo.
- Project 7:** To build an interregional Mediterranean consortium for maritime security.
- Project 8:** To promote the teaching of Arabic and Chinese in participating regions.
- Project 9:** To approximate modes of action of decentralized cooperation to internationally recognized laws.
- Project 10:** To define a common stance on promoting Mediterranean agriculture in European policy, and defending it in the 2008 renegotiation of the Common Agricultural Policy.
- Project 11:** To elaborate a joint integrated regional stance on matters related to immigration and co-development.
- Project 12:** To maintain the Mediterranean Institutes work group, and mobilize it for the Mediterranean strategies of participating regions.

The document also points out that, in order to have new regional leeway, an in-depth modification would be necessary, between territorial authorities in the Mediterranean space; this would be a big technological step forward. The projects identified, responding both to northern and southern challenges, could be extended to the whole basin, including TMCs.

It is in this context that the Medgovernance project was born, promoted by Tuscany together with the RIM and the CPMR IMC, approved in the Transnational Cooperation Programme MED2007-2013 in order to prepare political recommendations tending to include regional authorities in the design and implementation of Mediterranean policy, and within which this report is being carried out.

The six Medgovernance regions have participated in many different projects within MEDOCC 2000-2006 and the 2007-2013 Med Programme. The projects, of which some examples will fo-

llow, were selected using these criteria: a) projects in which Andalusia is a partner, together with other Medgovernance regions; b) thematic variety and similarity with Medgovernance project sectoral priorities (environment, culture, transport, socioeconomic development, innovation, town planning); c) participation of the different Departments of the Andalusian Government as partners in the programme; d) projects headed by the Andalusian Government; e) participation of Southern Mediterranean countries as observers, particularly Morocco; and f) projects with a certain continuity in later actions.

We interviewed the political and/or technical official representing the Andalusian partner in each of the chosen projects, in order to collect first-hand information on: the most relevant results or products, the most innovative actions, benefits for the partnership and particularly for the Andalusian partner, the degree of involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project, the degree of interchange of information, experience and good practice, the value added by the project to interregional cooperation and multilevel governance, the project's weaknesses and strengths, continuity of the actions and the partnership once the project is finished, etc.

Chart 3.2.

ANSER Project-ARCHEOMED Project



ANSER Project:

Anciennes Routes Maritimes Méditerranéennes (2002-2004)



ARCHEOMED Project:

Maritime Cultural Heritage of the Mediterranean (2006-2008)

Co-financed by the Initiative Interreg III-B. P.O. MEDOCC (2002 call).

Execution phase: 2002-2004. / Total cost: 2.883.750 euros.

Project manager:

Tuscany (Italy).

Andalusian partner:

Directorate General for Cultural Goods of the Culture Department of the Andalusian Government.

Technical execution:

Sub aquatic Archaeology Centre of the Andalusian Institute for Historical Heritage.

Other partners:

- CASC-Submarine Archaeology Centre of the Catalanian Region (Spain)
- Provincial deputation of Alicante, Valencia (Spain)
- CNRS, PACA (France)
- Région PACA (France)
- Institute for the Mediterranean, Lazio (Italy)
- Region of Campania (Italy)
- Region of Lazio (Italy)
- Region of Liguria (Italy)
- Foundation for International Studies (Malta)
- Portuguese Archaeology Institute, National Centre of Náutical and Sub aquatic Archaeology, Algarve (Portugal)
- Ministry of Communication and Culture (Algeria), observer member
- Ministry of Communication and Culture (Morocco), observer member

Main object:

Lasting and creative appreciation of the archaeological heritage linked to the presence of ancient ports as sources of local development and cultural growth.

Aim:

To understand the different experiences worked on for the revitalisation and publication of the maritime heritage, which has fallen into oblivion despite its specific weight in the peoples of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

Specific aims:

- The improvement of public action in the sphere of territorial management and of the protection and appreciation of sub aquatic cultural heritage (creation of joint intervention methodologies and efficient, innovative management criteria).
- Training for professionals and technicians involved in restoring and preserving submarine archaeological heritage.
- Civil awareness regarding the value of submerged archaeological heritage (institutions, media, citizens).

Actions:

- Study and development of common orientations: Bibliographic database, shipwreck chart and a repertoire of ancient ports.
- Creation of a permanent international network: participation in Pilotage Committees, Scientific Committees, etc.
- Interchange of experiences: participation in international seminars.
- Pilot projects.
- Information and communication activities: publicity and open doors days.

Most relevant results/products

- Creation of a permanent international network.
- Confection of a document on the state of the question of the subject studied, and of a Guide for the lasting appreciation of sub aquatic archaeological heritage.
- Confection of a research dossier on localisation, protection and preservation of archaeological sites linked to ANSER heritage.
- Conceptual and material design of a bibliographic and shipwreck database. In the case of Andalusia, all references were collected regarding ANSER heritage on the Andalusian coastline from Ancient times to the Renaissance (10 sites in the province of Huelva, 10 in Granada, 13 in Seville, 19 in Almeria and 39 in Cadiz).
- Participation and organisation of courses.

Most innovative actions

- What was truly innovative was the convention of European partners dedicated to this novel thematic field.
- Pilot project: temporary exhibition "Under the sea: restoration of the whalers' ceramics " in the Cadiz Museum, in September-October 2004, showing the visitor not only the site and all the ceramics found, but also the process of restoring the archaeological materials of sub aquatic precedence.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

For the partnership: the convention of different European partners working in the field of sub aquatic archaeology, who thus establish relations with each other.

For the autonomous region of Andalusia: to gain visibility at European level, and to influence the opinion of other partners. Andalusia supplied a new viewpoint on the tutelage, management and protection of sub aquatic archaeological heritage.

For the Marine Sub Aquatic Archaeology Centre: to participate in a European Project for the first time. To meet and talk to European and Spanish partners working in the same field. To gain visibility and recognition at European and Spanish level. Contact and coordination with other Spanish partners (Catalonia and Alicante).

Projects's added value to interregional cooperation and multilevel governance

- Inclusion of Morocco and Algeria as observer members. Two European countries paid the expenses so that the Moroccan and Algerian partners could be present in some activities, as they did not have their own funds.
- Andalusia has been the first AR to apply legislation on legal protection of Sub Aquatic Archaeological Heritage. Other ARs are beginning to apply it, following the Andalusian example.
- Because of the projects, the Director of the Sub Aquatic Archaeology Centre has been named by the Ministry of Culture as Spain's representative in UNESCO'S Scientific-Technical Consultative Council for the protection of sub aquatic heritage.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties:

- The large number of partners was an obstacle for the decision-making process.
- Unequal involvement and commitment by some partners in the Project.

Strengths:

- An understanding of the different ways of looking at the subject: each region interpreted sub aquatic archaeology its own way.
- Contact with partners and presentation of a new Project (ArcheoMed) which meant a big step forward.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

There was no formal continuity, but contact between partners did go on, especially between Spanish partners.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- The ANSER Project was continued in the ARCHEOMED Project (Maritime Cultural Heritage of the Mediterranean) financed by Interreg III-B P.O. MEDOCC, from 01/06/2006 to 30/06/2008, headed by the region of Tuscany with very similar aims to those of ANSER.
- The number of partners was smaller than in ANSER, enhancing decision-making and activities: Region of Tuscany (Italy), MIBAC Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali (Italy), Region of Campania (Italy), CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PACA (France), CASC-Centre d'Archéologie sous-marine de Catalunya (Spain), Ministry of Culture, Directorate General for Fine Arts and Cultural Assets, - Portuguese Archaeological Institute, National Nautical and Sub Aquatic Archaeology Centre, Algarve (Portugal), National Marine Archaeology Museum and National Submarine Archaeology Research Centre (MNAM-CNIAS) Cartagena (Spain); University of Malta (Malta).
- Morocco and Algeria were invited, but finally did not participate due to political problems.

Chart 3.3.

EUROMEDINCULTURE Project



EUROMEDINCULTURE project
(2004-2006)

Co-financed by the Community Initiative Interreg III-B. P.O. MEDOCC (2003 call).

Execution phase: 2004-2006 / Total cost: 798,150 euros

Project manager:

ADCEI: Association for Cultural and International Development (PACA), France.

Andalusian government member:

Andalusian Government Department of Culture.

Other partners:

- Provincial Deputation of Cordova (Andalusia, Spain)
- Provincial Deputation of Granada (Andalusia, Spain)
- University of Cadiz (Andalusia, Spain)
- Region of Lazio (Italy)
- Region of Sardinia (Italy)
- Region of Tuscany (Italy)
- Mohammed V University-Souissi (Morocco)
- Region of Tangier-Tetouan (Morocco)

Main objective:

The appreciation of the Euromediterranean space as a place of cultural interchange and cooperation among institutions, and cultural operations between both shores.

Aims:

- To start a cooperation network supporting regional, Euromediterranean and international cultural projects.
- To identify the most adequate institutions, networks and agents, thus strengthening cultural institutionalisation.
- To allow a wider circulation of cultural operators in the area, in order to enhance reciprocal understanding, interchange and the emergence of projects of Euromediterranean scope, through a true partnership.

Actions:

- Edition of the newsletter "Euromedinculture Info" in three languages, 13,500 copies.
- Edition of the guide "Cultures and Regions of the Mediterranean", 450 printed copies and a CD.
- Four conventions for professionals on the themes of: Books and reading, the performing arts and heritage, held in PACA (November 2004), Tuscany (June 2005), Andalusia (November 2005) and Rabat and Tangier-Tetouan (April 2006).
- Transnational meetings and technical interchanges.

Most relevant results/products

- Impulse of Euromediterranean cooperation.
- Promotion of relations between participating territories.
- Creation of a permanent cooperation network.

Most innovative actions

- Encounters among professionals, an important step towards creating a cooperation network. During interchanges and encounters, partners explained the structure, workings, and powers of intervention of each territorial level (national, regional and local) in matters of culture and European affairs. This made it possible to define a complete institutional and operative panorama of each territory in the area, accessible to cultural professionals, and useful in their cooperative relations.
- Edition of the guide "Cultures and Regions of the Mediterranean", a new kind of tool for reference and information on the cultural structures of each region. It lists the institutions, networks and agents dedicated to cultural management, and a panel of European funds and programmes, together with examples of selected projects from the different regions supporting cultural activities.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- Stakeholders were greatly involved in the project's activities: associations, professional federations, societies, regional agencies, public and parapublic collectivities participated in the conventions and in professional visits to different centres.

Interchange of information, experience and good practice

- In the four conventions, the operators of the different regions met in order to interchange experiences and practices, and talk about possible associations and joint Euro-Mediterranean projects.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

- Identification of cultural platforms in the regions associated to the project.
- Generation of synergy among professionals in the same field, resulting in the creation of new projects.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- The impulse given to cooperation and interchange between agents can contribute to better cross-border governance. The project has attempted to involve the largest number of agents in each territory, enhancing the transference and interchange of knowledge.
- The creation of a tool for promoting future European projects among professionals in the Euromediterranean area.
- The participation of two Moroccan partners, thus including the Southern Mediterranean point of view.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties:

- Despite the fact that the INTERREG III-B MEDOCC community programme strongly recommended the inclusion of partners on the southern Mediterranean shore, only expenditure in European territory could be "eligible". In order to work on equal terms with our Moroccan partners, all partners agree that these differences must be neutralized.
- Some activities had not been included in the budget. For example, the idea of translating the Newsletter into Arabic, proposed by the Tangier-Tetouan Region, was solved through the partners' cooperation: the Andalusian Government assumed the expense of translation and editing, and the Tangier-Tetouan Region took care of publication and distribution.
- The low degree of some partners' commitment to the Project, for carrying out their assigned activities. For example, there was trouble for starting the website, solved thanks to the project managers' assuming the activity by including it in their own website.

Strengths:

- Impulse of trans-territorial cooperation among cultural agents.
- Promotion of relations between participating territories.
- An understanding of other cultural realities, enhancing the promotion of cultural diversity.
- A strengthening of institutions and agents involved.
- The appreciation of the power of culture as a social cohesion factor.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

Throughout its three years of life, the Project promoted the start of other cooperation projects, such as Culture 2000, Interreg III, etc. The project's impact is therefore reflected in the increase in cooperation and cultural interchange among participating regions.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- In 2007 some members took part in a European Volunteer Service project, to take young people from other countries into cultural institutions.
- In 2008 the project "Euromedinculture Citizenship: culture, creation and dialogue" was approved by the European Programme for Citizens; it was executed in 2009, giving continuity to the work carried out in the Interreg Project, with the ADCEI as project manager. This project had nine partners from eight European countries, plus Tunisia as an associated country.
- The Euromedinculture Network was formalised in July 2009, as a platform for cooperation in the Euromediterranean area, consolidating and widening the partnership: 22 founding members from 16 northern and southern Mediterranean countries, plus 11 observer organisations from seven different countries. It works as a non-profit association. <http://www.euromedinculture.org/>
- In 2009 the project "Euromedinculture Citizenship: culture, creation and dialogue" was approved as continuation of the 2008 project. It was executed in 2010 y had 12 member regions in 11 European countries
- In 2010 the project "Euromedinculture: sharing and creating projects" was approved through the "Cultural cooperation with third countries" programme.

Chart 3.4.

EUROMEDSYS Project



EUROMEDSYS PROJECT I y II

Transnational cooperation between local economic systems
of the Mediterranean
(2002-2004 and 2004-2006)

Co-financed by community initiative III-B. P.O. MEDOCC (2002 and 2004 calls).

Execution phase: 2002-2004 and 2004-2006.

Total cost: Euromedsys I: 2,197,288 euros. / Euromedsys II: 1,100,760 euros

Project manager:

Sviluppo ItalyToscana S.C.p.A., (Italy)

Andalusian partner:

Andalusian Innovation and Development Agency (IDEA) of the Department of Economy, Innovation and Science of the Andalusian Government.

Other partners (EUROMEDSYS II):

- Region of PACA (France)
- Region of Crete (Greece)
- Region of Calabria (Italy)
- Region of Campania (Italy)
- Region of Emilia-Romagna (Italy)
- Region of Sardinia (Italy)
- Region of Alentejo (Portugal)
- Ministry for the Environment and Territorial Planning (Algeria)
- Region of Tangier-Tetouan (Morocco)
- Government of Sousse (Tunisia)

The region of Valencia (Spain) participated in Euromedsys I through its Institute of Small and Medium Industry, and also the Sfax (Tunisia) Regional Council; these did not participate in Euromedsys II, but were replaced by the Region of Alentejo (Portugal) and the Region of Crete (Greece).

Main objective:

The design of innovative solutions for economic cooperation among small and medium enterprises (SMEs) on the northern and southern Mediterranean shores, linked to traditional Mediterranean food and habitat.

Aim:

The development of local Mediterranean economic systems, by creating platforms for Euromediterranean cooperation enhancing the economic integration of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) belonging to the productive sectors of traditional Mediterranean food, Mediterranean habitat and advanced services for SMEs.

Actions:

- Three pilot projects (FoodMed, HabitatMed y SerMed).
- Web portal and digital marketplace for productive sectors of traditional Mediterranean food, Mediterranean habitat and advanced services for SMEs.
- International seminars and workshops.
- Databases, thematic networks and publications.
- A virtual network of service centres at Euromediterranean level, through a portal for technical and economic cooperation and interchanges between service centres of the two productive sectors of the Project: *HabitatMed y FoodMed*.

Most relevant results/products

- Conformation of a transnational network of local and regional stakeholders in different countries on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and an alliance for working together on affairs of joint interest.
- The *FoodMed* pilot project, in the Agroindustrial sphere, made out a basket of excellent Mediterranean products, and worked on a joint methodology for determining olive oil quality (olive oil being a product common to all partners).

Most innovative actions

- The *HabitatMed* pilot project brought together designers from one region and enterprises from another, so that the latter could develop the ideas proposed by the former. The possibility of a *HabitatMed* trademark was also contemplated, but did not come to fruition.
- In the *FoodMed* pilot project, in the agroindustrial sphere, there was interchange of experiences and good practice regarding food quality control processes in each member region.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- Local stakeholders were greatly involved in the project's activities. Businesses were invited to participate in the conventions, and to establish links with businesses in other regions. An on-line market place was attempted but did not finally come to fruition.

Interchange of information, experience and good practice

There was interchange of experiences, through visits to businesses in different regions, seminars and workshops in regions of both Mediterranean shores.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

For the partnership: Creation of an on-going network of partners.

For IDEA: The Project was a starting point in cooperation, and was useful for gaining experience in management of European projects, generating expectation for future joint work.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- High participation level by Morocco and Tunisia in the project's actions; some activities even took place in these two countries.
- Manifestos of joint intentions were drawn up and signed for each pilot Project.
- Positive experience in cooperation, increase in trust among the members in different government levels, and among public and private stakeholders in the different regions.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/Difficulties:

- Some partners found it difficult to meet deadlines.
- Some initial aims turned out to be too ambitious and did not come to complete fulfillment.

Strengths:

- Good coordination among partners and project management mechanisms.
- Contact network among partners, and at local and regional stakeholder level.
- Some events took place in Morocco and Tunisia.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- In some cases, such as the *Habitat-Med* Project, designers and businesses have kept in touch.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- Presentation of the Euromedsys II Project after Euromedsys I.
- Several partners participate in the IC-Med (Inter-clusters *Méditerranée*) Project managed by PACA (France) and financed by the Transnational Operative Programme MED (2007-2013): Andalusia, Valencia, Murcia and the Basque Country (Spain), Lombardy, Tuscany and the Piedmont (Italy), PACA (France) and Greece.
- Andalusia has promoted, through IDEA and with the cooperation of the Tangier-Tetouan Regional Council, the "Trans-frontier Network of Business Services (ReTSE)" project, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) within the Interreg III-A Spain-Morocco Initiative. This project was developed during the 2002-2008 period, and later a new Project was presented before POCTEFEX: the current "Cross-border Network for Cooperation and Services for Support Agents and Businesses".

Chart 3.5.

MARIMED Project



MARIMED Project

Fisheries as a factor for development of sustainable tourism.
(2004-2006)

Co-financed by the Interreg III-B. P.O. MEDOCC Community Initiative (2003 call).

Execution phase: 2004-2006 / Total cost: 2,095,416 euros.

Project manager:

Region of Emilia Romagna (Italy), D.G. for Productive Activity, Trade and Tourism.

Andalusian partner:

Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Other partners:

- AR of Murcia-Department of Tourism and Territorial Planning. Directorate General of Tourism Infrastructures (Murcia, Spain)
- Maritime and Fishing Enterprises Association —EMPA— (Catalonia, Spain)
- Provincial Deputation of Gerona. Programming and Studies (Catalonia, Spain)
- Torroella de Montgrí municipality. Local sustainable development (Catalonia, Spain)
- Commune of Port Saint Louis-Department of Tourism (PACA, France)
- City of Marseille-Mission for Private and European Programmes-CMCI (PACA, France)
- Commune of Carloforte-Department of Tourism and Entertainment (Sardinia, Italy)
- Commune of Porto Torres-Sustainable development (Sardinia, Italy)
- Region of Sicily-Department of Tourism, Sport and Entertainment (Sicily, Italy)

Main objective:

To achieve the integration of the tourism and fishery sectors, with the intention of experimenting with an innovative qualification model for touristic offers and the development of sustainable tourism, for the promotion and appreciation of the natural, cultural and social heritage of fishing ports.

Aim:

To increase the values of local sea traditions, and create a new cultural image of fishing professionals who would become “promoters/educators in sea culture”.

Actions:

1. Studies and research

- Analysis of characteristic elements of fishing ports, in terms of cultura, traditions, history and the environment.
- Design of territorial development plans.
- Identification of sectors and fields for intervention.
- Viability studies and analysis of fishing and tourism impact.

2. Creation of networks

- A website for promoting relations among territories involved in the Project.

3. Pilot projects

- Design, experimentation and promotion of new touristic products, through the definition of ecomarine itineraries, touristic fishing activities, gastronomic offers based on sea products, etc.
- Actions for re-evaluation the territory, in order to promote non-seasonal tourism.
- Creation of a Quality Trademark.

4. Educative and Informative Actions

- Identification and development of attractive communication and publicity models, in order to capture the attention of the general public.
- Re-evaluation of fishing ports, and also the promotion of a certain image of the fishing sector.
- Reinforcement of the identity of small towns, and support for the promotion of manufactured touristic products.
- Awareness through events and musical, theatrical and cinematographic events related to the world of fishing and its customs.

5. Interchange of experiences

- Interchange of information and experiences for sustainable development.
- Reinforcement and development of a reconstruction process for local identities.
- Re-evaluation and promotion of the tutelage and protection of environmental heritage.
- Active cooperation among European regions.

Most relevant results/products

- Almadraba (tuna fisheries) touristic route.
- Promotion of the natural, traditional, regional product of the "Flor de la Sal" saltworks.
- Development of a pilot Project in an Andalusian fishing area where tourism is also important: the towns of Tarifa, Barbate and Conil, near the Straits of Gibraltar.
- Outlay of promotional material: calendars, postcards and various publications.
- Digital guide to the seashells of the Gibraltar area.
- Music CD of songs of the sea: "Cantos del Campo y del Mar".

Most relevant results/products

- Educational workshops in schools all over Andalusia, and a special publication for schoolchildren.
- Awareness activities on "Responsible fishing and trade" in Andalusian coastal towns. Beach campaigns.
- Photographic exhibition in Tarifa, compiling and digitalizing old photographs. This activity had a high emotional impact on traditional fishing families.
- Confection of food guides focused on sea products. Also a cookbook of traditional sea dishes: "Sea cooking in the Straits".
- First Andalusian National Model Fishing Boat Competition.
- Cinema: screening of films related to fishing and marine cultura, from the scientific and commercial viewpoints.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- The councils of the towns where the events took place cooperated very actively. Also the media, especially local television. Fishing guilds, ship-owners associations, and fish-farming associations also cooperated.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

For the partnership:

- A new appreciation of the fishing world, and the rescue and publication of Mediterranean fishing heritage.

For the Autonomous Community of Andalusia:

- To give publicity to the marine environment, culture and food of the Andalusian region.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- Good relations among partners, especially regarding public administrations.
- Interchange of experiences and good practice in the different regions.
- Draft of a document defining "fishing-tourism", presented to the European Commission.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties:

- The continuity of actions in some regions, once the Project was finished.

Strengths:

- Coordinated work among partners.
- Multiple, diverse creative activities carried out with a high level of involvement by civil society agents.
- Wide publicity for the results of the Project, at civil society level.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- In Andalusia, the "Cultural Week of the Sea" was held in Tarifa in May 2008, financed with THON.DOC funds.
- Subsequent activities in Carbonera (Almería) and Isla Cristina (Huelva).

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- MARIMED partners presented a new Project called MARINET, but it was not approved. Andalusia participated in the THON.DOC project "An evaluation of Transnational Cultural Tuna Heritage in the Western Mediterranean" (2007-2009), together with other partners, with the cooperation of the Andalusian Government Department of the Environment.

Chart 3.6.

PAYS.DOC Project-PAYS.MED.URBAN Project



PAYS.DOC PROJECT

Good landscape practices (2005-2007)



PAYS. MED. URBAN

High landscape quality as a key to sustainability and competitiveness in Mediterranean urban areas (2009-2011)

PAYS.DOC project:

Co-financed by the Interreg III-B. P.O. MEDOCC Community Initiative (2004 stage).

Execution phase: 2005-2007 / Total cost: 1,532,000 euros

PAYS. MED. URBAN project:

Execution phase: 2009-2011. / Total cost: 1,633,332 euros.

PAYS.DOC project:

Project manager:

Andalusian Government Department of Public Works and Housing, through the General Secretariat for Territorial Planning and Development.

Partners:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| - Catalanian Generalitat (Spain) | - Region of Basilicata (Italy) |
| - Valencian Generalitat (Spain) | - Region of Emilia - Romagna (Italy) |
| - Region of Murcia (Spain) | - Region of Lazio (Italy) |
| - Region of PACA (France) | - Region of Lombardy (Italy) |
| - Anem - Prefecture De Magnesie Développement Compagnie (Thessaly, Greece) | - Region of Piedmont (Italy) |
| - Autonomous Region of Sardinia (Italy) | - Region of Tuscany (Italy) |
| | - Region of Umbria (Italy) |

Main objective:

Development and practical application of the European Landscape convention, approved in 2000 by the European Council, and of the guidelines regarding landscape in the European Territorial Strategy, for the pertinent public policies (especially territorial, urban environmental, infrastructural, agrarian, touristic and cultural).

Aim:

- Identification of Mediterranean landscapes.
- To valorize local experiences so that they can be models of good landscape practice.
- To draw guidelines for the correct management of landscape transformation and for territorial identity awareness.

Actions:

Different activities were carried out along four lines:

- *Line of action 1:* Creation and management of a Virtual Observatory for Mediterranean landscapes (coordinator: Andalusia).
- *Line of action 2:* Good Practices catalogue, and Mediterranean Landscape Award (coordinator: Tuscany).
- *Line of action 3:* Creation and management of a Portal on landscape (coordinator: Umbria).
- *Line of action 4:* Handbooks of landscape guidelines and strategies, to be applied in instruments of territorial policy (coordinator: Catalonia).

PAYS. MED. URBAN project:**Project manager:**

Andalusian Government Department of Public Works and Housing, through its General Secretariat for Territorial Planning and Development.

Partner:

- Catalonia, Palma de Majorca, Murcia, Valencia (Spain).
- ANEM-Magnesia (Greece).
- Tuscany, Umbria, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, Lazio, Basilicata, Veneto (Italy).
- Algarve (Portugal).
- The European Network of Local and Regional Entities for the Implementation of the European Landscape Convention (RECEP-ENELC), as an observer partner.

Aim:

- It focuses on peri-urban and peripheral landscape, and considers that high landscape quality is not only an element of identity, a heritage element of natural, ecological, historical and cultural values, but also a strong resource for the economic development and competitiveness of city areas capable of attracting tourists, and for locating businesses belonging to new economic sectors.

Actions:

- The Project was articulated around 6 lines of action, continuing the four lines developed in the PAYS.DOC Project, plus two more: Pilot actions and awareness activities.

Most relevant results/products

- Three publications (book + CD): a) Catalogue of Good Landscape Practice. b) Virtual Mediterranean Landscape Observatory. c) Handbooks of landscape strategies and guidelines, to be applied in territorial policy instruments.
- Creation of an internet portal on Mediterranean landscapes (www.paysmed.net), the most relevant in its field.
- Second Edition of the Mediterranean Landscape Award in 2007.
- Creation and consolidation of a network of 14 regions in four different countries, enhancing mutual understanding, the interchange of experiences, and the creation of a strategic value by capitalizing results in the continuing Project: Pays.med.urban. Using Pays.doc methodology, a new Good Practice Catalogue was written, focusing on urban landscape.

Most innovative actions

- The Catalogue of Good Landscape Practices collects works, projects and educational activities, and contributes to example-based teaching. Different local authorities, technicians and professionals contributed to it, representing different viewpoints regarding landscape. The winners of the 2007 Mediterranean Landscape Award (MLA) (coordinated by the Region of Tuscany) were chosen from the Catalogue; this award means international recognition for the best practices (significant landscape experiences) in the following categories: 1) plans, programmes and projects, 2) completed works, 3) landscape awareness experiences, and 4) landscape communication activities. The First MLA took place in 2000, and the Third edition took place within the PAYS.MED.URBAN project, coordinated by the region of Murcia.
- The handbooks offer guidelines and criteria for the correct management of landscape transformation, in the following priority situations and processes:
 - (a) communication infrastructures and access to cities,
 - (b) productive, commercial and logistical spaces,
 - (c) historical, cultural and touristic sites, and
 - (d) agrarian, forest and natural spaces.

This activity has had a more operative aim, focusing directly on the production and publication of useful knowledge for public and private action regarding landscape.

- The virtual observatory is a system for recognizing and observing characteristic Mediterranean landscapes.
- The aim of the internet portal, a tool for continuing the Pays.doc and Pays.net projects (<http://www.paysmed.net/pays-doc/>), is to enhance Mediterranean interchange and cooperation regarding landscape, also with other interested institutions. The portal was useful as an internal work platform during the project. It was also meant to contribute to

the international promotion of the landscape, environmental and cultural heritage of the Mediterranean regions. Each partner is considered as a node of documentary resources, to which the portal offers technical support, and which will become an interregional thematic reference for Mediterranean landscape.

- The PAYS.MED Project includes two more lines of action:

a) *Pilot actions*, focused on experimenting proposals for landscape requalification, in accordance with Article 6 of the European Landscape Convention, which each of the regions participating in the Project will start in a specific area, using public participation processes in order to actively involve citizens in the transformation of the local territory.

b) *Awareness activities*, focused on awareness in local stakeholders as a strategic value in the implementation process of the European Landscape Convention. The idea is to define joint strategies for involving local stakeholders in landscape valorisation processes, to give public agents criteria and tools for making decisions, and to create a database of useful, applicable example experiences.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- *The Pilot actions* paid special attention to dialogue and argument among stakeholders, citizens and institutions. The *Awareness activities*, however, were aimed directly at local stakeholders. For example, some city councils and universities took part, such as the University of Seville through its Landscape and Territorial Studies Centre, an institution based on a convention between the Department and all Andalusian universities. Local public and private stakeholders were very active in the awareness workshops.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

For the partnership:

The creation and consolidation of a transnational network which has gone on after the projects were finished.

For the Autonomous Community of Andalusia:

The Andalusian Plan for Territorial Order contemplates activities for landscape promotion such as awards, publicity, participation in European projects, etc. All these work towards inclusion in public policies.

- Both projects are a continuation of a long history of participation in European projects, on both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, by the General Secretariat for Territorial Planning and Development in the Department of Public Works and Housing.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- The Project is fully coherent with the aims of the European Landscape Convention. It is also an example of how to implement Article 9 of the Convention, regarding cross-border cooperation at local and regional level in matters of landscape; the creation and application of joint landscape improvement programmes are foreseen.
- The Project has consolidated cooperation between regions which had worked on joint initiatives regarding landscape prior to the PAYS.DOC Project, and also included new regions.
- The European Council has designed the European Landscape Award, based on the Mediterranean Award experience designed by the regions, a fact in favour of the idea of "building Europe from the bottom up".
- The PAYS.MED Project included the European Network of Local and Regional Entities for the Implementation of the European Landscape Convention (RECEP-ENELC), as an observer partner. This gave the project greater opportunities for publicity through the RECEP website, and also contributed to establishing relations with new regions: a cooperation protocol was signed between PAYS.MED regions and other non-Mediterranean regions.
- Andalusia will be the seat of the Technical Coordination Board of the European Network of Local and Regional Entities for the Implementation of the European Landscape Convention (RECEP-ENELC). This organism is one of the most relevant centres for landscape knowledge in Europe, and gives public administrations faster and more complete access to the best completed or current practices in the different territories of the network members. The candidacy presented by the Department of Housing and Territorial Planning, offering Seville as the Technical Board seat, was unanimously approved by the RECEP members at the European Council seat in Strasbourg.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties:

- Changes in government in certain regions have meant some setbacks, but has not affected the projects thanks to coordination between technicians.

Strengths:

- Andalusia's financial management has been praised by European authorities.
- Given the large number of partners in the Project, a decentralised work system was established in which each action line had a coordinating region. This enhanced relations between partners, splitting up responsibility regarding the coordination of contents (decentralised work), though general financial and technical management were the responsibility of the Project manager.
- There was very good understanding among the partners, based largely on personal and professional relations between Project technicians who have been working together for two decades.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- The PAYS.MED.URBAN Project is the continuation of the activities, and the capitalisation of the results, of the PAYS.DOC project: the four lines of action are ongoing, and 80% of the partners are still participating, plus some new ones: Veneto, Algarve and Majorca.
- Both projects also reflect twenty years' experience in interregional cooperation, showing true regional strategy at the base of the partners' and the actions' continuity.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- The signing of the Mediterranean Landscape Charter (Seville Charter) in 1992 by the regional presidents of Andalusia (Spain), Tuscany (Italy) and Languedoc- Roussillon (France), containing aims and recommendation for action for sectoral public landscape policies, resulted in several lines of action among the regions. It would later result also in the European Landscape Convention, passed in 2000 by the European Council and ratified by Spain in 2007.

The Seville Charter also resulted in the First Mediterranean Landscape Award, followed by the PAYS.DOC Project (already presented to Interreg IIC, but not selected), approved by Interreg IIIB.

Due to the fact that so many regions were interested in participating in the projects, once PAYS.DOC was finished, the partners decided to split the project into two different ones: Tuscany led PAYS.MED.NET, which was not selected, and Andalusia led PAYS.MED.URBAN, which was.

In order to keep in touch with the regions excluded from the Project, PACA and the Piedmont were included as observers, and other regions were invited to take part in certain activities.

- There are two large families of landscape projects, one led by Andalusia and the other by PACA (in which Andalusia is also a partner). For example, the AMAT Project (Mediterranean Workshops for Territorial Planning), coordinated by PACA, gave way to the Community Initiative Projects-Mediterranean Regions (PIC-RM) a seed bank of projects to be presented to the next MED call; the OTREMED project (Territorial Observatory of the Mediterranean), led by Murcia, was selected. Also selected was Lombardy's ENPLAN Project (Environmental Evaluation of Plans and Programmes), in which Andalusia was a partner.
- Other than landscape, the Department of Public Works and Housing is a partner in the ANDALBAGUA Project (Territory and Navigability in the Lower Guadiana), within the Spanish-Portuguese POCTEC 2007-2013 (1st phase), coordinated by the Presidency Department through its General Secretariat for Foreign Action, with the aim of creating a strategy for cross-border territorial planning around the Guadiana river, and for endowing the maritime-fluvial environs as the development hub of the area. The other partners are: the Andalusian Public Agency for Ports, the Deputation of Huelva, the Regional Coordination and Development Commission (CCDR) of Algarve, the Port and Maritime Transport Institute, and the Town Councils of Vila Real de Santo Antonio, Alcoutim, Castro Marim and Mertola. Total cost: 4,095,512 euros.

Chart 3.7.

REVERMED Project

REVER MED

REVERMED PROJECT

Green European Network of the Mediterranean Arc (2002-2004)

Co-financed by the Interreg III-B. P.O. MEDOCC Community Initiative (2002 call).

Execution phase: 2002-2004. / Total cost: 2,234.412 euros

Project manager:

Andalusian Government Department of the Environment

Other partners:

- Comarcal Council of Tierra Alta, Catalonia (Spain)
- Deputation of Alicante, Valencia (Spain)
- Deputation of Córdoba, Andalusia (Spain)
- Deputation of Girona, Catalonia (Spain)
- General Deputation of Aragon (Spain)
- Provincial Deputation of Jaen, Andalusia (Spain)
- Deputation of Seville, Andalusia (Spain)
- Spanish Railway Foundation (Spain)
- Valencian Generalitat (Spain)
- Beturia Commonwealth, Andalusia (Spain)
- Region of Murcia (Spain)
- Catalanian Tourism (Spain)
- French Association for the Development of Cycling Routes and Greenways (France)
- Rhone-Alps Regional Council (France)
- Department of Hérault, Languedoc-Roussillon (France)
- Navigable Ways of France (France)

- Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development (France)
- Ministry of Sports (France)
- Italian Greenways Association, Lombardy (Italy)
- Commune of Milan-Central Directorate for the Environment and Mobility (Italy)
- Commune of Rome-Environmental and Agrarian Policy Department (Italy)
- University of Milan, Lombardy (Italy)
- Province of Modena, Emilia-Romagna (Italy)
- Lambro Valley Regional Park, Lombardy (Italy)
- Province of Turin, Piedmont (Italy)
- Region of Emilia-Romagna (Italy)
- Region of Liguria (Italy)
- Region of Lombardy (Italy)
- Region of Sicily (Italy)
- Alentejo Regional Coordination Commission (Portugal)
- Algarve Regional Coordination Commission (Portugal)
- National Railway Network (Portugal)

Main objective:

The creation of a greenway network for non-motorised transportation along the Western European Mediterranean Arc, including Portugal, Spain, France and Italy, following the model already started in Northern Europe, known as REVER AMNO, approved by the European Commission within Interreg II C. This first project included the northwestern metropolitan areas of Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium Luxembourg, the north of France, the Netherlands and Germany; Wallonia (Belgium) is the project manager.

The Mediterranean Greenway was inspired by the Lille Declaration (septiembre 2001), reflecting the decision of European countries and regions to create, with the support of the EU and of the European Greenway Association, a "Green European Network" to satisfy the demand for non-motorised transport and safe leisure activities in contact with nature, and contribute to the development of sustainable tourism in order to renew the local socioeconomic fabric, improve landscape preservation and diversification, especially in city environs, and revalorize the cultural and historical heritage of the towns on the way.

Aim:

- The design of a 10,000-kilometre green network, connecting the south of Portugal to the south of Italy, crossing the Spanish and French Mediterranean regions. This network will be made up of greenways, cattle routes, riverways, canals, bicycle paths, rural paths and roads with light traffic that meet with the requirements in the project's methodology.
- Incidentally, the Project is also meant for the interchange of experiences between the public administrations of different countries and associations or entities involved in sustainable transport policy, in order to support it at European level.

Actions:

Activities were grouped in seven chapters. Two of these, the study of itineraries and the execution of pilot projects or awareness activities, were carried out directly, locally, by each partner; the rest were horizontal, jointly managed under the coordination of the Andalusian Government Department of the Environment as project manager. The chapters, and their percentages in the project budget, were as follows: General outline (4,5%), Study of itineraries (10,3%), Design of pilot actions (60,1%), Convention (3,8%), Thematic round tables (2%), Communication and publication actions (7,7%) and Coordination (9,9%).

Most relevant results/products

- The creation of a General Outline for the Green European Network in the Western Mediterranean, divided into main axes and complementary interregional itineraries articulating the network.
- The technical and political convincement that linking the Western Mediterranean through greenways is possible, not ignoring the fact that a great effort will be required.

Most innovative actions

- All partners have agreed on a General Outline with a joint methodology, which has been useful for later actions in some regions.
- A study of the itineraries in order to compile information on the physical features of the terrain, interesting heritage in the environs, and a diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of the route.
- The execution of constructive pilot projects for adapting routes to pedestrians and non-motorised vehicles, and actions for the promotion and valorisation of specific route segments in each member region. In Andalusia a 5-kilometre segment of the "Two Bays (Cadiz-Algeciras)" Greenway was adapted, in the municipality of Medina Sidonia (Cadiz).

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- A large number of public agents who had always worked individually on similar subjects joined forces for the first time.

Interchange of information, experience and good practice

- All partners had the opportunity to contribute to the understanding of the matter. The four member countries each hosted a monographic round table, each of which initiated a true interchange of experiences.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

For the partnership:

- The Project has given organisms, associations and administrations which had been working individually on the same subject the opportunity to find a common methodology and aims to share, through the use of the jointly designed General Outline.
- The interchange of experiences has made it possible in some cases to reaffirm actions that had already been carried out, and in others, to enrich and improve pre-existing ideas.

For the Autonomous Community of Andalusia and for the Cattle Routes Plan Department:

- This Project is of special relevance for Andalusia, the AR with most cattle routes in Spain (4,765 km, 44% of the total, 10,000-km network) and the first to have a Plan for the Recuperation and Planning of Cattle Routes, approved by the Government Council on 27 March 2001.
- The Project meant the union of Andalusia's eight capital cities and its entire heritage declared of national or world interest by the UNESCO, and all protected natural spaces through cattle routes.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- A large number of partners (a total 33: 27 public administrations and four technical partners, belonging to Spain, Portugal, France and Italy) had to be coordinated, due to the deeply territorial character of the project.
- The participation of stakeholders at different government levels and with different powers depending on the country. This was not a problem within the project, but could have limited future application of the actions once the project was finished. This was not the case in Andalusia, with an ample degree of autonomy, and whose regional government believes in the project.
- The complex coordination mechanism designed by the Andalusian Department of the Environment as Project manager, articulated at two levels: 1) at national level, there was an Association in each country, technical but non-financial (it did not supply co-financing funds, but did receive them for the execution of actions), coordinating the rest of the partners and acting as spokesman with the project manager; 2) the Pilotage Committees, including all financial partners. As the coordination mechanism was an action in itself within the project, a part of the budget was dedicated to it.
- Technical support from the European Greenways Association (EGWA) which, at the request of the Project manager, facilitated the search and selection of technical and financial members for the Project designed by the Department of the Environment.

- The signing of the "Declaration of Seville", reflecting the strategic convictions and demands for the future development of the European Green Network.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/Difficulties:

- The usual financial circuit for European projects demanded an excessive dedication of time and energy, although this did not affect the Project in its outcome.

Strengths:

- The participation of a large number of partners (33), 13 of which were Spanish, from the regions of Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia.
- The sustainability and capitalisation of the project's results in later actions.
- The creation of a common Mediterranean identity along the route.
- A greater coherence for actions carried out at regional and local level, in each country and also among the countries.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- Once the Project was finished, all Andalusian cattle routes included in the general outline were defined, and the "Green Gates" Programme was started; it finished in 2010 after four years of work, and is considered a "star project" by the Andalusian Government Directorate General for European Funds.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- The partnership presented two new projects for continuing the first, but they were not selected. However, three of the most active regions in the Project, Andalusia, Algarve and Alentejo, have participated in the "Guaditer" Project for Itineraries on the Lower Guadiana, coordinated by ODIANA-Association for the Development of the Lower Guadiana (Algarve, Portugal), and financed by the Spanish-Portuguese Operative Programme for Cross-Border Cooperation (POCTEP). This project took place in 2008-2010, and three Andalusian Government Departments participated: Environment (through the Cattle Routes Planning Office), Culture (through the Directorate General for Cultural Assets) and Tourism, Commerce and Sport (through the Directorate General for Touristic Promotion and Commercialisation), besides the Provincial Deputation of Huelva (through its Cooperation for Local Development area). In order to create and publicize a joint touristic strategy for a structured offer centred on heritage, culture and the environment in the Lower Guadiana cross-border region (Algarve, Lower Alentejo and Andalusia), actions were carried out which were very much related to the REVERMED Project, such as the execution and signposting of itineraries connecting both sides of the border, and the joint touristic promotion of the Lower Guadiana area. The total cost of the Project was 3,519,871 euros.

Chart 3.8.

RURALMED Project I and II



RURALMED project I y II:
Permanent Forum and Network of Centres for
Rural Development in the Mediterranean
(2002-2004, 2004-2006)

Co-financed by the Interreg III-B. P.O. MEDOCC Community Initiative (2002 and 2004 calls).

Execution phases: 2002-2004 and 2004-2006

Total cost: The first phase of RURALMED had a total budget of 1,181,744.20 euros, and the second phase had 2,633,867 euros.

Project manager:

Directorate General for Rural Development in the Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, aided by the Public Enterprise for Agrarian and Fishing Development.

Andalusian partner:

The Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Other partners:

- Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (Andalusia, Spain)
- Department of Innovation and Territorial Action (PACA, France)
- Regional Government of Calabria (Italy)
- ERSAT: Regional Entity for Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance (Sardinia, Italy)
- Region of the Piedmont Consortium of Agrarian Entities (Piedmont, Italy)
- Mediterranean Landscape Workshop/ University of Florence/ ARSIA) (Tuscany, Italy)
- Algarve Regional Development Association -Odiana- (Portugal)
- Research Centre for Economics Applied to Development -CREAD (Algeria): guest observer
- Regional Ministry for Agriculture, Rural Development and Maritime Fisheries (Morocco): guest observer

The Valencian Community participated in the first phase (2002-2004) but then dropped out, and was replaced by two Tuscan stakeholders.

The first phase started at the end of 2002 and finished in April 2004; the second phase ended in October 2006.

Main objective:

The creation of a network for the interchange and coordination of rural development initiatives, including regions on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Basin.

Aim:

- To contribute to the competitiveness of the Western Mediterranean space, through actions for integrated rural development, in order to strengthen relations among member regions, pursuing institutional, public and private coordination within each territory for more effective cooperation, and drawing up joint strategic documents in matters of rural planning.
- The network's aim was to promote and optimize participative rural development processes within the Western Mediterranean Basin, through the interchange of knowledge and experiences, joint publicity and the execution of joint projects.

Specific Aims:

- The identification of problems common to different regions.
- The interchange of experiences.
- The publicity of good practices.
- To enhance cooperation among regions, and interaction between people interested in rural development.
- The creation of joint strategies.

Actions:

The first phase (2002-2004) had four thematic areas, each of them including different activities:

- The gender and youth factors in rural development, coordinated by Andalusia.
- Heritage as a nuclear element in rural development, led by the Algarve.
- Geographical Information Systems as tools for diversification in rural development, works directed by Sardinia.
- Organic agriculture, quality products and Denominations of Origin in the Mediterranean Basin, coordinated by Valencia.

In the second phase, the thematic areas were:

- Gender as a factor in rural development, coordinated by Andalusia.
- Rural heritage, headed by the Piedmont: modes of intervention, exploitation and management on heritage, based on social participation.
- Participative rural development, directed by PACA.
- The creation of a quality-certified touristic circuit in the Western Mediterranean rural area, coordinated by the region of Sardinia.
- Technical innovation in agriculture, among the requirements for quality and environmental tutelage, led by the region of Calabria.
- Landscape and heritage in contemporary rurality, coordinated by Tuscany.

Most relevant results/products

- The creation of a Territorial Centre in each member region, whose main job was to conform a regional partnership including all organisations in the territory working on subjects linked to rural development, thus creating a cooperation network in each territory participating in the Project. That way, the result of the works was received by a large number of agents and institutions with power in rural development policy.
- Within "Gender as a factor in rural development", coordinated by Andalusia (RURALMED II), an Observatory for Equality and a Gender Assessment Unit were created in Andalusia, and a book identifying good practices was published.
- Within the "Creation of a quality-certified touristic circuit in the Western Mediterranean rural area", coordinated by Sardinia (RURALMED II), a "Handbook of good practices and qualification rules for receptive businesses of excellence in the rural world" was published.

Most innovative actions

- The creation of a transnational platform for joint work, for all stakeholders involved in territorial management and in rural development processes. In the different thematic lines, reports were articulated through transnational work groups that met in person or online, through their own digital platform (www.rural-med.org), still operative.
- The reports on gender and participative development, coordinated respectively by Andalusia and PACA, discussed concepts towards agreement on criteria for policy design. Morocco and Algeria participated actively.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- In cooperation with each partner in the Project, administrations, research centres, universities and development agencies from the member regions and countries took part, attending the meetings held within the Project framework.

Interchange of information, experience and good practice

- The Rural-Med Web has a private area, with access restricted to the partners in the Project, and a public information area for interaction between people and entities interested in the Project, and between those and the member regions.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

For the partnership:

- The creation of a cooperation process with other interregional stakeholders, directing one's own actions according to the viewpoint of other partners in the Project.

For the Autonomous Community of Andalusia:

- The Directorate General for Rural Development, as a member and also as manager and executor of the Project, has promoted cooperation among different Groups for Rural Development in Andalusia, according to their interests and experience, through the attendance of their representatives at meetings and their active participation in the different actions of the Project.

For the Directorate General for Rural Development:

- Visibility and general recognition for the strategy planning and execution model applied by the Andalusian Government regarding rural development in the region, and also for the innovative technical capacity, and the capacity for coordination, management and leadership among partners, placing Andalusia as a firm candidate for directing other projects and actions towards joint integration and development with regions and countries on the southern Mediterranean shore.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- The inclusion of stakeholders at different government levels, public and private, in the work groups in each of the regions, and their subsequent interaction and cooperation with the rest of the regions at a transnational scale.
- The participation of Algerian and Moroccan public entities has enriched the results of the Project, and has contributed to enhance cooperation between both Mediterranean shores regarding a subject of special interest to the countries and regions involved in the Project.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties

- Difficulties in communication due to the language barrier were overcome thanks to the translators, who acted as mediators.
- Some lines of research did not work as expected.
- Morocco and Algeria, as guest observers, did not have funding for the Project, so the European partners had to finance some of their activities.

Strengths:

- The Project conformed a transnational network; open to the inclusion of all Mediterranean regions and entities interested in taking part.
- The mutual understanding and cooperative work during RURALMED I made RURALMED II possible.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- The actions in RURALMED I continued in RURALMED II, in which most entities went on, and some new ones were included, bringing with them new viewpoints and contents, and thus consolidating all the work.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- After the successful RURALMED I project experience, in which all the objectives were reached to a greater or lesser degree, the regions involved decided to present a new Project in order to give continuity to the first one, based on the international and interregional working relations established then. So RURALMED II was approved for the 2004-2006 phase.

3.3.

Cross-border cooperation between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean. Our necessary, privileged relations with Morocco

As we have said before, EU countries were able to cooperate with TMCs through the Interreg Community Initiative Cross-border Cooperation Programme. Also, the EMA decided that the MEDA Programme would be the main economic and financial instrument for cooperatively helping the TMCs to reform their economic and social structures, and to lessen the social and environmental impact of economic development. MEDA I, started in 1996, and modified in 2000 (MEDA II), replacing the different bilateral protocols, has thus allowed the EU to give financial and technical aid to the following southern Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, the Palestine Territories, Tunisia and Turkey. One of the novelties in MEDA II (2000-2006) was that it contemplated

directly endowing the receiving member with support for economic reform within structural adjustment programmes.

Once the 2007-2013 EU economic, social and territorial cohesion policy came into effect, cross-border cooperation with non-community countries was no longer included in the European Territorial Cooperation Objective, but in the ENP, through the Cross-border Cooperation Programme, with a 1,181-million euro budget for the six year period.²⁸ The aim of this programme is to reinforce cooperation among territories situated on the outer borders of the EU, that is, between Member States and partners sharing sea or land frontiers, by financing cooperation projects managed by local and regional authorities, and also by other local

28 Through the ENPI, managed by Europeaid, three types of programme are financed: a) bilateral programmes between the European Commission and neighbouring countries, b) regional and thematic programmes, and c) cross-border cooperation programmes. The first two are endowed with about 10,600 million euros (95% of the ENP budget), whilst cross-border cooperation has 550 million euros from Europeaid and the same again from ERDF funds. The programmes are based on mutual benefits, co-ownership, association (at least one EU and one third country) and co-finance.

stakeholders such as universities, trade unions, business organisations, NGOs and Chambers of Commerce, all using the methodology used in regional politics, though slightly simplified. So, for the first time, local and regional authorities are situated at the centre of Euromediterranean cooperation, and regional political methods are extended to EU foreign cooperation actions.

For the Mediterranean space, the ENP designed a Mediterranean Basin Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, to be applied only in Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Portugal, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom. All the countries have participated in the design and programming stages —except Algeria, Libya, Turkey and the United Kingdom, which are not initially adhered to the programme but will be able to participate once it has started—, in order to reflect the members' joint, unified viewpoint and the specific interests and needs of each. We must highlight the fact that, within the management and administration structure of the programme, Spain has been chosen for the installation of the Antenna for the Western Mediterranean, situated in Valencia, which includes a group of contiguous countries with the aim of strengthening the transnational nature of the Programme (the Antenna for the Eastern Mediterranean is in Jordan). The programme has a total budget of 189,231,983 euros for 2007-2013, of which the EU contributes with 173,607,324 euros and the member nations co-finance 10% (Morillas Fernández and Gallardo Martínez, 2008: 123).

The thematic priorities of the Mediterranean Basin Programme are: 1) the promotion of socio-economic development and territorial improve-

ment, 2) the promotion of environmental sustainability in the sea basin, 3) the promotion of operative frontier efficiency in order to ensure better conditions and modes in the movement of people, goods and capital, and 4) the promotion of cultural dialogue and local governance.²⁹ The programme establishes eligible areas in each country for applying the projects, which in Spain are: Andalusia, Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla.

Although a bit late, due to delay in signing the financial agreements required the Mediterranean Arab Countries by the European Commission, the Mediterranean Basin Programme launched its first call for "standard projects" in mid-2009, and approved 30 projects with a total 42.5 million euros, from about 600 proposals received. And more recently, in May 2011, the first call for "strategic projects" was launched, with a total budget of 62.4 million euros. The latter focuses more specifically on priorities 1 and 2:

Priority 1

- a) Definition of policies and promotion of pilot initiatives in support of investment and development, technological innovation and transference, with special attention towards SMEs; and the promotion of innovative SME groups, in the sectors of food and agriculture and sustainable tourism, based on the preservation and appreciation of cultural and natural heritage.
- b) Promotion of joint planning methodologies, especially regarding integrated coast management, including maritime safety.

29 Cfr. *Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy Paper 2007-2013*.

Priority 2

- a) Promotion of investment and development, innovation and technological transference, with special attention to SMEs working on residue treatment and recycling.
- b) Water management, with attention to: quantity and quality of the supply, regarding alternative water supplies and reusing residual waters and/or an efficient use of water resources, especially in agriculture.
- c) Definition of policies and promotion of pilot initiatives supporting investment and development, innovation and technological transference, with special attention to SMEs in the solar energy field.

Due to the impossibility of starting the bilateral Spain-Morocco cross-border cooperation programme (within the ENPI Maritime Routes Programme), as no joint ENP programme met the legal deadline, POCTEFEX 2008-2013 was born, under a specific Cross-border Cooperation Operative Programme format—in the ERDF Objective 3 (territorial cooperation) framework—in order to carry out cross-border cooperation projects between Spain and Morocco ensuring the continuity of relations, agreements and joint projects already existing. This format makes it possible to use ERDF funds in community territory and the execution of up to 10% of that assignation on eligible expenses generated directly in non-EU countries. The general aim of the programme is to promote harmonic socioeconomic and environmental development, and to contribute

to a greater structuring of the cooperation space. It has two cooperation areas: the Straits (the provinces of Almería, Granada, Málaga, Cádiz and Huelva, the adjacent provinces of Seville, Córdoba and Jaén, and the cities of Melilla and Ceuta) and the Atlantic (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz de Tenerife). On the Moroccan side, eligible partners are the regions of Tangier-Tetouan, Taza, Alhucemas-Taounate and the Eastern Region, in the Straits area, and in the Atlantic area, the regions of Guelmin-Es-Smara, Souss Massa Drâa and Laâyoune-Boujdour-Sakia El Hamra.

The projects developed between Andalusia and Northern Morocco since the mid-nineties within the Interreg II-A (94-99) y III-A (00-06) Spanish-Moroccan initiatives, in order to promote socioeconomic progress in the area³⁰, gave way to the creation of a sociability network entre the different public and private development stakeholders both sides of the Straits, through the 115 projects financed by Interreg III-A, such as the Straits Migration Observatory and the Prevention of Undesirable Effects, the creation of the Transcontinental Andalusia-Morocco Biosphere Reserve, the Maarifa Project³¹, etc. These projects certainly strengthened the role of decentralised international cooperation, and acted as a platform for the design of new projects, such as the 39 approved (30 of them for the Straits area) in January 2010 by the Management Committee of the programme, presented to the first call of POCTEFEX (2008) and which should be executed by 30 June 2011. Based on the selected pro-

30 The areas eligible for financing were the provinces of Cádiz and Málaga, the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the adjacent provinces of Huelva, Seville, Córdoba and Granada. The Andalusian-Moroccan cross-border cooperation projects executed within the two Interreg Programme phases (1994-1999 and 2000-2006) were assigned a total of over 400 million euros.

31 The Maarifa Project, presented by the Socioeconomic and Technological Employment and Development Institute of the Provincial Deputation of Cádiz, is a comprehensive project for improving competitiveness and capacity for sustainable development in the province of Cádiz and the Tangier-Tetouan region, through which to promote the creation of a competitive environment.

jects, the following areas seem to be priorities for cross-border cooperation:

- a) *In the business area:* The creation of a Mediterranean business school, a network of chambers of commerce and a programme in support of SMEs have been proposed.
- b) *In the area of employment and training:* A project for training technicians in cultural management, the creation of a Spanish-Moroccan studies centre, and cooperative ICT development.
- c) *In the environmental area:* projects for sustainable urban and rural development, renewable energies, water technology transference, the creation of a marine observatory, to name a few.
- d) *In the port sector:* Environmental management and decontamination of ports, and the creation of a port logistics platform.
- e) *In the touristic and cultural sector:* the dynamisation of leisure and touristic businesses, the appreciation of historical and cultural heritage, the recuperation of ancient crafts in danger of extinction, and the modernisation of craft production and commercialisation. There is also a project for Youth as a motor for tolerance, another for strengthening local institutional cooperation through the creation of networks, and one for creating a system for the mobility of labour migration flows.

This situation confirms once more the interest shared by Spain and Morocco in cooperation, and very especially Andalusia and Northern Morocco, areas with a lower level of development in comparison to the other regions in their respective countries, and situated on a border with an extreme inequality level in terms of economy and development³². Regarding the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the level of interdependence with their retro-country is very high, and demands a joint effort in terms of cross-border region economic development, and also joint strategies for managing migratory flows, and for diversifying economic activity in order to put a stop to so-called “atypical trade” on the borders.

Also, the fact that the two regions straddle the Straits of Gibraltar, in a strategic area where the geopolitical and economic objectives of the great international powers meet, and which the EU considers as its natural influence area, has led Spain and Morocco to reinforce bilateral cooperation at central government level, but also, basically, through decentralized cooperation. Following the State’s guidelines, Andalusia sanctioned the 14/2003 Law for International Development Cooperation, and in 2006 created the Andalusian Agency for International Development Cooperation (AAIDC), situating Morocco as a privileged partner and the main recipient of the Andalusian government’s Official Aid for Development (OAD) in the last ten years³³, and which started the “Cross-Border Development Programme between Morocco and the Andalusian Government for the 2003-2006 period”.

32 In this sense, economist Iñigo Moré refers to “economic frontier steps” and points out that the Spanish-Moroccan border is the most unequal in the whole EU: the inequality between Spain and Morocco has a ratio of 15 points in terms of nominal per capita GDP, and 5.45 in terms of purchasing power parity, higher than the difference between Mexico and the USA, usually cited as the highest economic disparity (Moré, 2007).

33 Between 1999 and 2005, the Andalusian Government gave Morocco an average 20% of the total OAD, despite the fact that the neighbouring country is listed among those with a medium HDI. (Desrués and Moreno Nieto, 2007: 252).

This programme was structured around seven priority action hubs: basic social services, social development, economic development, infrastructures, institutional reinforcement, energy and the environment, and culture and the preservation of architectural heritage. Intervention areas of preference were: the Tangier-Tetouan region (prefectures of Tangeer/Asilah and Fahs beni Mekada, provinces of Tetouan, Larache and Chefchaouen); the Taza/Alhucemas/Taounate region (provinces of Taza, Alhucemas and Taounate) and the Eastern Region (prefectures of Oujda/Angad, provinces of Nador, Berkane, Taourit, Jerada and Figuig). Morocco and the Andalusian Government gave 48 million euros, with which they financed 250 projects implemented through the Andalusian government itself, and Andalusian municipalities, NGOs, universities, trade unions and business organisations.

The Rif region in the north of Morocco has been historically ignored in favour of central and southern areas of the country; the Fez-Rabat-Casablanca triangle concentrates most economic activity, a situation which has begun to change after the accession of King Mohammed VI, and the start of the *Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement du Detroit* (SDAU) in the north of Morocco, around the building of the Tangier-Med Port and the transformation of adjacent areas, for the creation of an urban business environment enhancing a chain development of complementary activities. This development strategy across the Straits offers local and regional Andalusian stakeholders enormous opportunities for business cooperation and expansion.

The creation of the National Agency for the Promotion and Development of the Northern Provinces in 1995, the signing of the Cross-Border Development Programme between Morocco and the Andalusian Government (2003-2006) and participation in joint projects with Spain (at central government and decentralised level) and in the EU Interreg initiative, are symptoms of Morocco's faith in developing its northern area, which coincides with neighbouring Spain's (and particularly Andalusia's) interests regarding economy and security.

The Moroccan government's enthusiastic greeting of the ENP, unlike that of other Mediterranean partners such as Egypt and Algeria³⁴, may be understood as the culmination of its old aspirations to deferential treatment from the EU, more like a privileged association. In fact, relations between Europe and Morocco have gradually but perceptibly grown closer: from the first Agreement between the EC and Morocco in 1969, mainly commercial in character, to the Global Cooperation Agreement in 1976 which widened its scope to include economic, technical and financial cooperation, to the 1996 Association Agreement including political, social and cultural

34 Tanto Egipto como Argelia se han mostrado más reticentes al cambio que provoca la PEV y el nuevo IEVA (Soler i Lecha, 2006: 39). Un interesante estudio sobre las heterogéneas reacciones de los países del norte de África frente a la PEV, centrado en las respuestas marroquí y argelina, puede verse en Darbouche y Gillespie (2006).

dimensions, to the Advanced Association Statute in October 2008.

The model which finally included the ENP corresponds largely to Moroccan expectations, as it authorizes Mediterranean partners to advance at variable speeds (regatta model) and to sign bilateral plans of action according to priority cooperation areas. In fact, Morocco was one of the first countries to sign the joint Plan of Action in July 2005, and the first to achieve the Advanced Association Statute, playing a “*role d’avant-garde*” within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, a preview of what might in the future be the contractual framework for relations between the EU and nearest neighbouring countries from 2014; Ukraine, Moldavia and Israel are the other countries with which the EU would be willing to enter on special neighbourhood relationships.

Morocco has also been seen as an example of “good practices” regarding its role in the MEDA Programme. Of the total MEDA budget, Morocco was the main recipient, with a total 1,472 million euros for 1995-2006 (660 million under MEDA I and 812 million under MEDA II), for structural adjustment programmes in essential sectors such

as finance, the tax system, water, transport, health, education, and civil service, besides coupling and interchange measures in services such as customs, the environment, youth, transport and justice. Also, according to several European Commission reports, Morocco is one of the countries which have made most progress in the implantation of the Plan of Action, and the main recipient of ENPI funds (654 million euros for 2007-2010). As expressed by the European Commissar for Foreign Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, in March 2007: “The Commission has recently taken account of the first year of the Plan of Action’s coming into practice. In the case of Morocco, I am happy to say that our evaluation is highly positive. Overall, our relations have progressed greatly” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007).

However, there is still a long way to go, according to different joint work documents. For the 2007-2013 period, five priority financial cooperation areas have been identified: the development of social policy (45% of the funds), economic modernisation (37%), institutional support (5%), good governance and human rights (6%), and the protection of the environment (7%). The different priority areas to which funds will foreseeably be given reflect the multidimensional character of cooperation and also of the reforms necessary for the progress of Morocco.³⁵

We shall now take a look at three cross-border cooperation projects in which Andalusia and Morocco have been partners, within the Interreg III-A and MEDA II programmes.

35 Cfr.: *Morocco Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, 21. Este documento establece el marco estratégico de la ayuda de la UE para el periodo 2007-2013, el cual se divide en dos fases de implementación (y dos ejercicios de programas), la primera de 2007-2010 y la segunda de 2011-2013. Para la primera fase se ha elaborado el PIN 2007-2010, en el que se proponen las prioridades a financiar por la UE teniendo en cuenta aquellas propuestas por la política nacional marroquí, acordadas en el marco del IEVA.

Chart 3.9.

FIPAC Project

Training, Research and Computerisation Programme
for Cultural Heritage
(2002-2006)

Co-financed by the INTERREG III-A Community Initiative.
Spain-Morocco Cross-border cooperation (2003-2004 call).

Execution phase: 2002-2006 / Total cost: 720,000 euros

Project manager:

Andalusian Government Department of Culture through the IAPH (Andalusian Historical Heritage Institute).

Other partners:

Ministry of Culture of the Kingdom of Morocco, through its Tangier-Tetouan Regional Department of Culture.

Main objective:

The preservation and appreciation of historical and cultural heritage common to Andalusia and Northern Morocco, through joint training and research for their managing agents.

Aim:

- To establish communication and the interchange of knowledge between Andalusian and Moroccan cultural institutions, promoting interaction in the field of cultural heritage.
- To carry out research projects in the field of joint cultural heritage.
- Training in new technologies and information systems, related to historical heritage.
- To give continuity to previous training projects, and establish the basis for future joint actions.

Actions:

- The programming and carrying out of training activities in the areas of preservation, heritage publication and interpretation, cultural management, museums, libraries and documentation, musical tradition and the performing arts.
- Joint research projects, seminars and thematic conventions.
- Courses completed: 42, mostly in Andalusia.

- Research grants: 10 grants in the University of Granada.
- Joint research projects: 7 reports.
- Seminars and conventions: 4.
- Specialized training stays: 4 Moroccan technicians worked with partners in Andalusia for three months.
- Masters degree training grants: 7.

Most relevant results/products

- The design of a training programme, structured around the different cultural heritage areas (heritage preservation, museums, libraries and documentation, cultural management, joint cultural and musical tradition), for Andalusian and Moroccan technicians and professionals. About 200-250 Andalusian and 100-150 Moroccan technicians participated in these activities.
- High-level, specialized training for Northern Moroccan professionals in the field of culture.
- The creation of permanent cooperation networks around cultural heritage both sides of the Straits.

Most innovative actions

- Moroccan professionals completed specialized training courses, and will in turn train other professionals in their own country.
- Three-month training stays for Moroccan professionals in Andalusia
- Learning about new technologies and computers in all the training processes.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- There was a high degree of participation by Andalusian and Moroccan stakeholders in the different courses, in the two Literary Translation and Edition Conventions (Malaga and Tangier) and in the two training sessions for librarians in Tetouan and Tangier.
- For the organisation and carrying out of all the actions, technical and professional personnel from 123 institutions cooperated: museums, libraries, foundations, associations, universities, study centres, cultural centres, documentation centres, photo libraries, theatres, archaeological sites, etc., both Spanish and Moroccan.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

- The strengthening of cooperative relations.
- The identification of potential partners on both sides of the Straits.
- An understanding of the cultural management systems in Andalusia and Northern Morocco.
- Contacts between technicians and professionals in the cultural administrations of both territories.
- Understanding and training in information systems used by the Andalusian administration regarding cultural heritage.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- The interchange and transference of knowledge between technicians in the cultural field in two cross-border regions north and south of the Mediterranean.
- The strengthening of regional capacities through the involvement of public and private, provincial and local organisations and entities in the actions carried out. In the case of Andalusia, the Department of Culture included several regional institutions and dependencies from other Departments, which cooperated very actively in the project's actions. The same can be said of Morocco.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties:

- Although the selected Moroccan participants met with the required knowledge of the language, due to the specific subjects in some of the training activities, there was a lack of homogeneity in language levels. In order to prevent this fact from affecting the project's aims, the problem was solved by signing the technicians up for intensive Spanish courses, adapted to their individual levels.
- The Spanish Consulate in Morocco requires visa applicants to have 30 euros a day for their stay in Spain. In order to have the largest possible number of Moroccan participants, unforeseen grants for transport, room and board were given.
- Due to the difference in equipment and infrastructures in both regions, the received specialized training did not always have an immediate practical effect.

Strengths:

- Specialized training in the field of culture is immediately applicable, as long as the necessary infrastructural means are available.
- Contact was made between people working in the field of culture.
- A better understanding between Andalusian and Moroccan cultural institutions.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- Both territories continued cooperating on joint projects financed by the Andalusian Government Department of Culture.

Source: Information compiled by the authors from interviews and other sources.

Chart 3.10.

FORMAGRI Project

Cooperation in professional agrarian training for sons and daughters of farmers in Northern Morocco (2003-2006)

Co-financed by the Interreg III-A Community Initiative.
Spanish-Moroccan Cross-border Cooperation Programme (2002 call).

Execution phase: 2003-2007 / Total cost: 256,000 euros

Project manager:

Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Directorate General for Agrarian and Fishing Research and Training/ IFAPA: Agrarian and Fishing Research and Training Institute.

Other partners:

Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture, Rural, Water and Forest Development, through its Directorate for Training, Research and Development.

Main objective:

To contribute to the rural development of Northern Morocco through the qualification of young farmers.

Aim:

- To strengthen agrarian professional training in the rural development process in the provinces of Northern Morocco.
- To adapt the Andalusian model, of training and incorporation to agrarian enterprise, to Northern Morocco.

Actions:

- An Initial Seminar at the IFAPA Centre in Campanillas (Malaga).
- Visits to training centres in Northern Morocco.
- Adaptation, translation and edition of teaching material: Twelve handbooks were published, on: 1. Pruning olive trees. 2. Soil and nutrition for olive trees. 3. Cattle fodder. 4. Plaguicides. 5. Basic irrigation techniques. 6. Surface irrigation. 7. Sprinkler irrigation. 8. Localized irrigation. 9. Dairies. 10. Business management. 11. Livestock health and hygiene. 12. Basic cheese-making regulations.
- A visit from a delegation of technicians from work centres in Northern Morocco.
- Courses for training trainers.
- Internal or follow-up meetings, technical meetings, commissions, starting and finalisation seminars (Rabat, Malaga, Meknés, Ben Karrich, Granada, Cordova, Malaga).

Most relevant results/products

- Thirty-nine teachers from agrarian training centres in Northern Morocco were trained, in sectors such as intensive and extensive horticulture, fruit farming and olive farming.
- The twelve handbooks were among the first agrarian training books to be published in Arabic, and had great impact and usefulness in farming areas.
- Forty young Moroccans found employment.
- A plan of action for the Louco area in Morocco, of great farming potential.

Most innovative actions

- Regarding irrigation, the opportunity to implement the use of new data transference technologies was an innovation.
- Sub-tropical farming was an innovation for Morocco.
- The edition of handbooks in two languages, which reached rural areas.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

- This Project has had more visible short- and medium- term results than the PCIAAM and OPAM projects, due to its didactic character. The research projects, however, are not answering so directly to the expected rural sustainable development objective.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- It is a cooperation Project with a high development component.
- The FORMAGRI, PCCIAM (Andalusian-Moroccan Agrarian Research Cooperation Project) and OPAM (Observatory of Atlantic and Mediterranean Fisheries) projects were simultaneous, all coordinated by the IFAPA. This enhanced contacts between research and training groups from both countries, the joining of synergies and the capitalisation of results in the three projects. Some joint activities took place, such as follow-up and evaluation meetings and final seminars, thus strengthening the activity coordination, stakeholder networks and the publication of results in the three projects.

Weaknesses and strengths

Weaknesses/difficulties:

- The special characteristics of countries with different development levels influence the way they work, the way they think and how quickly things are done. However, there was very fluent coordination among the project partners.

Strengths:

- The action protocol was designed jointly by the Andalusian and Moroccan partners (both in PCIAAM and in FORMAGRI).
- Medium-term actions have had an important impact, and are ongoing.
- Research in this field is of high potential and relevance.
- In the MEDA programme, during which PCIAAM and FORMAGRI (2007-2009) actions were completed, Morocco was the Project manager and turned out to be a partner of quality, not only at technical level but also in partnership management.

Continuity of actions once the project is over

- Interreg III-A projects were supposed to finish in 2006; as some actions had not been completed, partners recurred to MEDA in order to give continuity to both FORMAGRI and PCIAAM II (2007-2010). In the MEDA programme, unlike Interreg in which only 10% of the budget could be invested, the funds could be invested in Morocco. Due to certain difficulties in expense management and justification, some actions which were supposed to finish in 2008 went on practically until 2010. The OPAM Project had no continuity in the MEDA programme.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

- Andalusia has participated in the Permanent Open Call of the AECID with:
- Morocco's "Transforman Project" (2008) for detecting technological transference needs, with a budget of 123,000 euros and 65 people involved.
- Algeria's "Development of a multi-tunnel greenhouse in Algeria" (2007-2008), for installing a multi-tunnel greenhouse and training Algerian technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture.

And also in the Inter-university Cooperation Programme of the AECID:

- Tunisia's "Effect of variety and size on productivity in hyper-intensive olive plantations" (2007 and 2008), which investigates the possibility of farming olives in hedges.
- New projects have been presented to European ENPI calls; some were not selected and others are pending resolution.
- IFAPA has also participated in Cross-border Cooperation Projects with Portugal, in the Interreg III and POCTEC Programmes, and in other European programmes with Mediterranean and Atlantic partners.


Chart 3.11.

PCIAAM I Project

Andalusian-Moroccan Agrarian Research Cooperation Project (2003-2007)

Co-financed by the INTERREG III-A Community Initiative.
Spanish-Moroccan Cross-border Cooperation Programme (2002 call).

Execution phase: 2003-2007 / Total cost: 524,000 euros



Project manager:

Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Directorate General for Agrarian and Fishing Research and Training / IFAPA: Agrarian and Fishing Research and Training Institute

Other partners:

- Meknès National Farming School.
- Hassan II Institute of Agronomy and Veterinary Science.
- National Agronomy Research Institute.
- Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture and Rural, Water and Forest Development, through the Directorate for Training, Research and Development (DERD).

Main objective:

To contribute to the establishment of permanent relations for cooperation and the interchange of information between the agrarian administrations of Andalusia and Morocco.

Specific Aim:

- To establish relations for cooperation and interchange regarding agrarian research, between the Andalusian agrarian administration and the Moroccan administration, focused on the North of Morocco.
- To identify lines of work of joint interest.
- To constitute cross-border teams of agrarian researchers.
- To carry out research projects on subjects of common interest in the field.
- To create a website on agrarian research in Andalusia and Morocco.

Actions:

- Exchanges and encounters among agrarian researchers from Andalusia and Morocco, with the participation of 36 researchers from Morocco, 39 from Andalusia, and 12 second-cycle students from Morocco who were working on their thesis.
- The design and presentation of projects by mixed teams, in search of funds.
- The carrying out of joint research projects.
- End-of-project Convention.

Most relevant results/products

- An agrarian and food research cooperation network was created, made up of a Mixed Commission for agrarian research in Andalusia and Northern Morocco, and networks of researchers grouped by work lines.
- An agrarian research website was created, in order to enhance the interchange of information between agrarian administrations.
- Thanks to the project's actions, some of the Moroccan students who were working on their theses were hired by the University in their own country, in order to develop and transmit what they had learned about subtropical farming in Granada.

Most innovative actions

- Exchanges and encounters among agrarian researchers from Andalusia and Morocco, with the participation of 36 researchers from Morocco, 39 from Andalusia, and 12 second-cycle students from Morocco who were working on their thesis.
- Seven research projects were carried out on different subjects: improving avocado productivity in Morocco, aromatic and medicinal herbs, extensive goat farming, use and management of water for irrigation, almond trees and olive trees.
- The irrigation assessment system has worked very well, and there is a Project along the same line with Algeria.

Involvement of public and/or private stakeholders in the project's activities

- As it was necessary to see the terrain and the resources, there were seminars and visits to Morocco, after which a specific Action Plan was designed for the Louco area (selection of plots for experimentation and irrigation perimeters, etc.). During the Interreg programme, Morocco could not be given equipment or training centres, but it has later been done using MEDA funds.

Benefits for partners and particularly for Andalusia

- The IFAPA training programmes were tested, and Andalusian trainers got to know other work terrains, thus enriching their technical training.

Value added by the project to interregional cooperation and to multilevel governance

- Until the Project started, there had only been sporadic, personal contacts between agrarian researchers on both shores. The project has contributed to institutionalized contact, a permanent cooperation framework, and a comprehensive vision of joint interests at interregional level. It has also meant a starting point for the presentation of joint research projects, using the new networks between teams.
- This Project is another effort on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, for the promotion of agrarian research and technological development and transference as a strategy within the Modernisation Plan for Andalusian Agriculture.
- The participation of universities has enriched the projects, according to their aims: in the case of FORMAGRI no universities participated, as the Project was based on IFAPA and DERD competences for giving the specific training courses needed by areas far from the universities.

Weaknesses and strengths

Strengths:


- The partners already knew and trusted each other loyally.
- IFAPA and DERD have very similar structures and organisation, although the latter depends on the Ministry and operates in the country as a whole. The main object of both institutions is technological transference to the rural world for its development.

Continuity of the partnership in other projects

See Chart 3.10.

3.4.

Main obstacles and challenges for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean



As this chapter has been reflecting, the Mediterranean space has witnessed an ever-growing regional cooperation. This has been possible thanks to the will and the need of the different European regions to join forces in order to solve common problems, and also to the opportunity they have seen for playing a more active role in multilevel governance.

The different projects designed and executed by various groups of regions since the mid-nineties have promoted cooperation between these regions in the most diverse fields and sectors, enhancing mutual understanding, the interchange of experiences and good practices, and the joint design of policies for territorial application helping to reach the objectives of regional European harmonisation and convergence.

From the European projects seen as examples in the preceding charts, we can appreciate progress in the following subjects affecting regional and multilevel good governance:

- Local and regional, public and private stakeholders and civil society in the territories involved are participating more and more actively in the projects, enhancing the principle of “ownership”;
- The consolidation of several transnational partnerships and platforms working jointly, showing continuity in subsequent programmes and projects, and also the gradual inclusion of new partners;
- Political and technical consensus between the regions has led to the signing of Manifestos of intentions and joint Declarations, some of which have reached national and European authorities;
- The design of joint strategies and sectoral measures for application in the respective regional territories, based on a joint methodology, and also the specific characteristics and different levels of power of each region;

- Recognition, by the States and the EU, of the work carried out by the regions, which gives an idea of the strengthening of European construction “from the bottom up”;
- Consciousness of the convenience and the opportunity of involving TMC regions in European projects, in order to enhance North-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and promoting the participation of regional and local stakeholders from southern countries who have smaller opportunities for action, due to their scarcely decentralized government systems;
- Constant learning of management procedure in European projects, giving way to greater co-responsibility among partners in their execution, in a decentralized system for organizing work in which each partner assumes the coordination of one or several actions of the project under the project manager’s supervision.
- We must ensure continuity of the actions in each of the regions, once the projects are finished;
- We must involve supra-national interregional cooperation authorities, as observer members of the projects;
- We must foresee the means for solving language barriers which sometimes prevent understanding between partners, and slow down joint work;
- We must offer specialized training in European project management to the technicians working on them;
- We must promote contact with other non-Mediterranean European regions, in order to share interregional cooperation experiences.

But there are still obviously several things that need to be improved, lest they become obstacles in the way of cooperation. Here are some of them:

- We must promote the coordination of projects and actions to be carried out in the same sectors, in order to join efforts, share experiences—good and bad practices—and avoid duplicating actions in the same territory;
 - We must increase the publicity given to current projects—their actions and results—and to the call for programmes, in order to encourage new stakeholders to participate in the projects;
 - We must ensure an effective ex-post project evaluation, in order to guarantee constant learning and improvement;
 - We must encourage projects that are structuring or strengthening for the territory, by articulating other sectoral projects;
- Andalusia has strengthened her role as one of the most dynamic regions in interregional, transnational and cross-border cooperation in the Mediterranean space. Proof of this is her high degree of participation as a partner and as project manager in many different European projects since the nineties up to today. In recognition of her natural Mediterranean—and also Atlantic—vocation, Andalusia has directed projects on subjects which happen to be Medgovernance priorities: the environment, innovation and competitiveness, transport and infrastructures, migrations, culture; to sum up, projects tending to integrated, sustainable socioeconomic territorial development.
- Andalusia’s work as project manager has often been praised by European authorities and also by partners in the specific projects. Andalusia has also achieved greater visibility and general recognition for the autonomous strategy planning and action execution model, applied for the past thirty years. We must also highlight Andalusia’s faith in projects with TMCs as partners, involving Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in several transnational and cross-border cooperation projects.

However, beyond the possibilities for regional cooperation starting from the different interregional, transnational and cross-border EU projects, it is necessary for supra-national Mediterranean cooperation authorities such as UfM to ensure the regions real, active participation in their projects and actions, both in their design and their execution. The action of ARLEM, as a pressure and negotiation lobby for achieving a greater presence of local and regional stakeholders and their respective interests and needs, is an essential key.

In view of the clear trend towards channeling resources to Eastern European countries, as seen for instance in the substantial increase in bilateral budget assignments in the ENP's NIPs (2011-2013) for Eastern European neighbours, in comparison to the assignments for Mediterranean countries³⁶, the Mediterranean region as a whole should try to develop coordination strategies in order to protect its interests in the EU's foreign policy priorities.

So the Mediterranean region has several challenges to face, especially after the recent revolutions in the Arab countries on the southern shore, which are positive on one hand in the sense of

advancing in the democratisation of their societies —necessary for promoting Mediterranean multilevel governance—, but on the other hand can affect the functioning of general cooperation frameworks, altering work chronograms because of the natural reconfiguration of priorities demanded by the internal problems of these countries.

We may conclude that it is absolutely necessary to continue working on joint action policies and strategies, starting from the priority sectoral lines drawn by the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, in order to become a solid front with negotiation power, and influence the design of regional and foreign European policy now and in the future. The Mediterranean regions must do this task through active participation in the different concertation forums and cooperation programmes from which valuable initiatives grow —such as the Integrated Mediterranean Strategy— and also interesting work documents and reports, both comprehensive and sectoral, such as those carried out within the Medgovernance project. All of them must be taken into account, with a view to effective Mediterranean multilevel governance.

36 The TMCs (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya, with a total population of 198.5 million) have been assigned 2,507.8 million euros for the 2011-2013 period, whilst the Eastern Association countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, with a total 66 million inhabitants) have been assigned 1,202.1 million. In comparison to 2007-2010, this has meant a 57.9% increase for the Eastern Association partners (although it must be said that the difference is due partly to the effect of the recuperation of assignments in comparison to the preceding period), and a 12.9% increase for the TMCs (Martin, 2010:12).



4

Mediterranean and Andalusian cooperation and priority actions within the framework of Europe 2020 strategy

Javier Roldán

4.1.

The Medgovernance Project and the priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy





4.1.1. The previous strategy

In 2000, the European Union gave itself an action strategy for the decade: the Lisbon Strategy, which looked forward to 2010. It was an important social and economic reform Project, supposed to make Europe the most competitive, dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. The method used to achieve this goal was more intergovernmental than community; based rather on coordination and consensus between Member States than on the action of supranational institutions, even if the latter backed the strategy. Indeed, the Strategy was approved within the European Council (an insti-

tution made up basically of the leaders of all the Member States), and lacked juridical formalisation and basis in the EU Treaty (Robles Carrillo, 2005). Regarding the regional phenomenon, the Committee of the Regions gave its grudging approval to the Strategy, at the same time criticizing the Member States and the Commission for its scarce decentralisation, which left regional and local collectivities in a very inferior position (Resolution on relaunching the Lisbon Strategy, DO C 164/91 on 5 July, 2005). In the end, the decade finished without achieving the main objectives designed in 2000³⁷.




³⁷ Aparte del notorio declive social y económico de Europa en la década pasada, se puede anotar un dato en materia educativa: de los cinco objetivos fijados para 2010 solo uno se consiguió en ese año (el aumento, en un 37%, del número de diplomados en matemáticas, ciencias y tecnología).


4.1.2 The Europe 2020 Strategy. General principles

So in 2010, it still remained to promote competitiveness, sustainable development, innovation, full employment, etc. in the EU. These aims are now even more urgent, due to the crisis in the whole world and especially Europe. Financial resources for these aims are now scarcer, but on the other hand, determination and a sense of State obligation are also stronger. The ideals in the 2020 Strategy are not very different from those designed in other developed areas, particularly the United States. There is nothing remarkable about this:

the 2008 Great Recession in the United States has spread around the world, but especially the West: current analysts call our world post-Western. International competence is therefore presented by the Commission as a solution for preventing Europe from having a “lost decade”. The Strategy begins by highlighting five quantifiable aims in five fields: employment, R&D&I, climate change and energy, education and the fight against poverty. Here are the very condensed aims established in each of these areas:

Table 4.1.

The Europe 2020 Strategy aims, classified by areas

Employment

To increase employment rate for the 20- to 64-year-old population, from the current 69% to 75% in 2020.

R&D&I

To increase investment in this area, from the current 1.9% to 3% in 2020.

Climate change and energy

The aim is based on the “three twenties”: To reduce by 20% the emission of greenhouse gases by the year 2020; and to increase use of renewable energy by 20%. This plan, presented by the EU at the latest UN conferences on the subject (Copenhagen and Cancun), could rise to 30%, as requested by seven Member Sta-

tes including Spain; but it is conditioned to the main EU's industrial partners making a similar effort, and to a new international agreement replacing the Kyoto Protocol. This confirms something very real in the Strategy's spirit: Europe's future depends greatly on the international context and foreign relations.

Education

To increase the ratio of 30- to 34-year-old population with complete higher studies from the current 31% to 40% in 2020.

Internal poverty

To reduce the poverty risk by 20 million, from the current 85 million (17% of the population).

In order to achieve these aims, a series of initiatives have been designed:

Table 4.2.

Initiatives proposed for achieving Strategy 2020 aims

Initiative

Innovation union

Description

To redirect R&D&I policy according to the main challenges, overcoming the lack of synchronisation between science and the market, and turning inventions into products. Just to give an idea, the community patent would save businesses 289 million euros a year.

Initiative

Youth on the move

Description

To increase the quality and the international attraction of the European higher education system, through the mobility of students and young professionals. A specific idea would be to allow greater access all over Europe to vacancies in the Member States, and to adequately acknowledge experience and professional qualification.

Initiative

A digital agenda for Europe

Description

To make the most of the sustainable socioeconomic advantages of the single digital market based on high-speed internet. All Europeans should have access to high-speed internet by 2013.

Initiative

Resource efficient Europe

Description

To support the change to a low carbon, resource-efficient economy. Europe should focus on the 2020 aims regarding energy use, efficiency and production. The result would be a 60,000 million euro decrease in oil and gas by 2020.

Initiative

Industrial policy for green growth

Description

To help the EU's industrial basis to be competitive in the world after the crisis, promoting entrepreneurial spirit and developing new capacities. That would help to create new jobs by the million.

Initiative

An agenda for new skills and jobs

Description

To create the conditions for modernizing labour markets, in order to increase employment and ensure the sustainability of our social models when the baby-boom generation has retired; and a European platform against poverty, guaranteeing economic, social and territorial cohesion by aiding the poor and the socially excluded, and allowing them to participate actively in society.

In the new Strategy for the 2010s the Commission, through a Communiqué dated 3 March 2010, formally initiated the process aimed towards achieving “smart, sustainable, inclusive growth”; the European Council approved it formally this time, and the Member States find themselves compelled to present their own action programmes. However, the execution of all these commitments requires everyone’s getting used to the idea and taking action; it is all about social transformation, and all public and private stakeholders, all state and sub-state administrations, each to their own capacity, must cooperate in publicizing and achieving these aims. The general consensus about the 2020 horizon does not succeed in hiding national, erratic divergences as to details and the means for arriving at the year 2020 having achieved all our aims (such as how to generate employment, or how to approach joint commercial policy, in a more or less free-trade key). Although the States and their regions share many of the same problems, they also differ in important aspects: the research sector in Germany, for example, is more developed and more inward-looking than in Spain; our economy’s competitiveness and unemployment problems are different from other countries’. Some social sectors, especially the entrepreneurial, have alerted us that the fight against climate change might cause a greater dislocation of productive activity outside Europe. So, different interests will have to be pondered. Nuclear energy, which had long been debated in the Union, has run up against the 2011 Japanese disaster. Europe usually works on long-term projects, which is all right, but these projects obviously need an irreducible general margin for change according to events which are often unforeseeable. But it is absolutely necessary for these aims to be taken into account, obviously

including regional and local collectivities, as being the closest to the citizens. When evaluating the political-juridical nature of the Strategy, we must bear in mind that it will be tested periodically by the Commission as to its general progress, and also through periodic reports on special aspects; for example, the Commission presented its third report on population at the end of March. The Strategy involves, however, not only public re-definition and re-direction, but also a change in citizen mentality, and this is more difficult to achieve, to supervise and to sanction. Talent and entrepreneurial spirit, for example, are the things to promote during the next decade.

Current events have brought out the need for coordination among States, which are too small for some things—thence the building of Europe and foreign relations—and too large for others—thence the needful decentralisation. The acute economic crisis has promoted economic integration, so the coordination method established by the new Strategy has been overreached somewhat by the reinforcement of economic unity, especially among the euro-zone countries. In this sense the Euro Pact (approved by the 17 euro-zone countries and plus four more EU States) encloses a programme for economic regulation and supervision which in some aspects goes beyond the Strategy and simple coordination and simple willingness. It is however worth thinking about if Pact requirements are wholly complementary, or at some point contradictory to Strategy requirements. In any case, this Pact for the euro was originally going to be called the “Pact for competitiveness”, the latter being a key word in the plans for 2020. Therefore, Spain and the Autonomous Regions are increasingly constrained in their social policy by external

imperatives, often agreed to within the EU, but sometimes the result of uncontrolled forces. It might be a good thing for there to be an external authority for imposing necessary reforms which are electorally costly, but we must also reflect on the state of national sovereignty and democracy, and the supremacy of economic over political power. The concurrence in the Strategy of the

intertwined competences of the different administrations makes coordination among public powers even more necessary. But this ambitious project for reformulating European society must not become a centralisation of regulating and controlling powers in Brussels, thus subtracting from areas closer to citizenry which are better placed for “working on site”.



4.1.3. The Europe 2020 Strategy and the distribution of powers among public administrations

The Lisbon Treaty, in effect since 1 December 2009, attempted, among other things, to clarify and outline European competences, by distinguishing and enumerating exclusive, shared and complementary competences. Despite this regulative effort, and what the 1978 Spanish Constitution says, there is no clear, closed list of functions and responsibilities among the different administrations. One of the obstacles in the way of this ideal inventory is the fact that there are many transversal competences, that is, competences that share the definition and relation of others, so their outlines are imprecise and expansive (Martín y López de Nanclares and López Escudero, 2000).

As is to be expected, the fight against climate change, mentioned explicitly for the first time in

EU treaties after the Lisbon reform, is one of the most outstanding items in the 2020 Strategy, and an example of how difficult it is to separate the competences of different government levels. This battle must be fought through a great number of European, State, and sub-state areas, some of which are mentioned in the Strategy itself: transport, energy, innovation; culture, apparently different, is also linked to climate change, besides being an important source of employment and entrepreneurial effervescence³⁸. The most largely funded community project in the Seventh R&D&I Framework Programme (2007-2013) is the electric car³⁹. The contention of climate change obviously involves formidable change in our schemes and our society on a world-wide scale, but the main efforts must be made at regional and local level (think globally, act locally, an ecologist slogan

38 The European Commission has funded 30 transnational cultural projects, under the general title “Culture in movement: en route towards 2020 Europe”. Among these projects, worth mentioning is “Imagine 202: Art looking at climate change”, helping artists to wonder and to imagine this situation.

39 The Commission has given a total 42 million euros to the Green eMotion initiative, in which universities, cities (Barcelona and Malaga, in Spain) and makers participate, and which is included in the Transport White Paper, whose aim is to reduce by half the number of conventional vehicles in cities by 2030.



Masterclass "The Europe 2020 Strategy and the Mediterranean". June 2010, Seville.

wisely says). These efforts, which must be negotiated by the EU with other, especially industrialized, countries, do not stop at a mere decrease in greenhouse gas emission, and are not aimed solely at controlling the Earth's temperature. Other Strategy aims, such as energy, are contained in six horizontal vectors pointing at changing an unjust, unsustainable model: the inner market, efficiency, infrastructures, foreign relations, R&D&I, interior energy sources and production. The first of these is the original and still central idea in the building of Europe. Other values such as gender equality must preside over the whole community effort, by reason of primary EU rights. Some fields covered by the Strategy, such as sport—not a priority in EU treaties—now become an outstanding element because of their involvement in youth policies, linked in turn to employment, training, social integration, etc. Education itself, not a prio-

rity in EU treaties either, has lately been sharply put into relief, due to the need for mobilisation and mutual acknowledgement between students and teachers; the Bologna Process, designed by Member- and non-member States on a weak and uncertain legal basis, needs loyal support from all collectivities involved. The field of Education is precisely where stability, long-term strategy and general consensus make sense, beyond electoral interests, urgencies and short-term views.

We therefore need an active citizenry, cooperation and synergy among the different administrations and between the public and private sectors, especially in these times of economic deficit and austerity. The Seventh Research Programme cited above invokes and begs private cooperation. The role of money, fortunately, is necessary but not exclusive or sufficient, in the exercise of

competences and in the achievement of the 2020 Strategy aims. For example, in order to increase competitiveness in Europe, it is absolutely necessary to implement greater fiscal coordination, a process which does not require financial support and which would in any case be required by the European single market.

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are guaranteed by the national and regional parliaments, and must preside over the exercise of non-exclusive EU competences. The idea is to demand that European action does not affect matters which can be better managed by State and sub-state administrations (subsidiarity), and that it does not go beyond whatever is needed in order to achieve Union aims (proportionality). Europe should come closer to the citizen, and current decisions should be made as close as possible to citizenry. Subsidiarity, rightly understood, aims towards the best distribution, technically induced, of competences among the different public powers, in order to avoid duplication and rationalize public spending in Europe. We should pursue added value, not redundancy in public action. Regional and local entities, though not formally EU organisms, are subject to the principle of loyalty and primacy of European law. The latter, however, must avoid legislating more than necessary, and evaluate its development's territorial impact. All these ideas are explained in detail in Chapter 2 of this report.

The Commission is working on a Communiqué, to be presented in autumn 2011, about the effects of decentralisation on European development cooperation policy. It will be an empirical, objective analysis of the pros and cons of intervention by regional and local powers in the management and results of this policy; in other words, the role of the principle of subsidiarity in this field. The European Platform of Local and Regional Authorities (PLATFORMA) presented a communiqué on the same subject on 28 March. This aseptic idea

of distributing competences is hampered, or even opposed, by the concurrence of political powers and interests. We are certainly going towards a multilevel governance model, in which the ruling idea should not be so much the compartmental limitation of functions, as their coordination, coherence and complementarity: to make the most of all synergies, to use a very popular term in public jargon. But the idea of making political decisions closer to the citizenry is opposed to globalisation, going the opposite way; there is more and more interdependence, more and more worldwide problems requiring worldwide regulations and solutions. Many of the general guidelines in the 2020 Strategy are explained and conditioned by the world context, which naturally affects, and often escapes the control of, the Union and its States, and which follows a path that not even the most experimented analysts can intuit, much less a decade in advance. There would be much to say about competitiveness, climate change, technological progress or energy. In this latter sector, the Strategy emphasizes foreign policy, aware of the lack of coordination in the selfishly national foreign policy of Member States, which hampers efficiency. The great transport and energy projects stimulated by the Strategy need political and financial Union participation, even in these difficult times. Some of these railway or electrical projects, for example, mean the extension of internal infrastructures to the transnational sphere, and strengthen the feeling of belonging to Europe. Regional, state and European vertebration must be strengthened through these networks.

The aforesaid principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are also counterweighed by the equally dominant principle of European loyalty. This principle obliges the States to act always with loyalty and support towards the European Union's aims. The European budget commissioner's spokesman has said that the regions of Europe should not ask themselves what the Union can do for them, but also what they can do for the Union. We are all truly Europe, not just Brussels. Territorial collectivities unfold functionally when they act at the service of the EU, and are a basic piece in the building of Europe. The assumption of competences and key roles in a State-based Europe must naturally be accompanied by the assumption of responsibilities, as established by the brand-new Spanish State Law on Sustainable Economy. This Law, which invokes the adjective "sustainable" in a polysemic way (ecologic, economic, innovation, lifelong education...) appeals to the involvement and complicity of sub-state entities in the pursuit of its aims. It is not surprising that its statement of purpose expressly mentions the 2020 Strategy, as the Spanish law and the European roadmap for the decade are on the same wavelength. We therefore must avoid radical, Manichean, excluding integrationist or autonomous stances, and branding some administrations as more efficient or austere than others. It is understandable, and praiseworthy, that the Committee of the Regions has formally requested a tripartite territorial pact, a wide administrative contract for funding and pursuing that "smart, sustainable, inclusive growth" in the Strategy's title. The State invokes,

often in vain, the need for great State pacts for solving the big problems which should not be at the mercy of inter-party or inter-territorial conflicts. In a crucial area for 2020, the Technology and Innovation Science Law seems to be making progress in the Spanish Parliament with almost unanimous support. So the States and their administrative divisions, traditionally jealous of their competences, often seek the juridical and political legitimisation offered by the European scene. That is the case, for example, in education; the national ministers meet, as is mandatory in Spain after consulting the ARs, within the European cooperation framework regarding education and training, and ask the Commission to evaluate and analyze European progress in access to education and the inclusion of infants. This initiative gives way to the Commission's launching a plan of action, in February 2011, for promoting universal access to quality preschool education. This will in turn enhance the attainment of great 2020 aims: to reduce the number of school dropouts and stimulate social inclusion. Again, the same Commission presented a communiqué as its "European contribution to full employment", within the flagship initiatives for 2020. Well, this communiqué has also been debated by the ministers of education, as training policies (university and professional) are closely linked to the labour market and lifelong learning. The same educational matter has been the object of agreements within Spain: the Autonomous Organism for European Educational Programmes has just been changed, in order to widen the ARs' representation in the Governing Council by including an autonomous representative designated by the Sectoral Conference for Education.

These examples show the ramifications and inter-connections inevitably experimented by internal and European competences, though the current Europeanisation process should not lead to an emptying of power and meaning for regional and local groupings. The Lisbon Treaty, the last reform

in effect among the original EU treaties, introduces the idea that subsidiarity does not operate only in EU-Member State relations, but also in the territorial structure of compound States such as ours.

The same can be said of youth, which is decreasing in number due to the population's ageing process, and on which the future of Europe depends after all. The chiefs of the national offices for "Youth on the Move" programmes meet in order to analyze a new generation of programmes after 2013, the end of the current pluri-annual financial framework.

Notwithstanding the more intergovernmental than European nature of the 2020 Strategy, this roadmap should actively promote, not just allow, the exercise of regional and state competences. European action must affect regional policies⁴⁰. The reasoned, reasonable creation of European associations of sub-state entities is healthy, such as the Confederation of Small Towns and Municipalities of the European Union in 2011. Coherence and complementarity must rule the aims for 2020, and positive interaction must rule among the different administrations called to implement them.



4.1.4. The regions and the Europe 2020 Strategy: The case of Andalusia

We have already pointed out that the whole Spanish State has been formulating actions to fit the letter and the spirit of the 2020 Strategy. Of particular significance is the Sustainable Economy Law, passed in 2011, projecting a great public action —by all powers— for redefining our social model. Apart from this legal framework, there are manifold state regulations linked to the European roadmap: for example, Law 11/2007, of 22 June, on Electronic Citizen Access to Public Services. From the EU's viewpoint, the Strategy

has already been implemented in many normative texts, directly or indirectly linked to its purposes⁴¹. We are therefore entitled to wonder about the discretionality and autonomy left to Spanish state and sub-state powers, after the imposition of supra-national factual and legal powers. From the Spanish point of view, and according to our Constitutional Court's oft-repeated doctrine, the Autonomous Regions are competent to proceed to the normative development and administrative execution of all European laws affecting their

40 See the 1/06/2010 sentence by the EU Court of Justice (Great Hall). Affairs C-570/07 and C-570/07. This decision was made due to a pre-judicial matter brought by the Asturias High Court of Justice.

41 See Royal Decree 307/2010, of 15 March, which approves direct funds for the European Anti-Poverty Network, for organizing, in cooperation with the Ministry for Health and Social Policy, the 9th European Round Table on Poverty and Social Exclusion. Official State Gazette 6 April 2010.

own competences. That is to say, the execution of European law must not give way to a re-centralisation of the State, nor must it undermine the autonomous competences established in the Constitution and in the Autonomy Statutes. In any case, a large part of the Andalusian Government's political and juridical task is already installed and imbricated in the 2020 Strategy, as this Strategy respects and requires the involvement of all public groupings on the basis of institutional autonomy: the State juridical order must organize competences and procedures for the correct compliance with Union Law. In order to break down and detail the actions aiming at the 2020 objective, the European Commission should take regional and local criteria and interests into consideration. In this sense, these entities have already criticized the lack of attention given to their problems in specific aspects: The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), for instance, has deplored the lack of sensibility shown by the Strategy towards these entities. This kind of criticism has pushed the Commission towards action for a better management of European maritime and coast areas.

In consonance with the 2020 Strategy, Andalusia sometimes carries out actions alone. Such is the case in renewable energies: they already answer for 13% of the electricity used in Andalusia, which is 2.6% higher than the national average. This percentage will foreseeably increase to 22.6% by 2013, achieving the EU objective for 2020. As to solar thermal installations and other related chapters, Andalusia is in a leading position. The Junta has been giving funds for improving efficiency in buildings, and has created the category "greenhouses of excellence" for acknowledging

and incentivizing greenhouses that make the most of energy. In any case, the fight against climate change also depends on imponderable, even negative factors: the economic crisis has reduced industrial carbon dioxide emissions in Andalusia by 8.2% in 2010.

In the field of new technologies, Andalusia spends 70 million euros in reimbursable funds for technology parks, and offers over 874 million through the new Fund for Technological Entrepreneurs and Productive Space Generation Funds.

In other cases, such as the European structural funds and the European Investment Bank, autonomous initiative is politically and financially backed by European budget funds. Through the Jessica programme, the EIB and the Junta have created the first fund for urban development in Andalusia. The Bank has clearly assumed the 2020 Strategy in its new action programme, especially two of its main aspects: climate and the knowledge society. Other Spanish territorial entities, such as Catalonia or the Deputation of Barcelona, with the support of European institutions, have worked towards ecologically balanced development. Andalusia has also benefited from funds for the implantation of the local "Agenda 21".

For all the 2020 Strategy flagship initiatives, the administrations must join efforts complementarily. This is the spirit of the Agrarian Employment Promotion Programme (PFEA), in which provincial deputations, the Andalusian Government and the national Government participate. Unemployment, a serious problem in the EU but especially in Spain and Andalusia, must necessarily be a priority in our time.



4.1.5. The Europe 2020 Strategy in time

The 2020 Strategy continues the plan for the future of European society begun in the Lisbon Strategy for the first decade of this century. The Union has not completed its own definition for the future, so it is impossible to foresee the structure and nature of European integration. Indeed, shortly after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the EU is already immersed in yet another reform regarding funds for rescuing national economies in distress. Also, the conclusions reached by the Reflection Group on the Future of Europe for 2030, chaired by former Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez, were published last year. The final report presents ideas linked to the objectives for the decade: greater competitiveness, in-depth changes regarding ageing, the promotion of scientific and technological research, the risk of international decline of the Union, the sustainability of the social model, etc.

Beyond annual budget planning, the Union has other pluriannual or long-term action frameworks, all naturally linked to the 2020 Strategy. Regarding finance, the EU has a pluriannual financial framework. We are currently in the 2007-13 septennium, and the next one, reaching precisely the year 2020, is already being debated. (The Commission was to present a report on the subject at the end of June.) Even within affairs regarding the Strategy for this decade, there are specific deadlines. As to climate change, especially, the agreement is being negotiated that will replace or extend the Kyoto Protocol, the first stage of which will expire in 2012. There is a 2020 horizon and,

beyond, commitments for 2030 and 2050. Transport has also been the subject of Commission reports looking forward to 2030 and 2050, promoting alternative energy sources, multimodality, increasing efficiency, etc. The Mediterranean rail corridor should reach Almeria by 2020. The necessary extension of the corridor to Algeciras, essential for the Euro-Mediterranean space, has no set date. The Energy Council approved the 2010-2020 strategy presented by the Commission in November of last year, a strategy whose main aspects are the same as the energy chapter in the 2020 Strategy. Research is, as we said, regulated in the seventh programme also for the 2007-2013 period, which will likewise be extended to 2020. 2012 will be the European Year for the Elderly, and the Commission has asked territorial powers at different levels and civil society to organize information and awareness events focused on intergenerational solidarity, and promoting active ageing. All in all, the internal and external challenges for the Union are many, also regarding development cooperation, detailed in the Millennium Development Goals approved in 2000 by the UN General Assembly looking forward to 2015.

Andalusia has also planned its main policies, by stages which sometimes coincide with the European stages. Such is the case in development or rural development cooperation, now in the 2007-2013 septennium. This related, complementary planning between state and European community will enhance interaction and coherence in the steps taken in the different territorial tiers.



4.1.6. The Europe 2020 Strategy: its financial framework

The financial scenario is a prime measure of European capacities and competences for achieving the 2020 goals, although these depend mainly on internal administrations. The 2013 pluriannual financial framework is nearing its end. The new one should be for 2014-2020, although there have been voices asking for a ten-year period, with a time for reflection and revision every five years.

The new economic panorama awakens great interest and concern, in a delicate, changing continental and world scenario. Regarding Union resources, the Commission insists on creating new financial resources (airline ticket tax, financial transaction tax), and linking them to the Union's own activity: that is, eschewing national contributions depending on each Member State's GNP, the basic food of European finance right now. However, due to the present situation of crisis and austerity, it would not be easy to further identify European public funds and increase the Union budget. It would also be desirable for the new resource system to be directed by progression, depending on the wealth of each State and region. The debate on fair return, defended by some states, by which what a State receives from the European exchequer depends on what it gives, is a fallacy. The benefits of belonging to the Union can certainly not be quantified or specified.

Regarding spending policy, the Commission already takes into account the goals in the 2020 Strategy when presenting and executing the annual European budget, which must be passed by the European Parliament and the Council. To date, the Commission has proposed a 5.1% increase

in 2012 for loans linked to 2020 Europe, reaching 62.6 million euros. But this and other proposals for more spending have already been put down by some states such as France, who think that in times of crisis and general spending cuts it would not be logical for the Union to increase its own annual budget. Future budgets, including the new pluriannual financial perspectives, will probably stay at current levels, which basically coincide with those of the 15-State Europe. The Committee of the Regions' idea, of eliminating any financial limit to regional policy in order to adjust finance to the needs of the moment, is well-intentioned but unrealistic. We must therefore not expect great aims regarding the 2020 Strategy in the European budget, so it is especially important to pursue synergies with State, regional and local budgets, which are also submitted to general European deficit control and public spending policy, imposed at State level in Spain by the reformed Budget Stability Law and also by the markets.

It is noteworthy that in times of need, there are fewer resources for some basic aims whose benefits are long-term, such as education or scientific research; this does nothing in favour of the 2020 spirit, and hampers the necessary economic convergence and harmonious development among Union States and regions, which have been penalized by the acute social crisis. This state of things certainly implies special care and an energetic search for transparency and benefit, and for the added value of each euro out of the public treasury, be it national or European. From the European standpoint it is necessary that, as regards subsidiarity, the Union should justify the added value of European

funds, thereby contributing to disarm the growing demagogic, populist Eurosceptical arguments in national public opinion. Transport is paradigmatic in the need for ingenious solutions for optimal funding for new projects. The new growth model postulated by the Strategy will be hampered by this scene of contention and scarcity, but this should not stop but encourage the quest for excellence and efficiency in spending public money. The demand and the exercise of new competences by any administration should also imply funding.

In the debate which is just beginning on new European finance, the dilemma between maintaining the current spending preferences —focused on socioeconomic cohesion and on the CAP—, or redefining spending policy more compatibly with 2020 Strategy priorities, will be very present, as it was in the previous Lisbon Strategy. This is, however, largely a false debate, as cohesion and agricultural policy are certainly not contrary to the 2020 spirit, but fully compatible and complementary to that spirit.



4.1.7. The Europe 2020 Strategy and economic, social and territorial cohesion

There are powerful reasons in favour of this policy, which must be wielded when the time comes to distribute EU public money for the next plu-

riannual financial framework and in the subsequent annual budgets, aiming at the 2020 Strategy. These are the main ones:

Table 4.3.

The 2020 Strategy and economic, social and territorial cohesion: justification

Reason 1:

Cohesion as a tool for growth and development.

It is not just a matter of funding, nor does it incentivize a parasitic economy, opposite the dynamism the Strategy aims at. Cohesion is an instrument for harmonious, balanced growth and development, peace and social inclusion, precisely at a time when social differences in the EU are widening. In the previous septennium (2000-2016), the Union supplied 25% of the investments in Spanish regions. In the current septennium (2007-2013) Europe will invest over 35,000 million euros in Spain, the largest figure ever for one country. The Commission has praised Spain's happy idea of concentrating most of those investments on crucial sectors for growth and employment. Cohesion combines development and solidarity, and both of these go together, not just from a humanitarian but also from a practical and technical point of view. The fight against poverty and exclusion being among the five 2020 Strategy priorities, it would be absurd to cut down on funds for social justice and human rights.

Reason 2:

Cohesion linked to the 2020 Strategy goals.

Figures confirm that cohesion is closely related to the main 2020 Strategy aims: social inclusion and the fight against poverty, environmental protection, demographic balance, employment, impelling renewable energies, R&D&I, the fight against climate change, reducing the digital gap, etc. Beyond this Strategy, the main principles and values of European integration fit in perfectly with cohesion: perfecting and balancing the domestic market, territorial and personal European vertebration, the spirit of European citizenship, etc. The different funds are actually being directed towards the general aim of cohesion, rather than sectoral ends. Cohesion has to be coherent and complementary with other Union policies and their transversal aims (equality between the sexes, environmental respect, etc.). Holistics should predominate over the lack of coordination among the different tiers of government.

Reason 3:

The need to redirect and integrate the 2020 Strategy goals in Cohesion functioning and funding.

It is no use multiplying the existing sectoral tools for diverse aims, as that will only increase management problems and costs, bureaucracy and administrative density. It is much better to redirect and include Strategy goals in cohesion functioning and funds. The EIB itself, a basic piece in equitable growth, has assumed the main Strategy goals, multiplying its actions in the fight against climate change and for the knowledge society.

Reason 4:

The need to adapt the ESF to the 2020 Strategy.

The European Social Fund must stay, but must also be reformed and adapted to the Strategy, several of whose points are linked to the sense of the Fund: lifelong learning, the reform and renewed acknowledgement of vocational training, the fight against social exclusion (statistics say 47 million Europeans live in extreme poverty), etc.

Reason 5:

The ESF and the average European GNI

The cohesion fund applies to member states with a Gross National Income (GNI) of less than 90% of the EU average. It goes to communications and the environment, which are part of the Strategy's philosophical hub.

Reason 6:
EU cohesion and balance

Cohesion –not only socioeconomic, but also territorial– is the paradigm of territorial balance in the Union, in vertical and horizontal multilevel governance, in the need to agree on and even contract the different administration tiers, for overcoming ridiculous rivalries and maximizing results with a view to the 2020 Strategy. Cross-border cooperation, through the creation of macroregions (in which Andalusia is already involved with Portuguese neighbours Algarve and Alentejo, as set down in the Official State Gazette of 9 July 2010), overcomes the provincial, endogamous spirit. The involvement of entities closest to the citizenry is paramount for specific aims, such as aid for SMEs, which should be very much linked to their geographical site.

Reason 7:
Participation of the regions in the whole picture

As the Commission propounds, all European regions should participate in Cohesion, so that its actions benefit all the States. Aid should nevertheless be graded in order to benefit the neediest collectivities, those hardest hit by the crisis.

Reason 8:
The Andalusian experience

Andalusia is an eloquent example for illustrating the benefits derived from cohesion, and also in priority fields covered by the 2020 Strategy. The Andalusian model reflects the necessary social and territorial balance which should continue to guide and preside the European Union in its financial policy.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

The survival and preeminence of social, economic and territorial cohesion, discarding selfish, populist and opportunist ideas, should encourage rather than block the debate on its reform and adaptation to a new era, and of course take the 2020 Strategy into account in order to connect both. The 5th report on Cohesion, presented by the Commission, presents some of the guidelines of this adaptation process:

Table 4.4.

Proposals for improving cohesion within the 2020 Strategy framework

The need to infuse greater efficacy into cohesion.

Cohesion must be infused with efficacy (putting the accent on results in the cause-effect relationship); more evaluation, control and fight against fraud; more transparency. The EIB has recently acknowledged Spain as a good example, in general terms, but according to the equivalence principle, irregular use must be prosecuted and sanctioned just as zealously, and using the same weapons, as embezzlement of national public money. Regions and States would then gain credibility and legitimacy when presenting their fair financial demands. The Commission must also take its part of the blame, as executor of the European budget, in any irregularities: it has indeed been reproached for its behaviour on several occasions and for different reasons by the European Court of Auditors. We are not asking for double audits or unnecessary, dissuasive paperwork, but coordination among the different administrations. A better visualization of cohesion and its relation to the 2020 Strategy would also be desirable, through the National Reform Programmes approved by the Commission; but this would not require a cooperation contract between the different administrations.

Simplifying procedures

Ignorance and the administrative load retract and delay petitions and the correct use of funds (this has been observed especially in Romania). It would be a good idea for the Commission to publish a practical handbook for public and private stakeholders concerned in Cohesion. And Cohesion should mean administrative and technical assistance, besides the economic factor.

Grouping financial cohesion tools under the same budget heading

It would be a good idea to group financial tools within the cohesion framework under a single budget heading, and to emphasize the connection between Cohesion and the 2020 panorama. However, operative plurifund programmes should not cloud each fund's *raison d'être* and specific follow-up.

Guarantees at State level of formulas to ensure that juridical and financial commitments are met with.

The increase of controls within the national and European frameworks, and the subsequent increase in internal conditionality should not be extrapolated to external conditionality. Non-compliance by a State with commitments included in the Stability and Growth Pact and in the brand-new Euro-Plus Pact should not be charged to non-State entities. Macroeconomic governance is essentially a State responsibility; however, formulas should be reached to ensure that all administrations comply with their juridical and financial commitments. Financial discipline must be wed with flexibility. The control stage will not admit general, objective, merely statistical formulas. The particular conditions of each region and each project must be taken into account, and also unforeseeable conditions.

Phasing out formulas.

Phasing out formulas must be found for regions included up to now in the category "Objective one" which, due to their own growth, but especially to the statistical effect derived from the latest extensions to more underdeveloped countries, will cross the 75% of the GNI line. This is the case of Andalusia, an AR requiring more generosity, not less, with the crisis: None of the Andalusian provinces reaches the average euro zone GNI; some of them, such as Granada and Jaen, are nearly 30 points below that average. It would therefore be a good idea to create intermediate regional categories, under whose umbrella Andalusia should be included, called "transitional", "competitive", or what have you. The Committee of the Regions has requested this new category to include regions situated between 75 and 90% of the average European GNI. In any case, this idea should include only regions coming from behind (from under 75%), not those which were already within this belt and were never ascribed to Objective One. Regional development should be connected to urban and rural development. In general, the GNI indicator should not be the only applicable criterion for modulating financial intervention. Other criteria such as poverty indices or unemployment levels should also be considered.

Socializing Cohesion

The future of Cohesion is of interest and concern for all. However, the breaking down of cohesion on the urban level might mean its atomization and scattering. All administrations should be called to participate in the debate; even perhaps the citizenry, through online formulas.

The principle of subsidiarity

The Junta de Andalucía has called attention to the fact that new Cohesion should naturally have uniform principles, but also principles flexible enough to adapt to the necessary decentralization and subsidiarity. This proposal goes along with the general subsidiarity principle, with respect for each country's and each region's mentality, with decisions made as close as possible to citizens. Subsidiarity and proportionality should be applied to the phase regarding management and control. This decentralization should also be applicable to local entities, and should take into special consideration the reality of maritime regions such as the Mediterranean. The Commission has insisted that all European regions will be connected to the trans-European transport network.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

4.1.8. The Europe 2020 Strategy and the future of European agricultural policy

This policy is undergoing the same troubles as socioeconomic Cohesion in general. In both cases, we are facing renationalizing trends, and in both cases we are trying to keep up the financial levels of the last septennium for the next (presumably 2014-2020). Right now, the Commission foresees a 3% increase in agricultural spending for the first pillar, that is, market expenditure and direct funding. For the second pillar (rural development), the increase would be under 1.5%. The

current circumstances, presided by volatility and speculation on the price of raw materials, advise maintaining a policy of market intervention. Funding must furthermore be steady and predictable, as farmers cannot work under conditions of uncertainty as to profits. It will obviously be necessary to ensure that funds are correctly distributed and used. Opinions in favour of decreasing agricultural expenditure state that, unlike others such as scientific research, it is already

included in Union budgets. This is where liberal Member States, in favour of de-financing the Union, oppose others, led by France and Spain, in favour of maintaining the current CAP levels. Two new funds were created in 2007 in the agricultural framework: the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) for the first pillar (market policy, direct funds), and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) for the second.

Though the Strategy does not give agriculture the attention it needs, there are many instances of interaction with the main goals and initiatives of the European plan for this decade: the environment (especially regarding “green” trends in CAP, which according to the environmental Council should be easy to manage, and not give way to overlapping of the agricultural pillars); population; territorial and personal balance; transport; climate change; consumer rights (the primitive 1957 goal of keeping consumers supplied is still alive); young farmers including women; the fight against exclusion and poverty. This fight could be affected by the recent European Union Court of Justice sentence dated 12 April 2011, *Germany vs. Commission*, establishing that the European programme for distributing food to the needy of the Union does not derive from the CAP, but from social policy, a competence of the Member States. This is just another example of the uncertainty surrounding public policies in the EU and its Member States. In any case, it is urgent to increase the visibility and social and political legitimacy of the CAP, damaged by enemies inside and outside the Union. The change from the merely agricultural to the rural, towards a multi-functional CAP, offers a wider scope for this community policy. Clearly, we cannot countenance over three-fourths of funds going to under one fourth of the population, the wealthiest part.

The Mediterranean is agriculturally different from other areas, and Andalusia, in turn, requires different attention, under the subsidiarity principle, due to the peculiarities of each province and each product. As an especially concerned AR—25% of the Spanish primary sector, and the recipient of 28% of direct funding for Spanish farmers—Andalusia should direct the Spanish stance during the tough negotiations to come regarding the future of CAP, one of the flagships for continental integration since the beginning of the European Communities.

Andalusia indeed has much to say and much to inspire in a sector so close to the regional mentality: the Second Andalusian Organic Farming Plan (in the same septennium as the current European financial framework, 2007-2013) leads organic production. *Green* agriculture already generates 20,000 direct or indirect jobs; citric fruits are the foremost products. Farming is suffering greatly from unemployment. Regarding consumer rights, the Law for Agricultural and Fishing Quality, passed by the Andalusian Parliament on 17 March 2011, acknowledges and promotes agriculture as an indisputable motor for economic development and social and territorial balance, and gives additional protection to distributors and producers. The Andalusian stance, expressed before the competent authorities in Brussels, is on the same wavelength as the Commission’s communiqué of last November, propounding the design and formalisation of the “active farmer’s statute”, for those who work the land, generate wealth and employment and help to preserve natural resources.

Factors conditioning and menacing the CAP do not derive only from the position of some Member States against its survival. The international factor is also a powerful element shaping the



Masterclass "The Europe 2020 Strategy and the Mediterranean". June 2010, Seville.

present and future of agricultural policy, basically through bilateral or general (World Trade Organisation) commercial agreements in recent years. In later subchapters we will take a closer look at the relationship between the CAP and EU trade policy, which should be presided by the principle of community preference. Conventional Union activity in this sphere should also be directed, according to the European Parliament, towards creating a worldwide system of decentralized regional and local stocks, in order to stop price volatility responsible for reviving world starvation. On some points, such as bio-fuels, there is an antagonistic relation and a moral and political dilemma between reasons about

energy and reasons about food. Right now, the very recent creation of a worldwide farmers' platform, launched from Brussels and supported by associations such as COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations) and COGECA (General Confederacy of Agricultural Cooperatives), would seem to indicate that there are more agreements than disagreements among farmers of regions worldwide. The worldwide demand for food may foreseeably increase by 70% in 2050, and there is a risk of unsustainable urban areas and unpopulated rural areas, so it would be a strategic mistake of unpredictable proportions to weaken rather than strengthen CAP, both internally and externally.

4.2.

The interests of Andalusian foreign action in the Mediterranean



4.2.1. The regions in international relations and in the EU: general questions

Though “Nation” and “State” are not equivalent terms, the term “international Law” suggests that international legal order was conceived basically by and for sovereign States. In recent times, other subjects and stakeholders such as sub-state entities have entered the international scene. There is certainly a decentralisation and a socialisation of contemporary international relations. However, the State is still the main subject in political and legal (not so much in the economic) order, and a large part of international legal traffic (membership in international organisations, international responsibility, etc.) is still reserved for the States.

That is why the (sometimes bloody) proliferation of States is often seen with mistrust by the international community, as putting at risk the territorial integrity and political independence of the State, and complicating international governance even further. The internationalisation of social life, limiting effective State sovereignty, paradoxically produces a certain political centralisation in the State, making it the great international protagonist. In any case, and with the limits already pointed out, the capacity of regions for acting in foreign policy is up to the constitutional order of each country. Let us take a look at Spain.



4.2.2. The autonomous State and international relations

Spain is, internally, one of the most decentralized States in the world. However, the 1978 Constitution managed to reserve foreign policy to the central authorities, the Government being in charge of directing it according to Article 97. International law enhances a certain political centralism.

The Autonomy Statutes are respectful towards this centralistic trend, even after the reforms most of them have undergone lately, and despite the fact that the fight by some ARs for widening their power scope and their own identity has invaded the international scene. As to international treaties, the matter varies among the different statutes, but as a rule the international community has the right to initiate agreements in matters of its own interest, to be informed as to negotiations, and to execute the agreements. This last point is idle, as the power to execute treaties does not depend on an additional attribution, but on the corresponding internal competence. No matter the explicit statutory order, the presence of ARs is usually contemplated in the State delegation in charge of negotiating or managing treaties, due to the fact that international agreements signed by the State affect the territories unequally. All these very reasonable dispositions should be generously observed by the State. The recent socialist governments have established the custom of inviting regions to bilateral conversations, especially contiguous regions when the conversations are with neighbouring States. The result is a complexly structured inner, united outer State.

Up to 1987, the Government tried to legally regulate and control the ARs' foreign action. Since then, however, there has been a prevailing political dialogue, a certain spirit for understanding

that regions should have their own foreign policy, notwithstanding the State's external unity.

The Constitutional Court firstly defended an ample idea of "international relations" defined in Article 149, 1, 3 of the Spanish Constitution, an idea assumed by other judicial authorities. Particularly relevant was, and is, Sentence 137/1989, of 20 July, annulling a cooperation agreement between the Xunta de Galicia Department for Territorial Order and the Environment and the Directorate General for the Environment of the Kingdom of Denmark. The supreme interpreter of the Constitution understood that the AR had surpassed its competences. The resolution was accompanied by four votes to the contrary, by magistrates who understood, rightly in our opinion, that it would be legal to admit activities which, though international, do not imply immediate obligations, or an exercise of sovereignty, nor do they affect State foreign policy or generate State responsibility regarding other States. The last twenty years have supported this opinion, and the regions have been acting accordingly, deploying an intense conventional activity on an international level; these agreements are never called treaties, a concept which is still reserved for the State. International relations are no different from other matters contemplated in Articles

148 and 149 of the Constitution, many of which (tourism, foreign trade, immigration, etc.) have a genuinely international dimension. The growing internationalisation of social and political activity was threatening to void the autonomous State, if the central State insisted on its exclusive constitutional right to direct international relations.

The truth is that, in recent years, there has been an important deployment of foreign action by the Autonomous Regions, and even by other territorial authorities, very visible, for example, in development cooperation, as to which a State law, dated 7 July 1998, disposed the creation of an inter-territorial commission to watch over coherence and preserve the unity of foreign action within a policy which is also shared according to the EU. The most advanced ARs, as to the exercise and demand for power and the perception of their own identity, have understandably projected their autonomous ambitions internationally. This still generates political mistrust and some competence conflicts which are submitted to the Constitutional Court. The intention of proceeding to a re-reading of the Constitution has reached international forums, where the most nationalistic regions have tried to express their visibility and their identity. Differences in this field have been a powerful reason for delaying the approval of a very desirable Treaty

Law. From the central Government, and from more centralist positions, this parallel diplomacy is seen with certain mistrust for fear of deterioration in the State's foreign policy, of disorderly international activity and of a greater public resonance of the complex inner articulation of Spain. The principle of constitutional loyalty is also wielded in these circumstances. The transfer to the international sphere of the State pulse can be seen in such tangible things as the creation of autonomous immigration offices abroad, or the authorisation given by the Basque Parliament to the exiled Kurdish Assembly to meet on its premises. The conflict of competence caused by these in the Constitutional Court was later withdrawn, the same as in the case of the fishing agreement signed between the Basque Government and Mauritania, in apparent contradiction with the EU's fishing policy.

The rapid internationalisation of our time, very acute in democratic Spain and unforeseen by our Constitution, should not be allowed to hamper the autonomous system any more than it affects the State system itself. Article 20.3 of the Guernica Statute states that no treaty will affect autonomous powers, unless by regular statutory revision, save as stated in Article 93 (a precept circumscribed, for the moment, to the sphere of European integration and to ratification by the International Penal Court Statute). It would therefore be desirable to design a wide political pact, in order to come to a compromise, a point of balance and mutual loyalty in Spain's foreign relations.

The Constitutional Court itself corrected its original jurisprudence and has been maintaining, since 1989, that not all autonomous activity with foreign connections belongs to the constitutional

sphere of “international relations”. Along this line, it has backed actions with foreign public entities which do not imply any threat to the unity of foreign State action⁴².

Sentence 165/1994, of 26 May, on the Basque Bureau vs. the European Communities, illustrates this trend. The main argument of this resolution lies in denying that Article 149, 1, 3 of the Constitution covers all actions with foreign connotations, as, if this were so, “there would be a reordering of the constitutional order itself, as to the distribution of powers between the State and the Autonomous Regions”. On this premise, the legal meaning of the term “international relations” is separated from its social meaning; the former—exclusive to the State—is circumscribed to the hard core of foreign policy, which would be made up of: the power to make treaties, the direction of foreign policy, foreign representation and international responsibility. The sentence ends by declaring that this kind of autonomous delegation

does not imply the exercise of a right of legation and, therefore, the Basque community had not carried out an *ultra vires* activity.

Once these bureaus, which basically assume functions of information and promotion, have been constitutionally sanctioned, they are legally official, as stipulated in Article 36.7 of the State Administrative Law: “The General Foreign Administration of the State will cooperate with all Spanish institutions and authorities acting abroad and especially with the bureaus of the Autonomous Regions”.

In conclusion, and before slipping into the matter of the building of Europe, the reforms undergone by most Autonomy Statutes have widened or legally formalized foreign competences that had already been assumed in practice by the Autonomous Regions, so the ARs’ international relations have become statutorily very important (García Pérez, 2009).



4.2.3. The autonomous State and European integration.

Though the EU partakes of many features of international relations, European integration also encloses many peculiarities. The Constitutional Court itself has refuted the full identification of trade carried out within the European single mar-

ket under the name “foreign trade”, attributed by the Constitution exclusively to central authorities.

The building of Europe obviously increases the outward projection of the ARs, very acute in re-

42 Among others, STC 153/1989, dated 5 October; and STC 17/1991, dated 31 January.

cent years and abetted by the reform of their Statutes. Political decentralisation in democratic Spain on one hand, and European integration on the other, each question the sovereign State as the definite form of political unity. However, we must bear in mind that the Union is founded on and presided by its Member States, which essentially set its course and its pace, up to the point that we would not err in thinking that this Europe of the States—rather than of the peoples, the regions or the citizens—might turn out to be a factor for political recentralisation, opposite which the sub-state entities must raise their voices and demand to be loyally and actively included in the European project. The impact of European law on the internal distribution of powers can be seen in Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Sentence 208/1999, dated 11 November, states that “we must not ignore the fact that the interpretation of the competence distribution system between the State and the Autonomous Regions does not take place in a vacuum, so it is therefore not only useful but also necessary, for its correct application, to pay attention to the way in which a particular legal institution has been created by community law”.

This type of question has been expounded in more detail in the second chapter of this report, but it is worthwhile to note some ideas here:

The fact that the building of Europe has advanced despite the political and economic crises confirms the need to seek reasonable formulae, both on the domestic level and the continental, for the participation of territorial collectivities in the process. The Senate not having been operative in the matter, the essential tool of consultation and cooperation, at State level, has been the Conference for Affairs Related to the European Union (CARUE), from both the upwards and the downwards pro-

cess. Important sectoral agreements have been reached within its framework. We should also point out the more recent decision of having an autonomous councillor accompany the minister to certain EU council meetings where autonomous powers are at stake.

From the European institutional standpoint, some steps have been taken with the creation in 1992 and a certain revalorisation of the Committee of the Regions, actually made up of regional and local representatives. In spite of this institutional progress, this organisation, strictly consultative in nature, does not answer satisfactorily to the concerns and personality of regions with legislative powers and nationalist ambitions. We must not forget that there are 271 regions in the Union, with very heterogeneous levels of power, and therefore very difficult to articulate in a uniform regime. The value of the Committee of the Regions also depends, of course, on the quality and seriousness of its debates and dictates. In any case, the latest treaty for the reform of primary law, signed in Lisbon, has extended and strengthened the role of the subsidiarity principle and its weight in national and regional parliaments. And there are several ways, official or officious, for sub-state entities to defend their interests before European instances; although in the legal system, the role of regions both as plaintiffs and defendants is still secondary. Let us add that, for obvious reasons, the application and consequences of European law in Spanish territory is very dissimilar, as shown by economic, social and territorial cohesion policy.

Let us take a closer look at the object of this study, with a more specific reference to Andalusia and, afterwards, Euromediterranean relations and the regional factor.



4.2.4. Andalusia's foreign, and especially development cooperation, policy

The Andalusian Autonomous Community's foreign action has been the object of valuable research projects. Some were completed before the important statutory reform⁴³; others afterward, once the article regarding international policy was considerably increased⁴⁴. The result is that the current Andalusian Autonomous Statute, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, has strengthened the importance and visibility of the community's foreign action, including in many cases a practice which already existed, but practically had no legal standing in the foundational Statute of the Andalusian Community: agreements, bureaus for economic and touristic promotion, visits abroad, regional cooperation, etc.

Development cooperation is a big chapter of foreign action, 70% in terms of money in 2007. In practice, and leaving aside our relations with the EU, Andalusian policy in relation to the Mediterranean sphere has been carried out mainly through development cooperation; the Statute itself establishes geographical priorities for cooperation with the Maghreb, Latin America and Africa as a whole (article 245.2) and, indeed, Morocco has been the main recipient of Andalusian foreign

cooperation in 2010, with an average 18% of the total 112.05 million euros. This is almost double the aid for the next African country (Mali). We must therefore focus this section on development cooperation, bearing in mind that this policy is a concurrent power, also deployed by Spain as a State and by the European Union. It is interesting to note that, both on the State and the European level, humanitarian groups are concerned that development cooperation is not dissolved in foreign policy as a whole, where Realpolitik could subordinate it to other interests.

The new article 245.1 proclaims the solidarity of the Andalusian people with underdeveloped countries, through the promotion of an international order based on a fairer distribution of wealth. The general framework for this matter is Law 14/2003, dated 22 December, which means that this policy had matured prior to the statutory reform. Article 6 of this law establishes that Junta policy in this respect is mainly articulated in the Andalusian Plan for Development Cooperation⁴⁵, the Annual Plans⁴⁶ and the Operative Plans by country: there are now 23 priority countries in the three great areas for Andalusian cooperation: La-

43 See BURKHARDT PÉREZ, I.G.: *Unidad y autonomía en el Estado constitucional español: reflexiones a propósito de la práctica internacional de la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía*. PhD Thesis. Almería, 1999. On general autonomous foreign policy practice during the 20th century, see FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMÁN, C.F.: *La acción exterior de las Comunidades Autónomas: desarrollos recientes*. Vitoria-Gasteiz International Law Courses. 1996. Pages 269-318.

44 MARRERO ROCHA, I.: "La acción exterior de Andalucía en el contexto del nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía". Published in the collective book, coordinated by García Pérez, R.: *La acción exterior de las Comunidades Autónomas en las reformas estatutarias*. Tecnos. Madrid, 2009. On the foreign policy framework established by the new Catalanian Statute, see in the same volumen SEGURA, C. and VAQUER, J.: "La acción exterior de la Generalitat de Cataluña ante la reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía". Also see PONS RAFOLS, X. and SAGARRA TRIAS, E.: *La acción exterior de la Generalitat en la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña*. Universitat de Barcelona. 2006. See also by PONS RAFOLS "La acción exterior de la Generalitat en la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña". *Revista Catalana de Dret Public. Especial Sentència sobre el Estatut*. 2011. In this Sentence 31/2010, the Constitutional Court did not annul anything regarding foreign policy, and confirmed its previous jurisprudence, commented on previous pages, on the foreign action of ARs according to the Constitution of 1978.

45 The Andalusian Cooperation Plan (PACODE) for 2008-2011 is in Decree 283/2007, dated 4 December.

46 The last one approved to date, for 2010, was formalized in Decree 353/2010, dated 3 August. Andalusian Government Official Gazette (BOJA), 17/08/2010.

tin America, the North of Africa and the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, depending mainly on their place in the UN Human Development Index, the volume of population in a situation of poverty, the traditional presence of Andalusian cooperation, the added value it might generate, and the complementarity of actions with State cooperation and others⁴⁷.

Together with the operative programmes for development as such, there is also a triennial Humanitarian Action Operative Programme, the current one being for 2010-2012⁴⁸, activated after the revolts and subsequent humanitarian crisis in the Arab world in 2011. The creation, through Law 2/2006, of the Andalusian Agency for International Development Cooperation, was a milestone.



4.2.5. Coordinating Andalusian, Spanish and European foreign development cooperation

The fight against poverty is many-sided, transversal, and feeds on many different disciplines, as poverty itself is a cultural, geographical, ecological, climatic and social problem.

Due to the horizontality of international cooperation, and its condition as a shared competence, coherence and coordination are essential concepts in its management. Besides the efforts made at global level by the United Nations system, the Union has been cooperating concurrently with its

States for decades. This concurrence means that many international EU agreements on the subject are mixed, that is, are also ratified by the Member States; such is the case of the oldest, most symbolic partnership of all, with ACP (Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries through the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement. Euromediterranean relations, as we have seen and will see again in the next section, take place within a different, specific framework. The political framework for EU action in this matter

47 See for example Decree 391/2009, of 22 December, approving the Operative Programmes for Priority Countries in Latin America and the Palestinian territories. BOJA, 14/01/2010.

48 Decree 354/2010, of 3 August. BOJA, 12/08/2010.

was defined in the European Consensus on Development, designed in 2006 by the national Governments, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament⁴⁹.

Right now it is more interesting to consider the relations between Andalusian and Spanish foreign cooperation, as the decentralized nature of the Kingdom of Spain has had its projection on this sphere, not only the autonomous but also in relation to other, more local, public administrations, such as deputations, town councils and universities. In order to coordinate properly, Spanish Law 23/1998, dated 7 July, created an Inter-territorial Commission. This multiplication of public stakeholders has two faces, as stated in Spain's evaluation by the OECD Committee for Development Aid in 2007: the fact is in itself positive and gratifying, as it means more funds and more contributors; but it also gives way to certain misadjustments. From a more practical Spanish standpoint, the atomisation of aid goes against obtaining returns, as the Spanish trademark as sole benefactor is diluted. The autonomous state's inductive principle, which is also that of European integration, of making political decisions closer to the citizenry, loses much of its *raison d'être* in this sphere. Through the subsidiarity principle, it would be preferable for the General State Administration to take care of collecting, rationing and making the most of resources. Decentralisation is not technically justifiable from the standpoint of the contributing country, but from the recipient country in order to ensure the proper channeling of aid.

However, the fact is that the ARs have already consolidated this side of their foreign action; as we have said before, an important side of it, as

reflected in the percentage of the budget ascribed to international aid. It is noteworthy, and praiseworthy, that an AR driven by the desire to come out of its backwardness and exclusion, as Andalusia was, uses such a large proportion of its economic and administrative capacities for the noble ends of international development cooperation, complementarily to Spanish and European cooperation, as repeatedly stated by community instances such as the Green Paper on Cooperation after 2013, presented in 2010 by the European Commission and backed by the Council. It is a fact, confirmed by statistics, that this duty of coordinating, a manifestation of the principle of loyalty of Member States towards the EU, is more invoked than actually practiced. The subsidiarity principle advises that the Union should focus on matters it can really infuse with added value: sustainable development, agriculture, human rights (including gender equality, of course), etc.

Undoubtedly, and inevitably as it is part of the EU and even, for the first time, IMF dictates for autonomous austerity, the regional budget for development cooperation will be cut due to the crisis, as the Spanish Government has already done in 800 million euros between this year and the next.

However, we must now highlight the fact that the regulative, financial and organic growth of Andalusian foreign cooperation has taken place in coordination with the State; there will probably be more problems for articulating autonomous with local cooperation. We shall now look at some analogous, combined aspects of State and Andalusian cooperation, some of which have already been suggested⁵⁰.

49 Regarding this community policy, Roldán Barbero (1992 and 2006) has published twice: first, after inclusion in the European Union Treaty following the coming into effect of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; the second, following the unborn European Constitutional Treaty, whose dispositions regarding development cooperation were assumed by the Lisbon Treaty, in effect since 1/12/2009.

50 On Spanish foreign cooperation policy, see Roldán Barbero (2011).

Table 4.5.

Parallelisms between State and Andalusian foreign cooperation policy

Action/Initiative Cooperation agencies

State Government

Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID)

Andalusian Government

Andalusian Agency for International Development Cooperation (AACID)

Action/Initiative Cooperation plans

State Government

The simultaneous Guiding Plan for 2009-2012 and the 2011 Annual Plan.

Andalusian Government

The 2008-2011 Andalusian Plan for International Development Cooperation (PACODE)

Action/Initiative

Development NGOs: Concertation of foreign cooperation with organized civil society, especially with development NGOs.

State Government

There is a Development Council, of mixed composition, a register of these DNGOs with regulations for controlling their internal and external organisation, etc.

Andalusian Government

As an Andalusian reference to this interaction with organized civil society, see the Order of 17 September 2010, regulating the procedure for qualifying DNGOs to access programmes for generating development processes, humanitarian action, except emergencies, education for development and development training and/or research^a.

Action/Initiative

Determining priority regions

State Government/Andalusian Government

In both cases, the priority area is Northern Africa and particularly Morocco, which has a Cross-border Cooperation Plan with Andalusia, aside from foreign aid. An example of this pro-Moroccan vocation of Spanish foreign cooperation is the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation Training Centre, in Tangier, within Spain's Permanent Diplomatic Mission in the Kingdom of Morocco^b, to name just one of many.

Action/Initiative

The ruling political system in the benefited country, a relatively irrelevant factor up to now.

State Government

The Spanish government is usually in favour of dialogue rather than isolating countries under authoritarian regimes.

The Andalusian government

Considers that Andalusia helps peoples, not governments, which would justify the priority attention given Cuba, the second destination of aid after Morocco.

Action/Initiative

Quick reaction to humanitarian disasters

State Government/Andalusian Government

There is a formal distinction between this humanitarian aid and development cooperation as such^c.

Action/Initiative

International solidarity

State Government/Andalusian Government

Neither the Andalusian nor the Spanish government has passed a legal declaration of intentions regarding international solidarity, such as the Basque Country Charter for Justice and Solidarity with Impoverished Countries, Law 14/2007, of 28 December^d.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

a: BOJA of 1/09/2010.

b: BOE of 22/12/09.

c: As an Andalusian example, see the agreement of 17/02/10 reached by the Board of the Andalusian Parliament, regarding regulations for the extraordinary concession of aid and grants. See BOJA of 9/10/10 for cooperation and solidarity activities to be carried out in the Republic of Haiti. This kind of measures is within the 2010–2012 Operative Programme for Humanitarian Action.

d: Basque Country Official Gazette of 9/01/08.

4.2.6. The general framework of Euromediterranean relations: current challenges and perspectives

Before going on to refer and comment on the priority cooperation areas for the Euromediterranean regions, for Andalusia and regarding Morocco in particular, in section 4.3, let us sketch an outline of general Euromediterranean relations, in the public, international legal sphere; this was

already done in depth in Chapter 3, so this will be just a scheme inlaid with future perspectives, duly cautious because of the dizzying current events in the Mediterranean and Arab world, and the proverbial incapacity of analysts and leaders to predict even the most immediate future.

The bilateral EU-Mediterranean States relationship

Beginning in the late sixties, and all through the seventies, the European Communities, together with their Member States, signed cooperation agreements with the States on the Southern Mediterranean shore. Northern-shore, as yet non-member States, aspired to being full members some day, so they gradually concluded association agreements which were understood as the prelude to an eventual future adhesion.

Those cooperation agreements gave way to association agreements, also with southern countries. These agreements, dated in the nineties and later, had no pretensions towards full inclusion, reserved for European countries, but they did politically distinguish southern countries, giving them a statute which partially included them in some community policies. Such is the case of the Spanish Constitutional Court Sentence of 11/09/95, stating that Moroccan workers had a right not to be discriminated against in Europe. The creation of mixed association committees has contributed to consolidating the association regime, as have also complementary protocols, in matters of trade for example (Roldán Barbero, 2002). The exception has always been Libya, with whom, notwithstanding, there had been exploratory negotiations before the 2011 revolution. Morocco was given the advanced statute by the EU in 2008; it is the only country that has it. This statute, staged at the bilateral EU-Morocco summit in Granada in

2010 under the Spanish Council presidency, is of deep political symbolism, but has yet to be given any real content; imaginative solutions are being sought. The question is, how much less than adhesion does this statute represent, and how much more than the current association? The fact that the EU was going to grant this advanced statute to the Tunisia of the deposed and processed President Ben Ali goes to show how difficult it is to give coherence and firm principles to Mediterranean relations.

In any case, this bilateral regime could be included within a multilateral process sheltering Euromediterranean relations, tending to narrow the deep, multifarious social gap between both shores. That is the purpose of the Barcelona Process, initiated in 1995 and followed, since 2008, by the Union for the Mediterranean. That is also the purpose of the European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2004.

Multilateral relations: the Barcelona Declaration, the Neighbourhood Policy, the Union for the Mediterranean and other institutional frameworks

The Barcelona Declaration and Process

Initiated, as we have said, in the Catalanian capital in 1995, the idea was to establish a general, multilateral basis for the bilateral agreements which would then become Euromediterranean association agreements. Despite the effort, for fifteen years we have been hearing that the process is stagnated and needs to be revitalized. The permanent, unfair Israeli-Palestinian conflict is always the excuse, but that does not explain everything, nor does Turkey's constant demand for inclusion.

The Barcelona Process was replaced in 2008 by the Union for the Mediterranean, a French idea, regional to begin with but which spread to the rest of the EU; it is not yet known if the UfM will be channeled at European institutional level, or at intergovernmental level by the EU Member States, giving European institutions but a small role. Further than the six projects detailed in Chapter 3, and the fact that it includes the 43 Mediterranean Basin States, always excepting Libya, the idea has never really got off the ground, due to the impossibility of getting all the Heads of State and Government to meet. The UfM Secretariat, located in Barcelona, which is celebrating the recent appointment of its Secretary General, Youssef Amrani (former Moroccan Foreign Minister), had been lacking a proper budget and well-defined functions. Notwithstanding this failure regarding

the media and high politics, there have been more substantial meetings and projects on lower tiers, including the interregional, which benefit from their lower political voltage and are relatively out of range of North-South conflicts, and also those which come up now and then between Southern Mediterranean countries.

And at this moment, popular revolts with democratic ambitions, of different intensities and with different outcomes have taken place in a large part of the Arab world. Due to this state of turmoil, Europe will be forced to modify her Euromediterranean relations, perhaps differentiating them by country, thus rewarding or censuring democratic progress one way or the other. These events are a test of the first order for the still tottering, contradictory EU foreign policy, often accused of shortsightedness, and called to exert itself regarding close neighbours. Europe has promised to accompany these political transitions, politically and economically, but trying not to seem interfering to the directly affected countries. For the moment, European countries have promoted and are partially executing the UN Security Council's historic Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force for protecting civilians in Libya, and thus placing human dignity over State dignity.

EU Neighbourhood Policy

This policy also goes with the idea of politically and financially distinguishing the countries on the southern Mediterranean shore (besides Eastern European countries which are not members or even candidates to adhesion, for the moment). Since 2004, these eastern and southern neighbours have received a total 11,200 million euros; Morocco is the most benefited, having received 580 million in the 2011-2013 triennium.

This neighbourhood policy, like the Euromediterranean, is conventional in its processes, but answers to more genuinely European initiative, whereas doubts are still pending over the European intergovernmental scope of the UfM.

On the other hand, as in the UfM and Euromediterranean relations in general, the Neighbourhood Policy is now at a crossroads because of the Arab revolts. This policy also needs a reformulation which is now pending an imminent Commission communiqué. This institution also defends the idea of the future Maghreb-Mashrek permitting a wider economic integration and political cooperation in the Mediterranean neighbourhood: the Union has promised to multiply economic aid for promoting and sustaining eventual democratic reforms, something it has hardly ever really done in the past, being more attentive to pragmatic, conservative considerations.

Other multilateral frameworks

Besides the two multilateral institutions mentioned, extensive but limited to the region as a whole, it is worth mentioning other forums which include countries on the southern Mediterranean shore, and which must be taken into account when articulating the future of interstate/interregional relations in the Basin. The African Union and the Arab League are especially noteworthy (pan-Arabism is not yet well organized). South-south integration unfortunately represents only 5% of international trade, and is hampered by public and private rivalries of different kinds; it is now also pending the outcome of the Arab spring. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is an example of the ideal lines to be followed; its failure would be harmful to general Euromediterranean relations. The cost of non-Maghreb is indeed immense in social and political terms.

Dialogue 5+5 is something different: made up of countries on both shores, but as the name says, only five on each (including Spain and Morocco, naturally). This forum, acknowledged by the EU itself, answers to the difficulties in advancing in the Euromediterranean framework as a whole, and to the special interests and sensitivities affecting the Western Mediterranean from the European standpoint. It is a matter of recognizing and promoting the variable geometry latent in Euromediterranean relations. All this is obviously independent of bilateral relations between each EU State and individual southern shore countries. Let us now give some details on Spanish-Moroccan relations.

A panorama of Spanish-Moroccan relations

For well known reasons, geographical (only 14 kilometres distant) and otherwise, Spain and Morocco are bound to cooperate. This cooperation, which we will see in the next section from a sectoral, Andalusian viewpoint, was set down in the 1991 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood. We must also bear in mind that the EU association agreement of 1996 commits Spain from a double standpoint: as a Member State of the EU, as far as the Union's competences; and as a single State, as this Euromediterranean agreement is mixed in nature, as its contents go beyond European competences and directly affect competences and interests that are still the State's. Spain as a EU Member undoubtedly has a main role in the impulse and design of relations with the Maghreb. In a recent newspaper article, a high Moroccan Government official encouragingly said, "Let us make Spain our main hook onto Europe" (Amrani, 2011). Spain aspires to overtaking France as Morocco's first European economic partner. Interdependence is actually increasingly symmetrical, for several reasons: Moroccans represent the second-largest group of foreigners in Spain, after the Rumanians; Morocco greatly influences Islamic practice in Spain; Morocco is a basic piece in the fight against Sa-

lafist terrorism, active in Morocco itself, and against irregular immigration. Rivalries between Morocco and Algeria put Spanish diplomacy in difficult situations, as both countries are basic for our foreign policy (Algerian fuel is politically and economically very important for Spain). Indeed, President Aznar's Government, diplomatically estranged from Morocco, situated Algeria at the same institutional level as its neighbour through a similar friendship and neighbourhood treaty.

These general Spanish and EU treaties have been developed through many particular agreements on very diverse matters: from high policy (such as the efficient legal and police cooperation in matters of terrorism) to smaller affairs such as the mutual acknowledgement of driving licenses.

The increasing interdependence between Spain and Morocco includes wide scopes for cooperation, as we shall see in the next section, but also some differences of opinion which are usually overcome through a spirit and general need for concord. But we must not ignore very sensitive, controversial subjects such as the Western Sahara statute, Ceuta, Melilla, etc. These disputes, which fortunately are usually kept at low gear, should

not cloud our bilateral relations; furthermore, the two autonomous north-African towns should bridge both cultures, both societies, and assume a new development model. Despite being the securest EU frontiers, there is an increasing cross-border flow of workers and consumers who keep mutual relations and understanding alive. Spain itself, a model of political and social transition, with its image of modernity and decentralisation, could become a reference for Moroccan political reform, and for that of the other countries on the southern Mediterranean shore. The fact that new Spanish Prime Ministers always visit Morocco on their first official tour abroad gives an idea of the crucial importance of these bilateral relations for Spanish diplomacy; a diplomacy, it must be said, that is chronically short of funds for placing Spain in its proper place in the world scene. In any case, Spain is a regional power with aspirations towards being an influence in the Mediterranean basin and building bridges across it, as the worldwide Alliance of Civilisations project also expresses. This cultural approach has many other manifestations in interstate relations, such as the Mediterranean House, founded in 2009 and preceded by the Arab and African Houses.

The very necessary bilateral relations are gradually growing closer to society, leaving the purely state sphere and going into other public institutions, as exemplified by the Medgovernance project, and also extending to private relations, for understanding between civil societies, and leaving off lazy, harmful prejudices and clichés propagated on both shores. It is worth noting that part of Spanish and European cooperation with Morocco happens to be directed at Moroccan civil society. In 2010, for example, the EU financed 19 projects with organisations of this kind, spending a total 73 million dirhams. Public and interstate relations must certainly be based on civil society on both shores, the vanguard of reforms and of an ever-closer cooperation.

a territorial and political organisation process which might spread to the rest of the State, more similar to the Spanish than the French model; from the Medgovernance viewpoint, Andalusia would have natural partners in the Southern Mediterranean. In any case, Andalusia is bound by need and interest to keep up fluent cross-border cooperation with its southern neighbour.

History teaches us that the Mediterranean has always been pierced by unbalanced progress on both shores. Spain now exceeds Morocco by 14 to 1 in terms of income. This economic fracture is compounded by the social, cultural, religious and political. For Andalusia, nothing would be better than co-development, harmonious growth on both shores. Morocco, despite its scarcities, is an emergent country with good growth figures amid the worldwide economic crisis. It should therefore become a land of opportunity, rather than a menace for Andalusian interests and citizens.

It is true that, in some sectors, Andalusian and Moroccan interests are not complementary but contrary. The most obvious is agricultural trade, but there are others, such as the Tangier port, which has lately been taking business away from Algeciras. In tourism there are also common clients to fight over, so Andalusian tourism and Spanish tourism in general are benefiting from the Arab revolts. But above these rivalries, the need predominates to walk together in more and more things, for the good of common interest. Andalusia, like the rest of Spain and the EU, is extraordinarily interested in a prosperous, stable, democratic Maghreb. So although the 2020 Strategy naturally belongs to the Union, many of its challenges and projects would be extendable to the whole Basin, through concertation and understanding for optimizing resources. For example, youth, decreasing in Europe and increasing

in the Maghreb, with poor job perspectives in both cases; or energy and climate change; the economy of knowledge, innovation and technology; the environment: natural resources know nothing about political borders. It is therefore crucial for Andalusia for promote collective learning and synergy in the whole Mediterranean area. To paraphrase the enlightened idea for European integration, the *common Mediterranean house* will have to be built, not all at once, but by creating factual solidarities and solid joint institutions. In short, a wider economic, social and territorial cohesion in the area, while keeping the identity and personality of each people and each government level.

These latter ideas must take shape in the projected, necessary Mediterranean Integrated Strategy (CPMR, 2011). It is indeed urgent to redesign and revitalize Euromediterranean relations, given the political changes taking place on the Southern shore. The Strategy, which will have its basic budget in the next 2014-2020 financial framework, would be the way to promote interregional relations and to give birth to a Mediterranean macro-region, immune to diplomatic and personal vicissitudes in the area. This macro-region would face the challenge of undertaking the Basin's joint future, a future which would depend on the extension and optimisation of the interrelated goals assumed by the EU itself in the 2020 Strategy: environmental balance, transport, energy, the fight against climate change, progress in education, etc. Those goals cannot be attained by the Union on its own, nor can the Arab countries attain them individually, or revalorize them. It is therefore necessary to contract and capitalize that commitment for the future, at regional and local level, for everyone's sake. The result would be something well known as profitable on the Northern shore: greater economic, social and territorial cohesion.



4.3.2. Some specific cooperation sectors

Here are some different cooperation sectors, analyzed:

Table 4.6.

Financial aid

The Southern Mediterranean currently benefits from several sources of European aid, an aid which is soon going to increase after the Arab revolts, according to advances attained by each country in matters of democratic reform. The promises and proposals for financial aid have come to the point of being considered a new Marshall Plan, with preferably private aid (this proposal comes from the Spanish Government). After the revolts, the region is obviously more or less unstable for European interests. We shall take a look at possible financial instruments for aiding the southern shore:

As to European Neighbourhood Policy, 2/3 of its funds go to these countries; the EIB sent 2,600 million euros to the region in 2010. It is expected to raise this amount to 6,000 million between 2011 and 2013. The priority is employment, for which three action areas of preference have been set: direct aid to certain industries, loans to local banks for financing SMEs and promoting transport and energy infrastructures. Within

the EIB, the Facility for Euromediterranean Investment and Partnership is directed towards granting loans and capital risk operations, but also technical assistance at national and regional level.

Another possible aid component which is being debated would be to change the statutes of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which attended the political and economic transition of the former Soviet bloc, in order to direct its activities also towards the Southern Mediterranean. Another option would be to create a new bank directly focused on the Mediterranean.

Other financial actions have more specific goals. For example, in 2010 the EU granted 55 million euros, non-reimbursable, in order to improve rural communications. This aid was part of the 2010 action programme subscribed with Morocco for literacy and agriculture.

Table 4.7.

Trade

Trade is an exclusive EU competence. Common trade policy has been characterized by liberalisation, except in the agricultural sphere, where the Union has often been criticized and denounced before the WTO. The agricultural sector, which has suffered for other reasons, fears liberalisation both in global negotiations within the WTO and in bilateral negotiations (such as that with Mercosur currently in progress)^a.

Regarding the Maghreb, Andalusian farmers are especially worried due to a new increase in Morocco's tomato quota for the European market. It has been observed that these quotas are not kept, though the EC does nothing to control the matter. On the other hand, production conditions for fruits and vegetables are clearly more favourable on the southern shore, and European standards Andalusian farmers are subject to are not always respected. So the CAP's central principle of European preference does not prevail. In short, it is not just a problem of regulation, but especially of enforcement (Díez Peralta, 2005).

In this state of things, Andalusian agricultural produce needs to be promoted, and has been for some time. Andalusia should also take advantage of the fact that Morocco will have to carry out a liberalisation process due precisely to those same trade agreements (for example, in the processed product sector and fisheries). It must also be noted that many Andalusian farmers

are established in Morocco. And also, the Spanish-Moroccan trade balance is still favourable to the former. In general terms, Andalusia had record-breaking exports in 2010, with a 27.6% increase.

The EU has promised to compensate northern Mediterranean farmers for the damage done by increasing free trade with the Maghreb. It would be a good idea to establish a financial compensation mechanism for Mediterranean farmers in case of a drop in profits due to market fluctuations. Andalusia cannot pay for the Union's strategic alliances with the southern shore. It is important for this region to exercise political pressure in this sense, and for the Mediterranean alliance to function within the EU, especially with France. The free trade zone with the Maghreb, designed in 1995 for 2012, is still very far away, due to the same economic legal and political divergences on the southern shore with an Arab Maghreb Union which is, for the moment, a fantasy. This Euromediterranean common market should be built, like the European common market was, on the basis of firm, equal institutions. In any case, it is important to note the recent signing of an agreement for the creation and promotion of original Mediterranean rules. The idea would be to replace the current situation, governed by compartmented bilateral trade agreements. The new convention will encourage and clarify the production of a single product in different countries.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

^a It is interesting to note that these trade liberalisation measures have in some cases been softened by the State or Andalusian administrations. See, for example, the Order of 24/02/2010, offering funds within the framework of the national restructuring programme for the cotton sector, under Royal Decree 169/2010, of 19 February. BOJA of 3/03/2010.

Table 4.8.

Investments

We have just noted that a part of the liberalisation of agricultural trade with Morocco benefits Andalusian businesses. In general, the Moroccan market offers important, growing opportunities for investment in Spain, although it is necessary to establish a more secure, transparent, predictable legal framework. Morocco has created the Moroccan Agency for Investment Development. These opportunities are mainly for the following sectors: renewable energies, tourism, agricultural industries, fisheries and infrastructures. It is worth noting that these business relationships condition Spain's foreign policy in general. What happened in Granada at the first EU-Morocco summit in 2010 was not exceptional: the political meeting was followed by a business meeting. The

future of investment in the regions will obviously depend on the political climate, agitated lately due to the Arab revolts. A legal framework presided by the rule of law and basic liberties will encourage the flow of European money into the Southern Mediterranean. For the Andalusian economy, business internationalisation is very important, as it has often saved the balance sheet amid the inner market's weakness. Such is the case of Isofon, a leading business in the Andalusian Technology Park.

We must also bear in mind that the countries of the Maghreb are also starting to invest in Europe: such is the case of Libya in Italy, or Algeria, through the Sonatrach gas company, in Spain.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 4.9.

The environment, climate change, energy and transport

These are interrelated spheres with important joint challenges. Regarding the purely environmental, let us think of desertisation or the rising of the Mediterranean sea levels (20 centimetres in the twentieth century). As to energy, Europe and particularly Spain are isolated and need a connection with other countries: 40% of the gas we consume comes from Algeria, Egypt and Libya.

Now then, together with challenges and menaces, these sectors also offer good opportunities for business and, correctly used, contribute to the creation and strengthening of a true Euromediterranean space and feeling. Examples are the electric cable through Tarifa, or Medgaz, the direct gas connection with Algeria, avoiding Morocco, through Almería: 8,000 million cubic metres cross the Mediterranean at depths of up to 2,160 metres. The construction generated 2,000 direct jobs for 20 months, through a Spanish-Algerian consortium (with Sonatrach, Cepsa, Endesa, GDF-Suez). The damage done by this to

fishermen in Almería has been compensating through a special fund. It is necessary to advance in an energy community between the EU and the Maghreb and then the Mashrek. The Spanish presidency of the EU Council, during the first semester of 2010, tried to associate Morocco to trans-European transport and energy networks. Finally, these spheres, which dominate the European 2020 Strategy, must be coordinated with our neighbours. That is also the case regarding climate change. The Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative, launched in 2010 with the support of the EIB, promotes governmental cooperation in the region regarding environmental matters, through the creation, among other things, of an investment forum for green initiatives. In this same climate change sphere, we must also note the exchange of emission quotas with Morocco within the clean development mechanism, applicable up to 2018.

Obviously, Andalusia's strategic and economic interest in this state of things can hardly be overestimated.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 4.10.

Fisheries

The Mediterranean is a singular, semi-closed sea. This singularity has invaded Spanish and European regulations regarding the Mare Nostrum. Different international treaties, besides, are expressly focused on the Mediterranean, since the 1976 Barcelona Convention: cetacean conservation, the fight against land-originated pollution, the integral management of coastal areas, etc.

Maritime regulation is not simple, as the delimitation system between coastal States is inexistent or defective (González Giménez, 2007). This legal insecurity should not stand in the way of collective concern and management about this delicate, polluted sea. The UfM, as we know, has put its decontamination among its priority projects. As to Spain, the 2010 Marine Protection Law should be a reference for conservationist efforts.

As to institutions, there is a General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and also, within the EU, a consultative council for this sea within the common fisheries policy. This policy

is now bound to undergo an important reform, after the European Commission was supposed to present a communiqué in mid-July, defending greater regionalisation and decentralisation from the management point of view. A specifically Atlantic section will probably be created, given the peculiarities of the regions bordering on the ocean. From the coastal standpoint, the Commission has just launched a debate on these areas, which present great opportunities for leisure, growing population, job perspectives, rich but fragile biodiversity, etc.

European fisheries policy is obviously also made up of a network of international agreements. Andalusia is especially interested in agreements with Morocco and Mauritania. The latter is the most important in terms of financial contribution. However, the agreement with Morocco is the most controversial, both because of its extension to Saharan waters and the conditions accompanying it, which hamper its profitability. We must not ignore the modernisation assumed by the Moroccan fleet. The convention has been renewed for one more year, after it expired on 27 February.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 4.11.

Education and Culture

This is a basic sphere for development in our respective societies, and also for mutual knowledge and understanding. The UfM knows it, and has included among its projects a future Euromediterranean Erasmus programme. Andalusian universities have also understood it, and Granada University has cooperation conventions with all public Moroccan universities. This cooperation is obviously not aimed at fusing both cultures, or eliminating either, but at understanding and tolerance, at a moment when there is a deep population unbalance between both shores, and it is getting deeper. Educational and cultural exchange programmes should lead to overcoming harmful prejudices still strong on both shores, and disdaining cultural and religious conflicts. Opinion polls still show a growing cultural gap between both societies. The EU's investment in Moroccan literacy is basic for the modernisation of that country, and for overcoming these stereotypes.

The mass media and social networks also have their own responsibility regarding this task. Andalusia, as the geographical and historical bridge between both cultures, has a leading role to play in these matters. Just to name one example, the Roape (Recuperating crafts in danger of extinction) programme, promoted by the Department for the Environment, has just hosted a convention on the crafts, ethnology and foods of the Andalusian and Moroccan natural spaces, in Orgiva (Granada). It is necessary to learn to appreciate and promote our rich cultural and natural heritage, which is the aim of programmes such as the "Medina 2030" Initiative, for restoring historic cities. This initiative is promoted by the EIB, backed by the Unesco and the Arab Towns Organisation. Lastly, sport is, as stated in the 2020 Strategy on a European level, a formidable tool for interrelations; the Mediterranean Games play their part in this direction.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 4.12.

Immigration

This is a real challenge for societies on both shores: the southern, with its myriad youth with few opportunities; the northern, with a speedily ageing population. Immigration should work towards mutual knowledge and understanding (and for better understanding oneself), not segregation and intolerance. From the Spanish standpoint, the National Plan for the Alliance of Civilisations speaks of "integration and training for immigrants, with special attention to youth". The SIVE (Electronic Vigilance System in the Straits) was a reasonable mechanism for watching migration flows in the Gibraltar Straits, but should not reflect an idea of walling Europe. Morocco should naturally play a leading role in this matter, as the country of immigrant origin and also transit. The agreement signed with Spain in 1992, on the readmission of persons found in irregular situations, has worked on and off, depending on the general state of bilateral

relations. The Moroccan State is currently cooperating more. The ARs understandably seek their place in migration policy, as they are directly affected. The different government tiers must cooperate coordinately. Spain has opened youth centres in Morocco, and some Spanish administrations such as Catalonia or the city of Madrid have done the same.

The Arab revolts this year are also a challenge in this kind of affair. Europe must appear united, internally and externally, before the flow of economic and political refugees, and discard dangerous populist stances. In any case, it is just one more example of Europe's interest in promoting free, stable, prosperous societies across the Mediterranean Sea. The examples set by Spain and Andalusia show that migration can be controlled when personal and social opportunities are possible.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 4.13.

Human rights

The previous section on immigration brings up several questions on the democratic future of our societies, in which human dignity must prevail. Indeed, modern times, modern technologies must enhance the protection of human beings wherever they are. In the Mediterranean, recent experience confirms that poverty and oppression (apparently) outside end up affecting European well-being and security. In this sense, Europe must be cautious and practical, but also defend European values, so in touch with our interests, which should not be Eurocentric but universal, even if they have to be adapted to the identity of each people. It is not a question of imposing our model by force, but of offering the necessary tools and encouragement for it to spread, especially so that women's dignity is strengthened. Each case is different.

This democratic spirit is basic for the growth of convergence and concord in the region (nationalism and authoritarianism are, by definition, contrary to international cooperation and trust). The same democratic spirit gives a necessary legitimacy to the cooperation among regional and local authorities. These democratic values must inspire Euromediterranean relations at all levels, though the recent idea of the southern countries' adhering to the European Council and its European Human Rights Convention seems premature to say the least. The impulse of civil society is certainly a basic factor for citizen renewal. Social networks and civic institutions, such as the Euromediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), should become institutions for promoting and controlling basic rights in each public scene. The modernisation of every public space must be impelled in all directions, promoting integration and the necessary social cohesion in the Maghreb.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.

Table 4.14.

Domestic and foreign security

The Mediterranean has become a basic space for the security of its States and for international relations as a whole (remember the stormy Israeli-Arab conflict). Terrorism is situated precisely where internal and external security overlap and are increasingly intermixed. The EU and NATO have therefore mediterraneanized their approaches to security. One of the main points is armament control and reduction, including denuclearisation, in the area. This is of course a State competence in which the regions must simply cooperate. Spanish-Moroccan legal and police cooperation are

on the right track. Both countries face common threats and enemies. There is no conflict here, but common interest. The joint challenge of security in the Basin and democratic reform on the southern shore must also imply a more general coordination of stances in foreign policy. That would be the great ideal in Euromediterranean relations: to adopt a joint position on more and more international affairs. That way, regional cooperation at different government levels among Mediterranean countries would be projected to the international scene.

Source: Information compiled by the authors.



5

Conclusive framework

Jorge Tuñón

Initial considerations

As we have seen in previous chapters, for many reasons of policy, identity, population, geography and even geostrategy, Andalusia is not just another AR within the Spanish context, or just another region at European level, nor can it obviously be considered an unimportant region within the dynamics and governance of the Mediterranean Basin, either on its northern shore, where Andalusia is situated geographically, nor the south with which it has such necessary, special, growing relations. Andalusia indeed has an area and a population not just similar to those of many medium-sized EU States, but even much larger on both counts than some other European countries. Besides being a basic element in the political construction of the modern Spanish State, and in its identity, Andalusia has a central geostrategic position in the framework of international relations. No other Spanish or European region is both Atlantic and Mediterranean, and no other region is closer to Africa: 14 kilometres at the nearest point. Andalusia is therefore Europe's southwestern border and the gateway to Spain and the EU.

This situation on the edge of Europe has also, however, distanced Andalusia not only geographically but also politically from decision-making centres both Spanish and European. Geographic distances tend to generate a certain passivity and lack of decisiveness; those forums somehow seem far away from Andalusian interests and concerns. Andalusia has sometimes felt that her worries and problems tended more towards other regions in Southern Europe, non-contiguous geographically, and even neighbouring Northern African territories. These common ambitions have not always coincided with those of the regions and States of Central and Northern Europe, much closer incidentally to Brussels, the continent's heart.

Despite all the above, the situation described can and must be put into perspective: within the Lisbon Treaty, Andalusia faces the challenge of exploring the ways to influence the European integration process, and also the building of a Mediterranean space for stability, peace and progress. That is to say, Andalusia's double foreign priorities, the European and the Mediterranean,

need not and must not be seen as separate, independent spheres, but must be politically understood and comprehended as interflowing, interacting and complementary. In this sense, the EU currently offers Andalusia opportunities for capitalizing its special conditions, not only as an arena for implementing European policy, but also as a stakeholder in Mediterranean governance; the EU has obviously special interests in the area, for many reasons. Andalusia must not ignore any of the bridges built by the EU across the Mediterranean, especially towards the countries on the southern shore, but must present herself as an essential, necessary stakeholder, as a trustworthy partner within the framework of European regional policy (mainly regarding cooperation, be it interregional, transnational or, especially, cross-border), and also in European Neighbourhood and even Development Cooperation Policy.

Andalusia must take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Mediterranean to become a reference in the main European process, and essentially within the framework of European dynamics in the Mediterranean Basin. This would lessen those old conditions stopping Andalusia from fitting perfectly into Europe. Indeed, if the European side were only an element of Andalusia's foreign presence, the strategy would be too narrow, focused specifically on obtaining small profits at international level. On the contrary, Andalusia faces the challenge of seeing the EU as an essential dimension of herself, in which she must participate fully, offering her own specific concerns in order to have the chance to communicate each and every subject to be worked on, be it political, economic, social or cultural, and overcome current limitations for full, definite integration in Europe. The Mediterranean

must be the reference and starting point, as the EU cannot afford to ignore what is happening a few kilometres from its borders. It goes without saying that this statement is illustrated by the recent democratic revolutions in Northern Africa, and the consequences derived from them at least regarding immigration and freedom of movement, forcefully reappearing in current European political debate.

It would be naïve and unrealistic to deny the differences still separating Andalusia from average (mainly economic) EU standards. Since Spain's accession to the EU in 1986, an important effort has been made for converging with Europe (largely thanks to funding derived from European regional policy, in which Andalusia has been a model of management), but there is still some way to go to situate Andalusia at the average European level. This is not going to be easy in the short run, due to the international economic crisis, which has hit the foundations of Andalusia very hard, especially regarding employment, her greatest structural weakness. In this sense, beyond the traditional regional discourse focused on agricultural, fisheries or cohesion policy, for a future general economic recovery Andalusia must rely on: budget discipline, common trade policy, attention to uneven training for research and development and now especially for innovation (R&D&I), or controlling unemployment. These "prescriptions" would be vital for the region, but the distinctive symbol, the added value for Andalusia can only come from technical and political trust in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Andalusia cannot and must not pass up the chance to make the most of her specific social, cultural, economic and geographical links, in order to become a vital stakeholder in Mediterranean

relations, promoting cooperation with regions on the northern shore, but especially facing the challenges presented by the southern. The development of the Southern Mediterranean, far from meaning just competition, can become a stimulus for Andalusia, which will then be in a privileged position to make the most of not only the political

but also the economic opportunities (still largely unexploited) offered by Northern Africa. In this sense, as we have made clear in preceding chapters, the promotion and progressive development of our relations with Morocco, despite political difficulties, must be not only a priority, but decisive and determining for Andalusia.



Summing up

This report has meant to analyze, focusing on the Andalusian instance, how the regions have been participating in the governance of the Mediterranean Basin, not only as arenas for implementing agreements and policies at different levels, but also as privileged stakeholders in the same. We have looked at Andalusian interaction within the Mediterranean framework, supervised by the Medgovernance Project (shared with partners Tuscany, Lazio, the Piedmont, PACA and Catalonia), starting from an always complementary threefold analysis (Mediterranean, Medgovernance and Andalusian). So: we have analyzed the decisive role played both by regions in general and Andalusia in particular, within the specific

sphere of Mediterranean Multilevel Governance; we have dissected the Mediterranean as a traditional scene of regional relations and interaction, both north and south of the *Mare Nostrum*; and we have defined action priorities for the Mediterranean in general and Andalusia in particular, from the double standpoint of interregional cooperation in the Mediterranean (with special attention to the Medgovernance Project), and the EU's 2020 Strategy action framework for Mediterranean regions. Now it is time to sum up the main discoveries, and decipher future and pending challenges and action lines for the regions in general and Andalusia in particular in the necessary, vital Mediterranean governance.



The regions and Mediterranean multilevel governance

The first thematic block of the present report (Chapter 2: *The decisive role of the different regions, and of Andalusia in particular, in Mediterranean multilevel governance*) went into very up-to-date matters such as the exercise of a *Third Level* of governance by the regions within the EU framework, a governance conditioned by political, institutional differences and also by asymmetrical powers among European and Mediterranean regions. The new multi-tier frameworks for regional interaction were therefore analyzed, some as relevant as the EU Council of Ministers itself, the Committee of the Regions, the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers, the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, the Inter-Mediterranean Com-

mission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, the Legislative Regions group, the Association of European Border Regions, or the Assembly of European Regions, among other forums. We took a close look at the participation of Mediterranean regions in the multilevel governance scheme, and also in new, eminently Mediterranean cooperation schemes complementing or replacing the old Working Communities and Euroregions. We analyzed the very recent implementation of the European Groupings for Territorial Cooperation, and also the viability of the much-mentioned, hypothetical Mediterranean macroregion in the image of other valued, tried experiences at EU level, such as the Baltic or Danube Strategies.



The Medgovernance experience: Teachings and challenges for a better cooperation in the Mediterranean basin

As we have repeatedly explained, the present report is part of regional initiatives derived from the Medgovernance Project, a project for territorial cooperation within the MED Programme for interregional cooperation, which has taken place from March 2009 to August 2011, with the participation of six Mediterranean European regions (Andalusia, Catalonia, Lazio, PACA, the Piedmont and Tuscany), together with their training and research institutes, and backed by the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions. Focused on 2020 Strategy priorities, its aim is to reactivate and re-evaluate the opportunities for progress in the Mediterranean, by evaluating cooperation tools and mechanisms in the Mediterranean Basin, within the Multilevel Governance framework. The

Medgovernance Project establishes a series of sectoral priorities: transport, competitiveness and innovation, the environment, culture and research.

The Medgovernance Project might have been more fruitful, if it had not had to overcome a complicated political context. Aside from the situation in Northern Africa, the successive political changes in some participating regions, after the first constituent declaration by Mediterranean Presidents in Marseilles, have prevented a continuity that might perhaps have meant an even greater political impulse. The personalities we interviewed have helped us to identify two stages: after a first impulse when the project was newly created, interest in the project has (only) remained constant.

Nonetheless, the project has had a noteworthy technical development, as we can see from the large amount of programmes carried out (some have been particularly dissected in the third chapter of this report) by the different partners in specific thematic areas, a fact which, from the Andalusian standpoint, shows the region's Mediterranean vocation, and affirms it with indisputable force. Even so, and beyond the absence of a large-scale Mediterranean strategic approach, the Medgovernance Project process has identified some inevitable, but avoidable, instances of malfunctioning in which Andalusia faces the challenge of increasing the impact and efficacy of her participation in future projects: we must improve internal coordination in European initiatives and projects in concurrence with other regions (this is applicable to Medgovernance, but also in general).

We must however not be pessimistic in this sense regarding Andalusia, as the regional administration is conscious of the need to strengthen sectoral internal coordination, as shown by its active commitment, in the recent creation of the Andalusian Territorial Cooperation Observatory (OCTA), a project of the General Secretariat for Foreign Action in the Presidency Department, approved within the 2007-2013 ERDF Andalusian Operative Programme and financed by the

European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). OCTA is a pioneer experience, motivated by institutional awareness of the need for a better communication of information on sectoral projects and initiatives in which the different departments participate, in matters of European territorial cooperation and neighbourhood. Together with its coordinating dimension, the OCTA aims at other related action areas: assessment, publicity, information and evaluation. The Andalusian administration will have the task of making the most of its participation in European programmes for territorial cooperation.

The Inter-Mediterranean Commission (IMC) of the CPMR has very relevantly, praiseworthy and plausibly backed the project from the beginning, by enhancing the confluence of political willingness. The project might even have been more successful, if it had paid more attention to IMC guidelines. Indeed, it also took part in the initial outline of the project through the Network of Mediterranean Institutes (RIM) grouping

the Institute of the Mediterranean (PACA), the Andalusian Three Cultures Foundation, the European Institute of the Mediterranean (Catalonia), the Paralleli Institute (Piedmont), the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in the European University Institute and the MAEM/MEMA network (Tuscany), and the Centre for International Political Studies (Lazio).

The participation of these institutes or centres for research and reflection is not unimportant, but a practice to be promoted, as high administrative officials insist on the need for specific authorities to assume a leading role in research and reflection processes, in matters of multilevel governance in general and their particular applicability to the Mediterranean. It is necessary to channel the formulation of proposals for

promoting regional participation in European actions aimed towards the Mediterranean space; the RIM has tried to do this up to now, but it might be a good idea to create an Institute or Research Centre expressly for this task. This institute might perhaps act as a centre for impelling and channeling the will of the different partners, thus obtaining better acknowledgement and visibility.



European Groupings for Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs): Unknown quantities in the present, potential for the future

The possible, foreseeable growth of EGTCs, a very new idea from the European Commission for the development of regional cooperation, must also be reflected on, not only by the regional Andalusian government or the sub-state governments of Mediterranean regions, but by European regions in general. In this sense, any analysis should ponder the obvious advantages but also the risks in the initiative. It would also be a good idea to consider if it is the ideal solution at Mediterranean scale.

According to information from the Territorial Policy Ministry, there are now twelve actual or projected EGTCs in which some Spanish regional, local or other legal entity participates. As we explained in the second chapter of this report, six are on the Portuguese border, five are on the French border and a very special one, ARCHI-MED or Mediterranean Archipelago, includes different islands or archipelagos in the area, such as Balears, in a very interesting, eminently Mediterranean proposal or initiative for cooperation.

Indeed, the Territorial Administration Ministry, limited by European regulation on the list of possible EGTC members, simply verifies that proposals comply with what was legally established for their constitution in 2006. EGTCs are therefore very unequal and heterogeneous in their composition, as they can be made up of very powerful regions, or a few local entities, or even legally constituted institutions such as universities.

Regarding the Spanish experience, as compared to other European countries, EGTCs in the latter are the outcome of previous cooperation processes, and so replace other cooperation mechanisms such as Working Communities, Interreg Programmes or Euroregions; this has not been the case in Spain, so a large number of EGTCs have proliferated in a disorderly manner, not replacing older cooperation formulae but co-existing, and sometimes overlapping, with them. It would therefore be a good idea to reflect seriously on the model we need.

Although the model developed by EGTCs with Spanish partners has a predominantly technical profile, in order to justify the survival of other more political formulae, EGTCs will foreseeably be very important, both from a strategic, politic point of view and regarding mere project management. The main potentials to be conveniently exploited are:

- 1) A double or variable dimension, making them useful for larger or smaller businesses at lower costs.
- 2) A long life.
- 3) Greater visibility.
- 4) The chance to assume funds from different sources and of different natures.

Even so, EGTCs can also mean or imply some risks (besides those mentioned in the case of Spain) derived even from their success: all the advantages mentioned could be a strong temptation for some regions' developing competences to which they are not entitled, and that might affect matters reserved for the States they are a part of. So the EGTCs' greatest danger might be the intention of taking them beyond their own limits.

Given the analyzed framework and the proliferation of EGTCs with Spanish partners, it is noteworthy that an AR as relevant as Andalusia has not yet implemented any. This, however, is not an incongruous stance, but a matter of political opportunity. Andalusia does not deny the potential of EGTCs, but has opted for a slower process, after 25 years' experience in cooperation through European programmes with other European re-

gions, crystallizing in May 2010 in the Alentejo-Algarve-Andalusia Euroregion. Its evolution, and the need for joint service management, might mellow the Euroregion into an EGTC. By then, the tool might be more defined, its regulations might have been reformed, and today's overlapping may have disappeared.

The future regulation revision may precisely open the door to EGTC participation in macro-regional strategies, and to the possibility of implanting it at Mediterranean scale. In this sense, it would be a good idea to distinguish between groupings made up of Member States and those made up of entities in third countries. In the former case, the EGTC has indisputable cooperative potential, especially under a selective geographical approach limiting its scope to specific areas (Western space, Adriatic-Ionian space, for example). From an ambitious perspective, it would be a future challenge to examine the added value that might be derived from using the EGTC as a mechanism for channeling macroregional strategies, thus giving a specific legal framework of reference to the commitment of jointly managing common policies. As to EGTCs including entities in third countries, among the recommendations made by the CoR regarding the regulation revision, express mention is made of the need to promote their participation, by associating it to regulations mentioned in Instruments for Pre-admission Assistance (IPA) and for Neighbourhood and Association (ENPI). This possibility, which would in practice endow the EGTC with an extraordinary potential for deepening and extending cooperative culture, would have the drawback of the regulative asymmetry of the respective States, making it necessary to adapt to the different legal frameworks.



Macroregional strategies in the Mediterranean: many ideas still to be specified

The analysis of macroregional strategies is very much in line with the above. It is impossible to ignore the exhaustion derived from the multiplicity of projected formulae. There have been many proposals or conjectures on the possibility of formulating a full macroregional strategy in the Mediterranean Basin; however, none has really taken shape, due to the complexity of the area. First there were hypotheses about a great Mediterranean macroregion, discouraged by the scarce stimulus from high political powers and the stagnation of the Barcelona Process (lately renamed Union for the Mediterranean); then there were others suggesting integrated areas for specific action, such as the Western Mediterranean or the Ioannina Strategy in the Ionian Sea; finally others proposing the division of macroregional strategies between the Southern and Northern Mediterranean.

At least two factors have prevented the consolidation of any of these possible strategies: the fragmentation of Mediterranean interests among the different EU, non-EU European and North African regions; and the fact that the EU has recently put a stop to the proliferation of macroregional strategies. Indeed, there are not only different proposals coming from the Mediterranean sphere, but also from the Atlantic Arc (in which Andalusia might have a place) and even the North Sea.

The EU has frozen all these processes for the time being, and does not wish for the proliferation of new ones until there are results from the two strategies sheltered and backed by the EU, that is, the Baltic and the Danube, which are furthermore not at the same stage of development. The much more advanced Baltic Strategy is better coordinated, and although the new financial perspectives (2014-2020) will be crucial, it seems to be satisfactory in the eyes of the European Commission. The Danube Strategy is also on the right track, although facing more important challenges due to the fact that it includes territories in less traditionally cooperative, less developed States.

The European Commission is now therefore much more skeptical, much stricter regarding new initiatives: in order to be contemplated, they must face new challenges by contributing tools that might be clearly and definitely useful. They must therefore respond to an external motivation, independently of political questions, and assume the Commission's three no's: they must involve no more funds, no more institutions, no more legislation.

In this sense, it seems that in the myriad Mediterranean proposals there has been more debate on the instrument itself than on its function. It would be a good idea to think about the strategy's goals

first, and then what tool to use for implementing it. Right now there is no choice but to make the Mediterranean Strategy match the pillars of the 2020 Strategy (R&D&I), promoting sustainable, inclusive growth in the Mediterranean Basin with special attention to the environment, but not forgetting very up-to-date matters such as prevention and integration regarding migrations.

Because of all the above, and within the framework of the opportunities we have explained, the most plausible are those initiatives whose priority is to amalgamate, summarize and give coherence to all these macroregional initiatives in the Mediterranean Basin. As we stressed both in the second and the fourth chapter of this report, the Integrated Mediterranean Strategy (CPMR, 2011) is being debated by the IMC as we write. There being as yet no document, no definite stance, the CPMR, aware of the difficulties for determining the common, decisive outlines of the Mediterranean Strategy to be presented to the EC within the redefinition of European cohesion policy, but also aware that it is time to discuss the new financial perspectives for 2014-2020, proposes: a) insisting on the need to include local and regional entities in the previous consultation process and in the hypothetical implementation of the strategy by the EC; b) working on connecting macroregional strategies to European cohesion policy, as the latter, together with the European Neighbourhood Policy, must act as transversal instruments involving other sectoral policies of interest for common development in the area; or c) linking the launching of an all-inclusive macroregional initiative in the Mediterranean to the

political contribution derived from the Barcelona Process and the UfM, and also the more technical contribution of the ARLEM.

So the idea is to join forces, not scatter them, by configuring a coordinated strategy avoiding functional duplication and overlapping initiatives. And at the same time, promoting the synergies derived from current cooperative experiences, which should crystallize in a macroregional process developed through strategic actions and projects with the cooperation of all governance levels. Even so, in spite of this very interesting CPMR initiative, we must point out that its success may depend on external factors (which are not very supportive right now), such as the extraordinary political instability in the Mediterranean Basin.

Despite all the above, the “three no’s” policy has its loopholes, and the Mediterranean EU regions (such as Andalusia) are in a better situation than others. The “three no’s” need not prevent the creation of non-European instruments. This is where macroregional strategy (probably at a lesser scale than the Mediterranean Basin as a whole) meets the new EGTC instruments. For example, if the confluence of funds gave way to better efficacy, and the Commission could reward it, it would be possible to contemplate co-financial taxes, which would then justify the creation of an instrument for carrying out that function, just as the creation of EGTCs themselves have been justified. Andalusia faces a challenge, an unequalled opportunity, as it is much nearer than many other European regions to non-European territories for co-designing these new mixed tools.



Participation in interregional associations: Quantity in search of quality

Full macroregional strategies (Mediterranean in this case) and EGTCs may be considered the very latest in tools for cooperation and regional mobilisation. However, it would be an unforgivable mistake for European and Mediterranean regions in general, and Andalusia in particular, to forget about traditional formulae for participation and association at European scale, in the framework of theories presenting regions as the third governance level in the EU, within multi-level governance. Beyond the difficulties derived from asymmetrical powers due to the different capacities enjoyed by sub-state entities in each European country, we have looked at European regional forums for action in general (the EU Council of Ministers and the Committee of the Regions, and also the Assembly of European Regions, the Group of Legislative Regions, the Conference of Legislative Assemblies of the Regions of Europe or the Association of European Border Regions, among others), and also the specific Mediterranean regional forums for action (the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, or the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly).

Andalusia has shown considerable interest in participating at European and also at Spanish level. In comparison to other regions on the Mediterranean shore, Andalusia participates amply in different interregional associations; in fact, she is a member of practically all of them to date. So participation itself is no problem; now the challenge is to develop qualified participation: that is to say, not to be content with just being a part of these associations. Andalusia has to assume responsibilities, leadership and activism in those associations, even if that means leaving some forums of lesser interest for the region.

Andalusia might firstly reflect on the challenge of leading some of these organisations, and holding some of their executive offices as a formula for including Andalusian interests in as many actions as possible. So Andalusia could offer to participate in their political and executive bureaus, to chair relevant committees or work groups, and even hold offices of relevance and visibility such as presidencies or vice-presidencies. Leadership is undoubtedly a costly strategy in financial and personal terms, but it means publicity and visi-

bility both within and without the region. Outside the region, it would present Andalusia as a responsible, trustworthy partner; inside, it would involve citizenry in the region's participation in different institutions and organisations: right now, only very well informed, concerned Andalusian citizens know that the region is a partner in different interregional associations. Mere participation would become visible leadership.

Besides the question of leadership, any European region can also be active by hosting events. Andalusia could make the most of her magnificent participation in the 2010 Spanish Presidency of the European Council, during which no other Spanish AR (except Madrid, the region in which the capital city is situated) hosted so many events during the semester: more than double any other

except Catalonia. Andalusia might take advantage of that recent activity, and offer to host the annual conferences or general assemblies held periodically by these associations, or even shelter general secretariats, which would give added value, recognition and visibility not only inside the regional territory but also before other partners.

Notwithstanding all the above, and due to the cost of the strategies suggested, Andalusia should first select priority areas and organisations, among those showing the most interesting thematic profile as to the concerns of both the political elite and the citizenry. In short, Andalusia might reflect on the advantages of working towards a higher-profile regional involvement, but focused on the areas of greatest sectoral interest for the AR.



Financial perspectives and cohesion policy: Possibilities for action within a framework of decreasing opportunities

Neither Andalusia nor many other Mediterranean regions should ignore a vital question the negotiation and/or modification of which has lately begun in Brussels. We are referring to the negotiation of financial perspectives for 2014-2020, which will in turn influence and greatly determine the possible reform in some degree of the European Cohesion Policy; this policy is vital for some Mediterranean regions which, due to the last decade's adhesions, will at best face a decrease in funds. The budget ceiling determined by the European Council will be decisive; forecasts

obviously are not optimistic amid the current worldwide economic crisis, aggravated by symptoms of exhaustion, mainly among net contributors, regarding the subject of European cohesion.

The EU budget up to the end of the decade has been the subject of negotiations for some months, and should be agreed on by Member States in the European Council by the end of this year or in 2012, in order presumably to establish the new financial perspectives for the seven-year 2014-2020 period. This agreement will determine the bud-

get ceiling, but also the distribution of resources among the great European policies. According to regional, national and European officials in Brussels, it looks like the CAP will continue to be untouchable, whilst some cuts will foreseeably be channeled through European Regional or Cohesion Policy. But not only regional policy but also some of its collateral or adjacent tools might be affected: namely, the budget for EU foreign action, especially for Neighbourhood Policy, which feeds the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation funds.

Aside from the very important budget revision, cohesion policy might undergo, if not a deep revision of goals and tools, a series of consequential adjustments. Right now the debate is what to do with European regions that have been receiving a large amount of European funds, and will no longer be eligible in the next period under the Convergence category (up to 75% of the average European GDP), but will not be able to reach the Competitivity category (precisely over 75%) due to that same cut in funds. Eighteen European regions (including the Spanish regions of Castile-La Mancha, Galicia and also Andalusia) affected by this situation have carried out economic analyses (already presented to the EC) on the setback and the negative effects of a sudden cut in European funds, and requesting the alternative "soft landing".

The European Parliament and Commission are currently working on an intermediate category between Convergence and Competitivity, a kind of Transition category which would include regions between 75% and 90% of the average European GDP; this category would receive fewer funds

than Convergence but more than Competitivity. The eighteen regions do not like this solution, which would not be especially beneficial for them; they are afraid they will have to dispute funds with regions which have long been at levels of 85-90% of the average EU GDP, and have had the chance to receive a specific phasing-out treatment and would be the most benefited by the reform, thus limiting the viability of transitional phasing out for others such as Andalusia. Of course Andalusia, which does defend the idea of a transition period for regions exiting the convergence objective, seems very concerned about this matter (and has indeed been defending it, both within the EC Public Consultation framework and during the regional president's visit to Brussels in January 2011), and has been involved in lobbying together with other European regions in the same situation, particularly Castile-La Mancha and Galicia: Andalusia feels close to these regions not only in this matter, but also in terms of cooperation. Political and technical empathy with an adjacent neighbour like Castile-La Mancha, and Galicia, a partner in common Atlantic strategies, is very convenient⁵¹.

Beyond this capital question, we must bear in mind that cooperation is the third goal in cohesion policy; it does not look like being suppressed, and though its funds are the least (only 2.85%), this is still a considerable amount, foreseeably about 34,000 million euros, very much to be taken into account by regions desiring to make an even softer landing outside the convergence objective. Not all regions pay special attention to this category, but it is especially recommendable for Mediterranean regions including Andalusia:

51 While this report was being revised, on 5 July 2011, the European Parliament was backing the European Commission's proposal of creating the new category of intermediate regions between 75 and 90% of the average EU GDP per capita, which can include Andalusia, and the advantages of which will be seen when the new category comes into effect, within the new pluriannual financial frameworks (2014-2020).

three-fourths of its funds are for cross-border cooperation, which an AR like Andalusia not only cannot ignore, but must exploit in her double condition as an overland frontier with the Portuguese regions of the Alentejo and the Algarve, and a maritime frontier with Morocco.

Aside from specific relations with Morocco (analyzed at different levels in chapters 3 and 4), Andalusia might benefit from the effects of even deeper cooperation with Portuguese border regions, by carrying out the so-called “cooperation for absorption” theories, which defend cooperating in order to receive funds in regions in other countries, thus indirectly benefiting a region like Andalusia. Although Andalusia cannot absorb more funds than it already does (its indices are, as in most Spanish ARs, among the highest in the EU), it is possible to cooperate with other regions, so the latter can absorb European funds that can benefit Andalusia by generating jobs to relieve regional unemployment, or building infrastructures and communications to revive trade and business opportunities with cross-border regions. This possibility has not been sufficiently exploited yet, but it is an obvious opportunity for Andalusia.

Similarly, the opportunities derived from revolving funds must not be ignored. These are funds which have not been absorbed (mainly by unprepared Eastern European regions), and instead of returning to the treasuries of net contributors, can go to cooperation programmes with other regions capable of absorbing them, thus benefiting

regions which set an example. This is another opportunity for regions which, like Andalusia, need to relieve their decreasing reception of European funds.

Andalusia, as the other ARs, is an example both in obtaining funds and in absorbing them. Thanks to these strengths, it is possible to make one last point, a recommendation on the advisability of strengthening even further some of the other phases in the reception of European funds. We are referring to a strengthening of auditing mechanisms, after absorption within the execution phase, and later, to the need of ensuring long-term impact. That is, beyond the necessary task of obtaining funds, regional progress derives from the impact, the output of these funds in the regional territory. We are referring to the “leverage effect” of cohesion funds, defended incidentally by the Andalusian President in the CoR: the need for funds to have a leverage impact for promoting, generating or enhancing autonomous regional development, and a growing independence from European funds which undoubtedly will keep dwindling to negligible percentages. Funds used for improving communications, especially the high speed trains crossing the AR, are a good example, good practice, as they stimulate regional growth and development (they are not the fish but the rod). The regional challenge comes from the execution of similar projects with similar impact, not only in the vital sector of transport and communication, but in others of special relevance for Andalusia such as immigration and tourism.



The mediterranean area: high politics versus regional cooperation within the 2020 Strategy framework

Both the second and the third thematic blocks in the present report (Chapter 3: *The Mediterranean area: A traditional scene of regional relations and interaction*, and Chapter 4: *Mediterranean and Andalusian cooperation and priority actions within the framework of Strategy 2020*) tried to shine a light on some interconnected matters regarding the Mediterranean Basin as the scene of relations and interaction. Both chapters stressed the need to separate high politics from cooperation policies; political initiatives at the highest level, such as the Barcelona Process or its subsequent UfM are stagnated right now, and there is also the fact of democratic revolutions in the

Southern Mediterranean. Cooperation policies are more technical and decentralized, much closer to the citizenry, and represent the validity of the regional level as a more productive sphere for action. Beyond a general analysis of the Mediterranean as a whole within the 2020 Strategy, including obstacles, challenges and priority action areas, but also specific cooperation projects and programmes (preferably referred to the Andalusian case, as a basic example for analysis and study), both chapters illustrate the more general conclusions through the very necessary, special relations between Andalusia and her southern neighbour, Morocco.



The present and the future of Mediterranean cooperation

The Mediterranean space has witnessed an ever-growing regional cooperation, thanks to the willingness and the need for different European regions to join efforts for solving common problems. The different projects designed and executed by several groups of regions since the mid-nineties have promoted interregional cooperation in the most diverse fields and sectors, enhancing mutual understanding, the exchange of experiences and good practice, and the joint formulation of territorial policies for attaining the goals of regional European harmonisation and convergence.

From a detailed analysis of a series of European projects, carefully selected and included in the third chapter of this report, we may highlight a whole series of advances and conquests in regional and multilevel governance in the Mediterranean Basin. Among others, the following are decisive: a) the increasingly active participation of local and regional, public and private stakeholders, and the civil society of the territories involved in the projects; b) the consolidation, continuity and extension (new members) of several transnational partnerships and platforms for working together; c) the political and technical

consensus among the signatory regions of manifestos of intentions and joint declarations; d) the design of joint strategies and sectoral measures for application in the respective regional territories, based on a common methodology, attempting to bridge specificities and different competence levels; e) the awareness of the convenience and advisability of involving TMC regions in European projects, in order to promote North-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and enhance the participation of regional and local stakeholders from southern countries, with lesser opportunities for action due to their scarcely decentralized systems of government; and f) the constant learning of procedures for managing and coordinating European projects, thus enhancing the partners' co-responsibility in their execution.

There is still a long way to go, as some obstacles persist as challenges for the consolidation of a practical, efficient cooperation framework in the Mediterranean that might become an example to be considered at different levels, including EU: a) the need to promote the coordination of projects and actions to be carried out in the same sector, in order to join efforts, share experiences—good and bad practices—and avoid the duplication of actions in the territory, b) a growing publicity for current projects (calls, actions and results), in order to incentivize the participation of new partners; c) to ensure an effective ex-post evaluation of the projects, in order to guarantee constant learning and improvement, and also the conti-

nuity of actions in each of the regions once the projects have finished; d) to incentivize projects which vertebrate the territory by articulating the rest of the sectoral projects; e) the need to involve supranational, interregional cooperation authorities as observer members in the projects; and f) the possibility of offering specialized training in the management of European projects (including the very important matter of language) to technicians carrying out this task.

Whether or not the above recommendations are assumed, there is no choice but for the Mediterranean regions to develop a very well-structured strategy, in order to overcome “cooperation fatigue”, and obtain the necessary resources to avoid cooperation being branded as scarcely efficacious and wasteful, as some countries in different areas of the EU have been (interestedly) reporting. The Mediterranean regions should prove the trustworthiness and efficacy of the programmes they carry out, and link them to the success of the ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programme, which should be seen as the basic forum for joining synergies, and leading and guiding the long-term Mediterranean cooperation model. There seems to be no better formula for ensuring and promoting the EU's growing commitment to Mediterranean territorial cooperation, than a solid technical and political stance of the Mediterranean regions in general, in defence of territorial cooperation as a formula for progress and understanding among the peoples on both shores of the *Mare Nostrum*.



The Mediterranean, between technical cooperation and high politics

We have sufficiently expounded the handicaps currently faced by political integration in the Mediterranean Basin; the development and definition of useful, specific governance tools might be at least a temporary solution. At a historical time when it is very difficult for the EU to keep up a definite foreign policy for the Mediterranean Basin, due to political instability in Northern Africa, there is no choice but to link foreign to regional policy: in this case, the latter would tow the former. Clear, definite high politics in the Mediterranean are complicated right now, but there is nothing against getting things ready for the future using the tools the EU offers. So if the EU suggests cooperation policies for lands in faraway continents, there is no reason why these low-profile policies should not be used on the Euromediterranean border. These cooperation policies not only promote EU principles such as decentralisation and subsidiarity, but are perfectly compatible with other European initiatives such as neighbourhood policy, as a formula for exporting democratic values across our borders.

Organisations for political dialogue that have tried to look at the Mediterranean as a whole have met with an insurmountable obstacle up to now. Praiseworthy initiatives, such as the Barcelona Process and its subsequent Union for the Mediterranean, have become stagnated because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in their midst, which has ended up tainting, overshadowing and practically invalidating them. In a way, the Middle Eastern conflict has become mixed up with, and practically dominated, the Mediterranean process.

But the Mediterranean matter cannot and must not wither away just because the Middle Eastern conflict has unfortunately been unsolved for too

long. It would be convenient, even necessary, for the stakeholders involved to be able to distinguish between the (currently stagnated) political side and the governance process as a whole. This process cannot go into judgment of political questions, but neither can it stop, as it affects the development of peoples on both Mediterranean shores. Pre-adhesion, neighbourhood, decentralisation or subsidiarity are instruments which help to bring both shores closer, and have no relevant political connotations, but can bring obvious benefits.

So, neither associations nor projects for cooperation judge the political side. Euromediterranean regions can therefore cooperate in programmes of varying depth (for example, the environment and residue management in the Mediterranean), even if the countries they belong to do not see eye to eye as to their political stance regarding some Northern African countries. No matter if there are political obstacles between Northern Africa and EU countries, the EU cannot turn its back on the southern Mediterranean shore. And the development of down-to-earth cooperation formulae might be the way to bring the citizenries closer (for the time being, until conditions improve), and later become cornerstones for political integration. To sum up, the vicissitudes suffered by high-level relations between States on either side of the Mediterranean advise the promotion of interregional relations, often more technical, more practical and less conditioned by the international agenda.

Past estrangements in the diplomatic relations between Spain and Morocco, for example, need not paralyze Andalusian foreign action in the area. Multilevel relations should help to bring the respective national and regional legislations closer, when their differences hamper coope-

rative fluidity and ambition. (Just to name two examples, financial markets are practically absent from the whole Southern Mediterranean; and regulatory disparities are still the cause of legal insecurity.) The *near abroad* would not then seem so foreign. Spain can be a mirror for Maghreb; Andalusia, with all its contradictions, is an optimistic example of a virtuous social transformation. The very success the Spanish State of Autonomies, linked to the idea itself of multilevel democracy, could be an inspiration

for the model Morocco wants for Sahara; none of the countries in the so-called Group of Friends of the former Spanish colony openly rejects it, given the difficulties for a self-determination referendum. This model would force our neighbour to begin a territorial and political organisation process which might spread to the rest of the State, more similar to the Spanish than the French model; from the Medgovernance viewpoint, Andalusia would have natural partners in the Southern Mediterranean.



Andalusia and Morocco: a multilevel relationship

As we have shown in the analysis of specific projects included in the third chapter of this report, Andalusia has been promoting her role in interregional, transnational and cross-border cooperation in the Mediterranean, as a partner or project manager in many different European programmes and projects ever since the mid-nineties. European authorities and partners have often acknowledged Andalusia's work as manager in European projects. Andalusia has also promoted the idea of TMC participation, by including Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in several transnational and cross-border projects.

Andalusia's foreign action cannot, in any case, be excluded from the general picture of challenges faced by the Mediterranean, especially after the recent revolutions in the Arab countries on the southern shore which are positive on one hand, for advancement in their democratisation processes—a necessary condition for promoting Mediterranean multilevel governance—, but may also affect the usual development of general cooperation frameworks, altering the agenda because of the natural reconsideration of priorities demanded by domestic troubles.

From a preferably Andalusian but also general standpoint, action policies and strategies must therefore be worked on, starting from the priority sectoral lines drawn by Northern and Southern Mediterranean regions, in order to build a solid front enhancing their negotiation power for influencing the design of present and future European regional and foreign policy.

For their mutual benefit, relations at all levels between Andalusia and Morocco must necessarily advance and deepen. Neither government can afford not to make decisions as close as possible to the citizenry: Andalusia must see the recent announcements, regarding a possible regionalisation plan in Morocco, as an opportunity and a challenge.

Andalusian interest in Morocco, beyond specific opportunities, can be measured not only in economic but also in social terms. Understanding between Andalusia and Morocco might promote awareness regarding opportunities for investment on the opposite shore, which would lead to influence in the Moroccan economy and businesses. Training and specialisation for Moroccan workers would also benefit economic interaction. Deeper

cooperation between both partners would promote Andalusian social models, leading to social modernisation in Northern Africa and the presence of Andalusia's image in Morocco.

As we have explained above, some cooperation programmes and projects started at different levels with Morocco (namely the bilateral Spanish-Moroccan programme for Cross-Border Cooperation) have not really got off the ground, due to a mixture of political motivations when solving eminently technical problems. Despite Andalusian concern and interest, the ball is now in Morocco's field: this country has passed up important funds because of (mainly political) reticence towards cooperation. It might be a good idea to insist on the task of mutual acknowledgement as partners, leaving aside the relations between the Spanish and Moroccan States; the Three Cultures Foundation has been working on this for some time.

The events still going on since the beginning of the year in Northern Africa should foreseeably promote EU awareness and interest in the Mediterranean, not only as an economic opportunity, but also for reasons of image, and in order to project a greater, wider European conscience, as an instrument for countering the growth of Euro-skepticism.

Even though Morocco is now a country with smaller economic capacities than Spain or Andalusia, it would be a tremendous mistake to underestimate it, and for its European bordering region to ignore a growing consumer capacity which should necessarily come with economic development. The Mediterranean, indeed, has always been split by unbalanced progress on either shore. Spain now has a 14 to 1 advantage over Morocco in terms of income. The fracture is not only economic but also social, cultural, religious and political. For Andalusia, nothing would be better than co-development, harmonious growth on

both shores. Morocco, despite its scarcities, is an emergent country with good growth figures amid the worldwide economic crisis. It should therefore become a land of opportunity, rather than a menace for Andalusian interests and citizens. The current situation must be reversed, in which neither Spanish-Moroccan nor Andalusian-Moroccan relations have been what they should, for Morocco to be ready for replacing France by Spain and Andalusia as main references for action.

This is not going to be easy: Andalusian and Moroccan interests may not be complementary in all sectors. Both in agriculture and fisheries, their interests clash; it might be possible to create joint innovation poles that would become references for both. Not only agriculture and fisheries, but also tourism is also a subject for conflicts in interests. But above all these rivalries is the need to work together for our mutual benefit.

Andalusia, Spain and the EU are extraordinarily interested in Morocco and the Maghreb being prosperous, stable and democratic. So even if the 2020 Strategy belongs naturally to the Union, many of its challenges and projects would be extendable, through concertation and agreement, to the Mediterranean in general, in order to optimize all resources. Common interests on both shores are innumerable: their complementary population pyramids; their unemployment perspectives; the subject of energy and climate change; research, development and innovation; the environment. It would therefore be crucial for Andalusia to promote collective learning and synergies for the Mediterranean area. Just as in the case of European integration, Mediterranean integration should be built gradually through the creation of factual solidarities and solid common institutions. Only then will a greater economic, social and territorial cohesion be possible in the whole area, while maintaining the identity and personality of its peoples and of its different governance levels.





6

Appendices

interviews,
maps,
tables,
graphics,
bibliography,
documents...

Cristina Gutiérrez

Appendice I

Interviews

In order to carry out this report we have used, as sources of original importance, the statements collected in about thirty personal interviews, listed below in alphabetical order. The conversations, which took place between February and May 2011 in Seville, Cadiz, Brussels and Rome, turned on two different types of subject. One group of interviews (reference AND) focused on a series of selected European projects in which Andalusia has taken part, either as a partner or as project manager, together with other Medgovernance regions. We interviewed officials and technicians responsible for monitoring these projects, who were deeply knowledgeable on their features, goals and results. The other interviews (reference GEN) focused on the role played by the regions, particularly Andalusia, as the *Third Level* of government, with reference to angles such as the Mediterranean strategic area, International Cooperation and the 2020 Strategy, to name just a few. We interviewed different public administration representatives in Andalusia, Catalonia, Valencia, Galicia and the Basque Country; in the Three Cultures Foundation; in the Centre for International Political Studies in Rome; and in the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the European Commission's Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions. Also, at EU level, we interviewed different officials in the European Commission's Directorate General for Regional Policy. Each interviewee is identified with the office held at the time of the interview. Here is the list of references of these conversations:

Andalusia

(AND-1) Ismael Adán, Chief of research and planning in the Directorate General for migratory policy coordination. Andalusian Government Department of Labour, 23 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-2) Isabel Albert, Chief of grant and cooperation programmes management. Andalusian Institute of Arts and Letters (IAAL). Andalusian Government Department of Culture, 3 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-3) Maribel Bermúdez Jaramillo, Technical assessor. Directorate for European programmes and international cooperation in the Andalusian Innovation and Development Agency (IDEA). Andalusian Government Department of Economy, Innovation and Science, 21 February, 2011, Seville.

(AND-4) Ana Compañía, Management technician for grants and cooperation programmes in the Andalusian Institute of Arts and Letters (IAAL). Andalusian Government Department of Culture, 3 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-5) Nicolás Cuesta Santiago, Andalusian Government delegate in Brussels, 9 March, 2011, Brussels.

(AND-6) Carmen García Rivera, Chief of the Underwater Archaeology Centre of the Andalusian Institute for Historical Heritage (IAPH), Cadiz. Andalusian Government Department of Culture, 18 March, 2011, Cadiz.

(AND-7) *María Godoy*, Technician in the Andalusian Government's Delegation in Brussels, 9 March, 2011, Brussels.

(AND-8) *Ezequiel Guillén Hortal*, Chief of training and actions in fisheries and fish-farms. Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research and Training (IFAPA). Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 10 March, 2009, Seville.

(AND-9) *Andreas Hildenbrand*, Chief of regional planning and landscape in the Secretariat General for Territorial and Urban Planning. Andalusian Government Department of Public Works and Housing, 11 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-10) *Noemí Molina Sanz*, Advisor on international projects for the Public Enterprise for Agriculture and Fisheries Development (DAP). Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 21 February, 2011, Seville.

(AND-11) *Mercedes Moyano Gala*, European projects technician. Regional planning and landscape service of the Secretariat General for Territorial and Urban Planning. Andalusian Government Department of Public Works and Housing, 11 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-12) *Inmaculada Ortiz Borrego*, Chief of the cattle trails bureau. Andalusian Government Department of the Environment, 3 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-13) *Sophie Pasleau*, European projects technician. Regional planning and landscape service of the Secretariat General for Territorial and Urban Planning. Andalusian Government Department of Public Works and Housing, 11 March, 2011, Seville.

(AND-14) *Juan Pizarro Ríos*, sectoral planning section Chief, Directorate General for Fisheries and Fish-farms. Andalusian Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 21 February, 2011, Seville.

(AND-15) *Celia Rosell Martí*, Chief of institutional relations and interregional cooperation in the Secretariat General for Foreign Action. Andalusian Government Presidency Department, 25 March, 2011, Madrid.

(AND-16) *Carmen Sillero Illanes*, Vice-director of international programmes. Directorate for European programmes and international cooperation in the Andalusian Agency for Innovation and Development (IDEA), Andalusian Government Department of Economy, Innovation and Science, 21 February, 2011, Seville.

(AND-17) *Three Cultures Foundation*, e-mail dated 23 April 2011.

General

(GEN-1) *Eric Dufeil*, Chief of Unit Regio F1 (Germany and the Netherlands) in the Directorate General for Regional Policy of the European Commission in Brussels, 10 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-2) *María Jesús Garea*, technical specialist in cohesion policy in the Galician representation bureau in Brussels, 10 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-3) *Marta Martín*, director of the Basque representation bureau in Brussels, 11 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-4) *Josefina Moreno Bolarín*, Executive Secretary of the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions in Rome, 12 May, 2011, Rome.

(GEN-5) *Paulina Orrego*, technical specialist in cohesion funds for the Catalan representation bureau in Brussels, 10 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-6) *Juan Prat i Coll*, director of the Catalan representation bureau in Brussels, 10 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-7) *Ana Ramos*, director of the Catalanian representation bureau in Brussels, 10 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-8) *Juan Manuel Revuelta*, director of the Valencian representation bureau in Brussels, 11 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-9) *José Antonio Ruiz de Casas*, Director of European programmes in the European Transnational and Interregional Cooperation Unit of the European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy in Brussels, 11 March, 2011, Brussels.

(GEN-10) *Andrea Stocchiero*, Coordinator in the Centre for International Political Studies in Rome, 11 May, 2011, Rome.

(GEN-11) *Jordi Torrebadella Aguila*, Director of European programmes in the European Commission's Directorate General for Regional Policy, Unit: Spain, 10 March, 2011, Brussels.

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